ASHM - Ashmore Group PLC

[klarmanite]

I noticed that Odey has a 3% + short position here. Which I don't really understand since I can't help being very bullish on ASHM long term myself. Valuation is fairly undemanding also. Anyone familiar with the gist of their short thesis?

[constructive]

Could be a pair trade against the long position in Man Group. Or a bearish view on emerging markets. Or something specific to ASHM.

 

http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/09/tiger-cubs-short-nokia/

[cr6196]

I noticed that Odey has a 3% + short position here. Which I don't really understand since I can't help being very bullish on ASHM long term myself. Valuation is fairly undemanding also. Anyone familiar with the gist of their short thesis?

 

Yes, I imagine they are expecting outflows due to general EM hijinks. It is also pretty difficult not to conclude that there isn't immense amounts of hot money in Ashmore's funds...at the start of the decade they were, at best, very small managing £250m. Now they manage £50bn which is, at least, very large.

 

I can see your point but: 1) it is very hard to get cash out of asset managers due to heavy insider ownership, there are quite a few London-listed asset managers in the same position and 2) if this isn't the peak for EM bonds I am not sure what could be...so lets say this isn't the peak, what more has to happen? Developed equities/rates would have to go back down, even more liquidity, Japan may disrupt things but I just can't see huge EM debt flows resuming. On top of that, we know that EMs are volatile, investors move in herds, and that some countries ran huge deficits and didn't really spend them on anything useful. That said, it looks like people were pretty interested at 320p so maybe it will just hold up here for a bit...I just can't see what the upside is though, def can't see it going above 400p over the next 5-10 years.

 

Edit: Forgot to add, their thesis on Aberdeen Asset Management is, most likely, something similar.

[klarmanite]

Another one we may disagree on I see  ;D

 

Excellent, some back and forth with intelligent people is the best way to see if my thesis holds up. Let me post the main points of my long thesis here later this week and we'll take it from there.

[klarmanite]

So the main points of my long thesis are the following (I'm assuming some familiarity with Ashmore's business here):

 

1. Ashmore has a scalable, very profitable business model with recurring income

 

2. Ashmore is out of favor because of negative EM flows. These fears are overdone. The long term outlook is good, not bad, even if not much could happen to earnings and cash flow in the short term.

 

3. Ashmore has sustainable economic moats

 

4. Ashmore has great management with lots of skin in the game. It has a culture that I like and recognize from great fund management companies: low fixed salaries, long term share based comp, not star driven but focused on long term team effort.

 

5. EM unrest has resulted in undervaluation. 

 

I will go through these points quickly below, one by one:

 

1. Fund management is a great business once a company reaches critical mass. I will not go into this in detail but this is self-evident. *In the case of ASHM, this is certainly the case. Looking at historical ROE, ROIC and EBIT margins (9 yr averages are 50%, 49% and 74% respectively), it is obvious that this is a truly great business.

 

2. Although negative EM flows in general have impacted AHM as well as the latest AUM report indicated, the media reports are misleading. First of all, the data most often quoted is EPFR data. This is an incomplete data set, because it doesn't properly account for investment flows from pension funds, sovereign wealth funds etc. Looking at IIF data, it becomes obvious that (for now) the media reports exaggerate the negative asset flows from EM. I suggest looking up the recent IIF flow report online for details. It is my contention that due to the make-up of ASHMS investor base, this is the most relevant data set, since ASHM has virtually no retail money. A whopping 81% of ASHMs AUM is from public and private pension funds and government sources. These assets are more long term and a lot stickier than retail funds. So the amount of hot money in ASHMs mandates is limited. Numbers from JP Morgan confirm the IIF estimates which show that it is retail money that has been flowing out for the most part in 2013 and 2014.

 

Admittedly, we don't know how long asset flows will be negative or how much worse things could get, or if institutional flows will turn more negative. But long term, the case for increased flows is good, not bad, in my opinion.

 

The reasons are:

 

a. EMs have less sophisticated capital markets which will evolve and grow over time. Low but rising disposable income in the local population will be supportive also. The BIS estimates that equity and debt markets in EM will grow from 28 Trn USD today to 79 Trn USD in 2020. My contention is that more sophistiocated, bigger EM debt and equity markets + growing disposable income in local economies means a big opportunity for ASHM.

