mevsemt

On relative attractiveness, it all depends... With LSXM there is finally a "pure" SIRI tracker. Since LSXM is trading at a discount, it makes much more sense for SIRI to "buyback" LSXM shares (instead of SIRI shares). If this happens, the NAV discount on LSXM will disappear and LSXM and SIRI would likely merge. This could happen relatively soon... With LMC the NAV discount is certainly attractive, but the path to collapse the discount is likely several years or more into the future. In the meantime, I expect LMC to buyback their own stock. Also, on a look through basis, LYV is certainly not the typical subscription-business / levered-equity-shrink (although I do think LYV is moderately attractive at these prices). With BATR it's all about the hidden asset(s), and these come in 2 forms. First is the real estate, and who knows what that's worth... Second is their minority stake in MLBAM / Tech BAM, and again, it's really not clear to me how much it's worth, but it could be a lot.

Mike- LMC's intergroup interest in the Braves matters because it's not reflected in the share count of BATR. An easier way to think about it would be as follows: 80% of BATR is represented by 34.5 million shares, so you could pretend there are really 43.1 million shares outstanding (34.5/80%) and LMC simply owns 8.6 million shares (43.1-34.5). The way it's presented in the slide deck shows LMC owning 20% of BATR after the rights offering has been conducted. So, I could be wrong here, but my interpretation is LMC doesn't have to put up any additional capital to maintain their 20% ownership (perhaps this is because their intergroup interest isn't represented via actual shares).

Look at page 7 of the same presentation... LMC will have a 20% intergroup interest in BATR (I think this stays at 20% even after the rights offering), which corresponds to $205 million of the NAV. So, the discount then becomes: 1 - 592 / (826 - 205) = ~5%

For LVNTA it's not just about the "static" valuation and discount to NAV, it's also about the structure... For example, let's say you have the following: Assets: 120 Debt: 20 NAV: 100 Then one year later the assets have appreciated 10%: Assets: 132 Debt: 20 NAV: 112 So, 10% appreciation in assets leads to 12% appreciation in NAV (of course it can go the other way as well). Now, let's add another layer... assume the market cap is 80% of NAV (80), and assume that we're comfortable keeping our debt:assets ratio constant, with all incremental debt going to buybacks. Assets: 120 Debt: 20 NAV: 100 MC: 80 Share Count: 100 PPS: .80 Then one year later: Assets: 132 Debt: 22 NAV: 110 MC: 88 Share Count: 97.6 PPS: .90 So, we took on 2 of debt and used it to buyback stock at the average market cap (84), which means we retired about 2.4% of share outstanding. In the end, our stock went from .80 to .90, giving us per share appreciation of 12.7% (vs. asset appreciation of only 10%), which is pretty powerful, especially if the underlying assets are appreciating at a faster pace...

Well, hopefully they'll figure out a way to make the deal work... Another idea is they could offer both LiLAC AND LBTY shares in proportion to the relative values of CWC's operating assets and tax assets. It's possible CWC shareholders will be given an all stock option (which will make it tax efficient for Malone) as well as a cash/stock option. BTW I wonder if LiLAC could use CWC's US tax asset to shield gains from selling their Puerto Rico business... Remember, the PR asset currently has potential synergies that can only be realized by a US company (i.e. CHTR).

When thinking about how a potential deal could be structured, don't forget CWC's tax assets ($5+ billion of UK capital losses and $3+ billion of US trading losses). Now, these assets are currently "stranded" at CWC since they have no UK/US operations. LiLAC wouldn't be able to use these assets either... at least not directly. But remember, LiLAC is a tracker, so I suppose it's possible for LBTY to send cash over to LiLAC to help fund the deal, and then immediately after the deal is closed LiLAC could send the UK tax asset over to LBTY. Essentially, this would "un-strand" the CWC UK tax asset since LBTY would be able to use it...

