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bobozou

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  1. I'd like to (subjectively) think 'no, each progress downturn would not be worse than the last, and require ever-larger bailout mechanisms, ad nauseum'
  2. Thanks for bringing this up - below are my simple thoughts, but feel free to let me know what I'm missing: Pros: 1) Given mgt's assessment of the value of non 77-Greenwich assets (circa April 2018)+ implied value of 77-greenwich (which is lower than April 2018 estimates, but may still be ~$2K/sqft) + current share price = attractive valuation 2) Recently announced $5M share purchase plan 3) MFP + 3rd Ave are large stakeholders (fwiw) Cons: 1) Management doesn't own significant stock / CEO also seems very highly compensated for $100M valuation (granted, company valuation used to be higher) & activities (buying & developing real estate)? 2) Management track-record (at TPHS) of real-estate deals seem... crappy-to-OK (at best)? A) 237 11th, purchased early 2018 for $81M... currently <50% leased, bc they discovered construction defect... ouch B) 223 North 8th, purchased via JV late 2016 for $69M (50/50)... currently 100% leased... annualized rental revenue is $3.2M (before expenses)... seems 'meh'? C) 250 North 10th, purchased via JV late 2019 for $138M (10/90)... TPHS received financing at 7% to fund this transaction Conclusion: 1) There's probably 'value' today (contingent upon what non-77 properties are worth, and what 77's ultimate sale prices will be) 2) Bigger question is what management plans to do with all that potential 'value'... fear is that they're more interested in building NYC RE empire, rather than finding opportunistic value-enhancing purchases. Correct me if I'm wrong, but the 3 acquisitions completed to-date don't inspire my confidence
  3. well - that seems like a relevant datapoint :'( may I ask where you obtained this info? (public filing/confidential source/etc)
  4. Agreed, the sale price seems like a dramatic discount to market price (even adj 15M remittance shares to $0)?
  5. Thanks that's helpful! They also left a VM for me, indicating that they plan to send K-1 information to brokers 3/15/19 (I probably got the info from brokers in previous years)
  6. That's helpful, but to be clear the site/mailer I'm referring to does not provide an individual's k1 for laaco, but rather the theoretical k1 for a theoretical unitholder who owns a single theoretical unit. I will reach out to company and report back, but if anyone else is also suffering from the same hallucination, please let me know.
  7. Tax season question I think in past years there was a website I could go to get LAACO unit-level K-1 information. Understanding that 2018 K-1's may not yet be ready, does anyone else know what I'm talking about and can point me to the site (maybe it wasn't a site, but was something that was sent)? TIA
  8. I personally believe the potential brand-impact of a 'consumer healthcare company' that knowingly sold dangerous goods to consumers (with end user being babies) is extremely negative. Personally, this news is pretty much up there in terms of 'ickiness': 1) energy companies lie about global warming - I get it, did anyone expect otherwise? 2) agrochemical/pesticide companies lying about potential harmful impacts on human population - ok sure, that makes sense 3) consumer health company pretty much intentionally selling very harmful products, intended for babies - ummm, just wow (maybe I'm being nieve)
  9. Apologies ahead if I missed something obvious, but it appears to be trading at close to (slightly below) book value; what makes you say it's at 40% discount to NAV?
  10. I'm not a lawyer, but management tweeting about a potential management buyout isn't a violation of (any) securities laws? I thought that's what 8k's were for...