 

b. That the developed world is dramatically underweighted in EM assets. If investors would have been properly weighted in EMs as implied by the MSCI  world index, EM weightings should have been 15-16% instead of a paltry 5% today. This is the equivalent of 4 Trn USD in debt and equity instruments. Ashmore has a market share of a little less than 2% of this (my numbers are not exact, but close enough).

Every percent increase in allocation to EM assets would mean about 800 Bn USD. If ASHM should maintain its market share on this 800 Bn, that’s 16 Bn USD in increased AUM. 10 x 16 Bn is 160 Bn…

Now of course, 160 Bn may be unlikely, but I think it’s obvious that with the severe underweighting and growing underlying capital markets, the ASHM opportunity is huge.

 

3. ASHMs moats are mainly cost and distribution advantages from scale and relationships with capital allocators and government officials that have been built up since Mark Coombs first got started in the 80s. These moats are very real (I know, I have spent a few years starting a small fund management company and have experienced first hand the barriers to entry in this business).

 

4. Mark Coombs is brilliant and owns 42% of the company. Reading interviews with the man (hard to come by mostly), you come away with a solid impression. He’s building something to outlast him, and is always thinking long term.

 

5. ASHM is undervalued! It has no debt, and about 20% of the market cap in cash, and looking beyond a P/E of 15 and an EV/EBITDA of 9 for 2014, it is actually very modestly valued. These multiples are «distorted» by ncreased investment in distribution capacity which has elevated costs temporarily. I expect a 15% increase in COGS and OPEX in 2014, and 10% increases every year after that in my forecast period thru 2019 (this increase shows that management truly believes in substantial further growth, btw). I am way below consensus on EPS for 2014 and 2015 (25 pence and 29 pence respectively) at 21 and 20 pence. This is mainly because I assume costs will rise, but also because I think that AUM stays flat this year, after which I assume 15% annual growth in AUM through 2019.

Based on normalized historical numbers, I think a fee margin of 0.85% on the AUM is realistic (marigns lately have been depressed because of larger than usual currency AUM inflows, which have lower margins). In my valuation I assume a gradual recovery toward the normalized fee margin of 0.85% by 2016.

In my model, EBIT will thus increase from about 185m in 2015 to about 400 in 2019. My numbers imply a reduction in EBITDA margin in the long term from 70% a few years ago to 60% or thereabouts.

Based on this EBIT estimate and other reasonable assumptions based partially on historical numbers and management guidance, I get a DCF value of 5.2 GBP:

 

DCF calculation

Discount rate 10.0 %

Terminal FCF gr. rate 3.0 %

Forecast period value 687

Terminal value 2,501

Net cash/debt 500

Equity value 3,688

Shares outstanding 707

Per share 5.2

 

 

Interestingly, if you assume no growth in FCF at all i the future, and use the avg FCF number from the last 3 years, you get a value 3.3 GBP, which means there is virtually no growth priced in today:

 

Avg FCF 2011-2013: 182

Disc rate 10 %

growth rate 0 %

plus cash 500

/ no shares 707.4

Base case fair value 3.28

 

 

So my conclusion is that ASHM is a good opportunity here. Sure, it can get cheaper if the shit really hits the fan with a debt crisis in China/emergin markets, but it is a fantastic company trading at a reasonable price. It may also be a takeover target in my opinion, but Coombs is unlikely to sell unless the price is sky high I think.

 

 

[skanjete]

Klarmanite,

 

Ashmore is a company I have been following for some time and I agree with your assessment.

Of all the fund managers focused on E.M., it strikes me as the most solid and qualitative one. As an aside : Peter Cundill also used the house for his E.M. investments.

 

Maybe some additional remarks :

- growth in the future will increasingly come from E.M. money itself, and not necessarily from developed world money being invested in E.M.

- In view of the economics of the sector and the quality of the company, the share price is not expensive. Nor is it dirt cheap. However, it seems that every few years there is some kind of E.M. crisis, and in such a climate there is every chance that the stock will be ridiculously cheap. So if and when there is such a crisis, it's a good name to remember. I have no position at the moment, but I would almost surely buy it during the next E.M. crisis. It's a way to play the E.M. in a very risk-averse way.

[klarmanite]

Thanks for your comments, I agree completely. Today the valuation is reasonable, but not a table-pounder. We have a modest position (5% of our AUM) today and are hoping for more trouble, in which case we will  increase our position substantially, probably by another 5%.