TeddyLampert - yes, I was using mgmt's revised guidance to figure out Q4 adjusted EBITDA. I also generally agree with loganc's comments - the conservative way to look at this is just to assume all cash from operations is used to retire debt. If you then assume modest EBITDA growth from a base of 600 MM in 2015, it's pretty easy to get to a pps around $60 at YE 2017 (and that's assuming 61 MM shares outstanding). BTW, I'd also note that Q3/Q4 results are pretty bad, so using these to determine an annualized "base" EBITDA could turn out conservative. If you just look at the legacy operations, plus the adjusted EBITDA announced with each acquisition, you get an annualized EBITDA around 645 MM (btw I'm not saying they'll get back to those levels, although I suppose it's possible). Anyway, for the next year or two, it's my guess that's Stiritz will focus on paying down debt. After that I think he'll try to maintain debt/EBITDA somewhere between 4.5x and 5.5x. Assuming EBITDA is growing, that means every year he'll take on incremental debt to maintain the leverage ratio. This incremental debt, along with free cash flow, will be used to boost returns to equity holders (either through acquisitions or buybacks). Assuming I'm right, and depending on the sustainability of this "perpetual-LBO," the returns for shareholders could end up being pretty good...

I'm using 51 shares b/c the TEU's convert to equity in June 2017 (depending on the price of the common, the TEU conversion will add between 4.9 and 6.0 MM shares). Also, for this stock to be interesting, we'd have to be looking at a share price in the 50's or 60's 2-4 years out, and if that's the case then at least some of the convertible preferred stock will convert to common (the 3.75% Series B has an effective conversion price of 47.19, and the 2.5% Series C has a price of 54.12). As for how I got PF EBITDA for POST (w/o MFI, AB, or PowerBar), I just looked at YTD results w/o MFI and FY guidance w/o MFI to back into management's guidance for Q4 adjusted EBITDA. I then determined Q3 adjusted EBITDA (again w/o MFI). Since this is a fairly stable, non-seasonal business, I think it's basically OK to just assume the first half of the year looks like the last half, so I just doubled Q3+Q4 adjusted EBITDA to get FY EBITDA. I think you have all the info you need in the Q3 earnings report, although it definitely gets confusing with all the noise from acquisitions.

If you're trying to back into the annualized EBITDA assuming a full year of results for recent acquisitions, the 512.5 MM is too low because 1) the 260-270 MM only includes partial year results for the acquisitions made before Michael Foods (Dymatize, Golden Boy, Dakota), and 2) it looks like PowerBar wasn't included (which is expected to close Q1 2015). Here's what I'm getting for annualized EBITDA by segment: POST plus all acquisition made before MFI: 281-301 MM MFI: 242-262 MM PowerBar: 15-17 MM AB: 14-16 MM Total: 552-596 Plus: Modesto plant closing: 14 MM MFI synergies: 10 MM Grand Total: 576-620MM Current share count: 51 MM Max future share count, depending on conversion of TEU's and preferreds: 61 MM Net Debt (based on Q3 balance sheet w/ cash reduced for PowerBar and AB): 3695 MM

Yeah... Sorry about not reporting holdings, but I think it's the right thing to do, and thanks for the kind words!

I haven't sold any since I first bought back here: http://mevsemt.blogspot.com/2013/05/what-just-happened.html

Has anyone seen this video on Tesco in South Korea? It wouldn't surprise me if SHLD is trying to develop similar capabilities with SYW. Also, if they can build something similar and offer the service to other retailers who share space with them (Whole Foods, Trader Joes, etc.) it could really be interesting...

Here's my write up on stra from when I purchased it back in May if anyone's interested: http://mevsemt.blogspot.com/2013/05/what-just-happened.html -mevsemt

Just a quick comment on the short interest/squeeze dynamic... Under some circumstances a short squeeze can have a real impact on the value of a company. For instance, (and this only happens rarely), an inflated stock price can be used as currency for acquisitions... Now if only there were a good example of this happening - perhaps this will suffice: http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0411190237nov19,0,6287747.story mevsemt.blogspot.com

I think it's a squeeze...remember this sucker jumped from $28 to $80 in a couple of months a couple of years ago. And I thought the short position was even tighter this time around. I would not be surprised to see it hit $70-75 again, and if you get some good news...watch out! I'm not selling this one like the Overstock options...it's going to be my year-maker! ;D Cheers! Remember though, part of the reason behind the 28-to-80 jump was the real estate sales and the announcement of the SHOS spin. Granted, the short squeeze element was also a huge factor. See this post from way back when: http://mevsemt.blogspot.com/2012/02/cause-loser-now-will-be-later-to-win.html