  11. I'd also agree that CVNA is the closest analog Market Size: CVNA obviously deals in a much larger market (Used Cars) than RMBL (Used Motorcycles) Competitive Dynamics: CVNA has to deal with existing players (CarMax & other used/certified dealers) and new entrants (future peer-to-peer facilitator? Amazon?)... my uneducated view of motorcycle market is that it's less liquid and less efficient Sourcing: CVNA sources primarily from auctions... RMBL is sourcing from individuals (more profitable and less efficient) End Customer: CVNA is selling primarily to consumers... if RMBL is selling primarily to dealers right now, then I think there would absolutely be margin-expansion opportunity to go direct-to-consumer Ancillary Products: Agree w KJP that CVNA will likely make up bulk of pre-tax margin from additional products (financing/warranty)... don't see this being big income stream for RMBL (maybe I'm wrong) / but if RMBL can continue to source from individuals & effectively sell direct-to-consumers, then I'm not really worried about the unit economics FWIW, I think CVNA's valuation seems aggressive, more aggressive than RMBL's (tho CVNA absolutely deserves credit for their execution thus far). If RMBL is successful (big if), they would essentially dominate used motorcycles - there's probably significantly more value in the stock, if that outcome is realized (no doubt, far from certainty). Honestly though, this management team is not the type that self-proclaimed risk-averse, value-investors would take home to meet the parents :p https://www.inc.com/magazine/20030201/25127.html
  12. 1) LFvalueseeker... I also appreciate the posts and information. Also agree that you've provided alot of information related to this idea (more than most, for most ideas). 2) Re -> promotionalism... It may just be a matter of style. Some people say/write things with conviction (sometimes excessive). Some people write with a degree of uncertainty (sometimes excessive). I feel I've seen just as much hype in Tesla, Sears, Amazon, probably Berkshire/Fairfax too. I think it's a bit harsh/critical to be layout out accusations, rather than focusing on the analytical problem (of the business/founders). 3) This is not a traditional value investment. It seems more akin to a high-risk bet, but with asymetrical payoff. I think that they are trying to do a workable business model (low/no-touch platform to provide liquidity) in a underserved market (2nd hand motorcycles). The model has certainly derisked from 10-20 years ago, as proven by the used car market (and the number/success of entrants). The management team seems far more legitimate to have a far more successful track-record than most microcaps (tho the CEO is probably not a 'value-investor', as much as he is a 'salesman'... not a bad thing at all, but some may find him 'promotional'). Could it be a fraud? Yea I guess so Could they fail to scale (due to lack of demand / excessively high acquisition costs)? Yea, quite possibly Could the economy go south prior to them reaching profitability? Yes, and that would likely be very bad for stock Could it work? Yes, I dont see why not Would it be an asymetrical payout of it does work? Yes, I believe it will be Oh yea - most importantly, (as it goes without saying?) caveat emptor?
  13. +1 KJP Thanks for the great thoughts and analysis
  14. NBL0303 - fwiw, I'm sympathetic to how rationally you are approaching this position (separating the value of the company/stock, and the risk of Biglari... at some point ANYTHING can be an attractive buy) That being said, do you feel like you are, more-likely-than-not, in a situation where the fiduciary is (far) MORE interested in shifting value from minority shareholders to themselves, rather than growing the pie (and taking an outsized portion of it)? Without the impetus to act with even the veneer of respectability, behaviors can deteriorate still further, ever more rapidly... I have no dog in this fight. I find myself detesting the behavior of one/more of the actor(s) involved. I don't want to influence your buy/sell decision, but am curious how you're quantifying the above possibility.
  15. Jurgis - I think I'd agree with everything you said, even/especially the last part that he is not building the next buy&hold-forever/berkshire. That being said: 1) Though he is no bastion of fiduciary responsibility, he has never gone out of his way to screw shareholders. On the spectrum of Buffett/Malone/Biglari, I think Jonas is very much akin to a Malone. I'd trust him with my capital, just not 'buy & forget'. 2) Like you said, he does a lot of different businesses. My sense is that he's out 'looking for a bargain' (rather than empire-build). STRP's spectrum was a (very) successful example. Genie was a less successful example. Jury's out on the pharma-investment, but I wouldn't be surprised if he did buy-in on a 'good deal'. 3) I have no opinion on his progeny-CEO's, with rabbinic training (Admittedly, I was more skeptical before STRP went parabolic; and to be fair, I wonder how much my degree-in-engineering really taught me anything relevant to what I do today. FWIW, Howard Jonas has the academic pedigree, but maybe he also felt that formal education/degree is not strongly relevant to real-world skills). For me at least, the sheer number/variety of undertakings, the success-rate of the undertakings, and the magnitude of the successes create a positive association in my mind. Lastly, I think the quirky, rebel-sympathizing, do-things-differently part of me is sympathetic to Jonas's eccentricities :) Writser - thanks for the note/correction on building capex & noncontrolling interests
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