 

I left out the local fund sourcing angle, but agree with you that this could be a major source of inflows in the future.

[steph]

Hi,

This is interesting.

Do you know what the percentage of equity / cash / bonds under management is?

Do they have performance fees?

What are the AUM?

What is the cost/income ratio?

 

Thank you!

[klarmanite]

Hi

 

That information is available in recent company presentations, results and AUM updates on the company website.

 

http://www.ashmoregroup.com/

 

[cr6196]

So the main points of my long thesis are the following (I'm assuming some familiarity with Ashmore's business here):

 

1. Ashmore has a scalable, very profitable business model with recurring income

 

2. Ashmore is out of favor because of negative EM flows. These fears are overdone. The long term outlook is good, not bad, even if not much could happen to earnings and cash flow in the short term.

 

3. Ashmore has sustainable economic moats

 

4. Ashmore has great management with lots of skin in the game. It has a culture that I like and recognize from great fund management companies: low fixed salaries, long term share based comp, not star driven but focused on long term team effort.

 

5. EM unrest has resulted in undervaluation. 

 

I will go through these points quickly below, one by one:

 

1. Fund management is a great business once a company reaches critical mass. I will not go into this in detail but this is self-evident. *In the case of ASHM, this is certainly the case. Looking at historical ROE, ROIC and EBIT margins (9 yr averages are 50%, 49% and 74% respectively), it is obvious that this is a truly great business.

 

2. Although negative EM flows in general have impacted AHM as well as the latest AUM report indicated, the media reports are misleading. First of all, the data most often quoted is EPFR data. This is an incomplete data set, because it doesn't properly account for investment flows from pension funds, sovereign wealth funds etc. Looking at IIF data, it becomes obvious that (for now) the media reports exaggerate the negative asset flows from EM. I suggest looking up the recent IIF flow report online for details. It is my contention that due to the make-up of ASHMS investor base, this is the most relevant data set, since ASHM has virtually no retail money. A whopping 81% of ASHMs AUM is from public and private pension funds and government sources. These assets are more long term and a lot stickier than retail funds. So the amount of hot money in ASHMs mandates is limited. Numbers from JP Morgan confirm the IIF estimates which show that it is retail money that has been flowing out for the most part in 2013 and 2014.

 

Admittedly, we don't know how long asset flows will be negative or how much worse things could get, or if institutional flows will turn more negative. But long term, the case for increased flows is good, not bad, in my opinion.

 

The reasons are:

 

a. EMs have less sophisticated capital markets which will evolve and grow over time. Low but rising disposable income in the local population will be supportive also. The BIS estimates that equity and debt markets in EM will grow from 28 Trn USD today to 79 Trn USD in 2020. My contention is that more sophistiocated, bigger EM debt and equity markets + growing disposable income in local economies means a big opportunity for ASHM.

 

b. That the developed world is dramatically underweighted in EM assets. If investors would have been properly weighted in EMs as implied by the MSCI  world index, EM weightings should have been 15-16% instead of a paltry 5% today. This is the equivalent of 4 Trn USD in debt and equity instruments. Ashmore has a market share of a little less than 2% of this (my numbers are not exact, but close enough).

Every percent increase in allocation to EM assets would mean about 800 Bn USD. If ASHM should maintain its market share on this 800 Bn, that’s 16 Bn USD in increased AUM. 10 x 16 Bn is 160 Bn…

Now of course, 160 Bn may be unlikely, but I think it’s obvious that with the severe underweighting and growing underlying capital markets, the ASHM opportunity is huge.

 

3. ASHMs moats are mainly cost and distribution advantages from scale and relationships with capital allocators and government officials that have been built up since Mark Coombs first got started in the 80s. These moats are very real (I know, I have spent a few years starting a small fund management company and have experienced first hand the barriers to entry in this business).

 

4. Mark Coombs is brilliant and owns 42% of the company. Reading interviews with the man (hard to come by mostly), you come away with a solid impression. He’s building something to outlast him, and is always thinking long term.

 

5. ASHM is undervalued! It has no debt, and about 20% of the market cap in cash, and looking beyond a P/E of 15 and an EV/EBITDA of 9 for 2014, it is actually very modestly valued. These multiples are «distorted» by ncreased investment in distribution capacity which has elevated costs temporarily. I expect a 15% increase in COGS and OPEX in 2014, and 10% increases every year after that in my forecast period thru 2019 (this increase shows that management truly believes in substantial further growth, btw). I am way below consensus on EPS for 2014 and 2015 (25 pence and 29 pence respectively) at 21 and 20 pence. This is mainly because I assume costs will rise, but also because I think that AUM stays flat this year, after which I assume 15% annual growth in AUM through 2019.

