thepupil

I was being sarcastic. I have to drive through there to see my in laws in rural NY. I take the longer beltway to avoid going through Harrisburg as I can get cheaper heroin in Baltimore. where the actual property is has decent demographics though. https://datausa.io/profile/geo/camp-hill-pa my point was that this property was not significantly higher in quality to the rest of CDR's portfolio.

Cedar sold a 97% occupied grocery anchored strip center outside of the booming metropolis of Harrisburg Pennsylvania for a 6.5 cap / $90 million. This along w/ the $115mm 10 yr mortgage they got in May significantly de-risks the balance sheet (the mortgage used a 6.7% cap rate for LTV purposes). On a $1 billion EV, the mortgage financing ($115mm) and asset sale ($90mm) are significant real world validations/de-risking events. The balance sheet de-risking and the obtaining of board seats by hedge fund / external shareholders are why I bought more of Cedar over the last few months, generally at higher prices than where I had previously sold. this is a different trade than when it was in the $3-$5 range (speaking in new post reverse split terms) where one had multibagger upside). From the Q1 call.

probably best IR that SRG has done in my time following it. Seems like a legitimate strategy shift and that she understands the problems and will take the necessary steps to address them. reading tea leaves, seems like a big portfolio sale of non-core is coming (rather than the slow bleed) is coming. I think the downside scenario of just a slow bleed where they fully fund mediocre developments while selling one off assets for 7 caps, all the while paying any meager value creation to berkshire, is a lower probability than before new mgt / Olshan came on. i think they could help themselves by disclosing more info on the 6 sub portfolios as she is asking investors to value those and is trying to highlight the value thereof. It would be easier if they broke down the portfolios by revenue / NOI, but perhaps they won't need to if there's a big asset sale coming.

$31mm is the quarterly revenue, not yearly. as of last q, SRG's properties had $31mm of revenue ($120mm annualized), $20mm of property taxes and operating costs ($80mm annualized) or $40mm of net operating income on an annualized basis. They have about the same in corporate g&a costs ($40mm /year). things will presumable get better as they lease up the properties, just a question of how quickly they can. I don't really follow what you're talking about regarding the stuff about multiplying revenue.

https://www.corelogic.com/insights-download/homeowner-equity-report.aspx there's also some good stuff here regarding home equity and typical LTV

https://constructioncoverage.com/research/where-residents-have-paid-off-homes#:~:text=According to Census Bureau data,to rise significantly during recessions. it's surprising to me, but 38% of homes are owned free and clear, but looking at the data, a lot of that is on the lower end (example West Virginia has the highest amount of free and clear homes, but that's with a median value of $85K). Proud Maryland resident, where only 16% (the lowest in the country) don't partake in the leverage!

From 3/30/2015 FIH total return: 7% in USD (1.1% / yr) MSCI India 62% in USD (8.1% / yr) MSCI India Small Cap 85% in USD (10.4% / yr) Price to book: 1.2x ---> 0.7x, w/ peak of 1.4x and trough of 0.4x in covid depths Almost any publicly traded investment company is destined to eventually trade at a big discount and go from loved to hated to maybe loved again. I need to play a little catch up and missed buying this at the juicy lows, but probably not a terrible time to have a look at this given the long term underperformance and sentiment correction (from premium to discount). BVPS has gone from $9.5 to $18 since 6/2014, so it's not like it's destined to destroy value. But price has really mattered. If you paid a big premium, your return probably sucked. If you got a big enough discount/bought into bad macro, you probably are sitting on a decent IRR.

I pulled Berkshire's annual for year ended 1998, when 10 yr treasuries yielded 6% and were very much positive / real. Berkshire was running very low duration back then too. Buffett has always had the 70's seared in his mind and seems to have been on the wrong side of the long duration trade for decades. I am not saying he is wrong. I think the cash / very ST FI makes sense in the context of the rest of his portfolio. But I don't think Berkshire is positioned any differently today than 5,10,20+ years ago. So I think his strategy is consistent. Run an overcapitalized insurance company. Don't take (much, if any) duration/credit risk. Own equities. I don't think it has to do with the current inflationary trends of 2021.

