Lemsip

I thinks the error is due to the wrong B share equivalent as of Dec 31 used in your table. Per the 10-K it should be 1,543,960 A share or 2,315,940,000 B share equivalents ( page K-107 of 10-K). The B share number for Dec 31 in your table should be 1,350,043,471 rather than the one used. That will help get to the correct figure as your A share number for Dec 31 is correct from the 10-K.

I don't think your calculations are correct as your share equivalents correspond to mine but your dollar amount calculations seem too low. They had already purchased $4.4b worth by 17th Feb if you use 233 as the avg price per b share till then

Roughly $5b quarter to March 3 reducing share count by a further 0.92% since Dec 31.

I think it is fair to consider these if you are looking at an estimate of earning power. Obviously for valuation purposes, the public securities portfolio is quoted regularly so the maket's valuation is included in book value. Berkshire owns 5.4% of Apple and as it stands you would not be able to get an accurate picture of Berkshire's true earning power derived from its Apple stake as only dividends received show up on the income statement. In comparison, KHC earning power is regularly reflected on the income statemen due to equity accounting although the form of ownership is essentially the same with a 26.4% ownership in this case. The issue is whether Bloomstran is being aggressive in the numbers he is using. I don't think he is. The 2019 Annual report had a table at the start of the letter which shows the retained earnings for just the top 10 portfolio holdings were $9b. Bloomstran uses $10b for the entire portfolio a year later so it doesn't look like he has applied unduly optimistic values here.

9% in USD and 5.65% in GBP. Happy with that. Was largely inactive all year ( including in March). Sold down a bit of BRK after the AGM where Buffett appeared spooked. Should've held. Best performers - NKE, GOOG Just 2 MKL, DEO had YTD losses. Positioned OK for next year although have to constantly resist the urge to trim NKE ( approaching 3x from my buy price of $51 in 2017).

In 2019 they were repurchasing till March the 29th so I don't think this is an issue.

100% replay of his IBM language. Sure it will be reduced steadily to zero this year.

Berkshire is down more than 7% in Frankfurt right now so a big one might be on its way.

For Berkshire the key issue is not whether this is a bubble ( I personally don't see it at current interest rates and equity valuations). They key issue is with the amount of cash they have accumulated and lacking reinvestment opportunities, this is time to use for returning capital to shareholders. That needs to be a far more important part of the allocation process than it hitherto has been. Certainly, most other money managers would not be afforded luxury the building up hundreds of billions of shareholder cash waiting for the phone to ring. Also, it is a myth that Buffett only invests when there are market dislocations. He wasn't particularly aggressive in 2008 ( focussing mainly on preferred fixed income type arrangements) nor in 1987 ( when he did nothing) or 1999. He was also totally inactive in Q4 2018 when the market dived 20% - a rare event. The key current capital allocation issues are size and shrinking universe and a hesitation to aggressively repurchase even when Berkshire has been cheap. Sitting on cash waiting for a future meltdown involves too much faith in specific future events and is also limited by Buffett's age and the lack of anyone else at Berkshire who can claim any experience allocating sums of this amount.

As someone with almost a 50% position in Berkshire, I agree that the capital allocation in the last 5 years has been sub-par and frustrating to an extent. Since the end of 2014 - Cash has doubled from 58 to 116 billion ( not 128 as reported in the media) Operating earnings generated and retained have been 93 billion ( virtually all cash) About 37bn of this capital has been deployed in sizeable new deals - $22b for PCP ( rest by debt) , $5b new commitment to KHC and $10b in OXY preferred. PCP has been subpar as earnings seem to be static since 2015, KHC has been a disaster and OXY should work out OK but is unlikely to move the needle at Berkshire. His straight equity deals have been better with exiting IBM, loading up on Apple and building a JPM position basically looked good. Buybacks in size - as in 2011- have been an opportunity missed due to thumb sucking and overly complicated self imposed rules. I think at the current price, Berkshire continues to be safe and bullet proof but I am not comfortable with a move to a market timing operation of hoarding cash sitting around waiting for a market event when the allocation model is totally centralized to 2 90 year olds. Market timing is iffy at the best of times but especially if practised by a couple of guys for whom time is the one thing they have a decreasing amount of with each passing day. The next rung of capital allocators have no experience or track record of handling anything like the amounts of capital that will needs to be allocated if all earnings continue to be retained. I do feel that one of the aspects that the market is not pricing is the possibility that allocation will become more rational post Buffett in that management will be less bound by self imposed constraints in returning capital to shareholders via buybacks. New deals may also improve since the Buffett model of wait for the phone to ring will not work for others so that operation may need to be a bit more proactive. These last 5 years have included 2 periods of weak markets - 2015 and 2018 and the 2018 plunge was pretty brutal so it is not as if it has been a market going straight up without any opportunities for rational buybacks in size or other purchases.

It is $442m buybacks according to the 10Q. I notice seekingalpha has an inaccurate summary where they say the buyback was 8.29m B shares whereas it actually is 1.76m

Interesting that they detail the expense (money spent on stock purchases), but not the effect (shares purchased and retired). Usually, when companies frame it like this (indifferent to cost), you know they are not out to really maximize shareholder returns. 90% of all the companies doing buybacks seem to be like that. This information is in the 10-Q ( under "Purchases of Equity Securities by the Issuer and Affiliated Purchasers") which should be released in a few days. In the last 10-Q it is on page 45 where the number of shares and price are shown for each month in the quarter.

Berkshire, close to London, in the UK

I think some British papers are massaging the headline to cater to a local audience. Buffett gave his standard response "we will be happy to buy outside the US" and obviously being the FT, the questioner made it more specific and he obviously obliged. In the past one of the issues Buffett has pointed out in the UK is that the reporting threshold for ownership positions here is 3% and he has said in the past this is a issue since they like to take large positions and this would alert others prematurely but he considers this a jurisdiction he understands well. On another note, I don't see Rolls Royce as a viable candidate. Currently it is a well known brand but not a great business with zero growth, loads of debt, highly variable earnings and high capital intensity. it has a 3 part business strategy that includes the phrase "transform the business". If that does not keep Buffett away I'm not sure what will. It may be a good cigarbutt candidate though but Buffett doesn't do that anymore.

Mine was in an ISA so no need to keep records for tax purposes and BRK.B gave me the added advantage of no dividends to reinvest and pay withholding tax on, giving me a further advantage over an S&P500 index fund. There turned out to be other advantages over the equivalent index fund investments based on what I could fund with the proceeds in 2014-2015 when the index was lagging considerably, perhaps more by luck than judgement. Same here. As of 6th of April the entirety of my large BRK position is in ISAs with a little bit in a SIPP. No capital gains ever. Per the BRK proxy, after my latest buying spree at a recent cost basis of $198 ( between July 18 and Feb 19), I now own more shares than one of the BRK directors ! If I had to pay capital gains on the accumulated gains there it would be an uncomfortable amount - that is what compounding over more than 15 years and full use of ISA allowances will do for you ! I will need to sell a bit from time to time to fund living expenses from next year but fortunately do not have to consider tax consequences. So all academic studies of performance vs S&P etc notwithstanding, BRK has definitely worked very well in setting things up comfortably for me. Of course it has also hedged against the local currency shenanigans over the last 3 years as an added bonus.