I don't endorse or recommend them, but yes, there is another way besides HELOC to pull equity out of hose without it being a (traditional) loan. You can get a shared appreciation agreement which is actually a 2nd lien loan where you receive cash and the interest rate is equal to a percentage of the home's appreciation. In the US, the main vendors are Point, Unison, and someone else. I don't know about Canada. You have no payments until you sell the house, or in some cases for 10-30 years. When I ran the numbers, the likely APR was too high and it didn't seem favorable. I'd only do this if I was desperate for cash or had a VERY negative outlook on the value of my house, since this is the only way to "short" your own house's value. If my house were to go up another 20% (+55% from 2019), all else equal, I may consider it. I am currently closing on a HELOC that's Prime -0.25% for first $50K (3%) and Prime -1% for the next $100K (2.25%), which seems pretty good to me. It's with Third Federal. Again not relevant for Canadians, but in case of use for Americans.

Not a bad 6 months for this group of overcapitalized high-ish quality securities. I must say that I'm having trouble getting too excited about stuff lately. Not going to cash, and been buying large cap tech / the chinese tech holco's/proxies (Prosus/Softbank etc.), but don't feel quite as chipper about the portfolio right now. FMBL: +20% LAACZ: +18.5% BRK/B: +22% EQC: -1.6% WEAK! BSM / DMLP: +35%, +26% GOOG, FB, MSFT: +33%, +23%,+15.5% EQR/AVB/CPT/ESS/MAA: +29-32% SPY: +10.9% VT: + 9%

my 22 bps my 22 bps in APTS calls which give me 17% notional exposure @ $12.50 which give me like 136% exposure to the appreciation of sunbelt RE on an asset basis approves of this message.

the largest category <10% is not what I would have expected. lots of renters (or people w/ high LTV's) or people w/ some big equity portfolios here! if your hypothetical COBF poster 20% down on a $500K house/condo a few years ago = $100K, let's say that house is up 20% since, so that's $200K of equity (not counting t-costs), to be less than 2% = $2mm net worth, which I'm sure many posters have (or much more) but not a huge %. scale the house $$$ up or down for various metro areas, or whatever, but nevertheless surprised <10% is 40%

even penciling this out, it's hard for me to get there: $800mm senior mortgage @ 4.5% / 30 yr amort = $50mm / year of debt service $400mm of mezz at 10% PIK = $40mm / year. $1.6B of common equity (following a $400mm raise) $2.8B EV this cuts interest expense to $76mm, you'd have $30mm of g&a, so $105mm of carrying costs, let's say you get NOI to $150mm w/o much capex as a bunch of things lease up, so that gets you to a like a 3-4% FFO yield ($150mm -$76mm-$30mm) which isn't at all interesting. At $200mm NOI ($200-$105mm= $95mm) = 18x FFO, myeh. and you still don't have that much to fund development with / still reliant on external capital

I agree w/ Greg /#3 and in fact see this as a potential (positive) catalyst for SRG but also one that cuts off the tail upside scenario to a degree. I think a reasonable outcome would be Berkshire converts its $1.6B loan to 2 instruments: and $800-$1B loan that attaches to the stabilized portfolio and is prepayable at par with asset sales / and or refinancing. you could justify a 5-6% rate for this (2% above market to pay berkshire for the trouble of providing a scale solution) and then some sort of mezz/pref that enjoys a higher return. You pay off the senior w/ mortgages/asset level financings over time (probably can't do this all at once, Berkshire is basically providing a senior bridge loan to permanent financing. it's honestly confusing to me why SRG hasn't been doing any partial paydowns w/ mortgages, I would think Berkshire would approve getting 60 cents back on the stabilized asset value as it would still have a lien on the equity of any property and would de-risk. That leaves $600-$800mm. Think you raise $200-600 million to add more equity to cap structure via rights offering/ equity offering and use to fund development, pay off the berkshire mezz w/ asset level financings from that. you'd end up w/ 20-50% more shares and a more sustainable cap structure that can self fund development.

primary home + publicly traded RE (loosely defined) gets me to about 50%