Based on normalized historical numbers, I think a fee margin of 0.85% on the AUM is realistic (marigns lately have been depressed because of larger than usual currency AUM inflows, which have lower margins). In my valuation I assume a gradual recovery toward the normalized fee margin of 0.85% by 2016.

In my model, EBIT will thus increase from about 185m in 2015 to about 400 in 2019. My numbers imply a reduction in EBITDA margin in the long term from 70% a few years ago to 60% or thereabouts.

Based on this EBIT estimate and other reasonable assumptions based partially on historical numbers and management guidance, I get a DCF value of 5.2 GBP:

 

DCF calculation

Discount rate 10.0 %

Terminal FCF gr. rate 3.0 %

Forecast period value 687

Terminal value 2,501

Net cash/debt 500

Equity value 3,688

Shares outstanding 707

Per share 5.2

 

 

Interestingly, if you assume no growth in FCF at all i the future, and use the avg FCF number from the last 3 years, you get a value 3.3 GBP, which means there is virtually no growth priced in today:

 

Avg FCF 2011-2013: 182

Disc rate 10 %

growth rate 0 %

plus cash 500

/ no shares 707.4

Base case fair value 3.28

 

 

So my conclusion is that ASHM is a good opportunity here. Sure, it can get cheaper if the shit really hits the fan with a debt crisis in China/emergin markets, but it is a fantastic company trading at a reasonable price. It may also be a takeover target in my opinion, but Coombs is unlikely to sell unless the price is sky high I think.

 

The main points I would make is that your view is the consensus and ASHM isn't "out of favour" at all. The price has sunk into a channel but the company is very well supported, all of the points you make are well known by the market. At 12x trailing, the market is saying they are going to keep collecting AUM, just not as fast as before. The mean target for the stock is 392p (I would be cautious of using DCFs, they almost always overvalue these situations).

 

I am also not convinced by any argument on what investors should do and then taking a market share based on that (I would also be very cautious about projecting anything forward in USD terms). Just in terms of logic, it makes no sense. It is possible that they have sticky institutional money (I don't think they do, esp. after the last AUM report) but even then that is just an argument for why they won't lose money, not how they are going to grow. Basically, I don't see any argument which really says...here is why AUM is going to grow, here is why profit is going to grow. I would also add, EM crises take many years to get to crisis point, usually about three. We may have already started that process but that is just going to weigh on them in my view.

 

I also don't think they will get flows from EMs. For one, the reason why EM crises happen is because EM countries are borrowing and not building solid foreign currency assets. By definition, we know that they aren't saving. For two, local investors will use local managers. For three, when states are building the resources to offset inflows (Chilie) they aren't generally turning around and investing back in EMs, the point is that they collect $ assets. For four, currency movements probably aren't helping. Finally, even if we knew that this was 100% true, it seems unlikely that it will happen soon.

 

Anyway, we will see what happens when they report out next Tuesday. My guess is that they go below 325p.

[klarmanite]

"I am also not convinced by any argument on what investors should do and then taking a market share based on that (I would also be very cautious about projecting anything forward in USD terms). Just in terms of logic, it makes no sense. It is possible that they have sticky institutional money (I don't think they do, esp. after the last AUM report) but even then that is just an argument for why they won't lose money, not how they are going to grow. Basically, I don't see any argument which really says...here is why AUM is going to grow, here is why profit is going to grow. I would also add, EM crises take many years to get to crisis point, usually about three. We may have already started that process but that is just going to weigh on them in my view."

 

While I respect your opinion, I still disagree.

 

I am not basing my projections on market share or the numbers I showed. If I was unclear on that, my apologies. I wrote that I am optimistic because I perceive that growth is likely. Those numbers were an illustration of the potential, but is not the actual basis for my projections. You think it's unlikely. Fair enough. But I don't think your argument makes more logical sense than mine.

I think AUM and earnings will grow because of increased distribution efforts, good relationships with key capital allocators built over time and INCREASED flows to EM, for the structural reasons cited. MAybe not i the short term (1-2 yrs), but in the long term it is likely - in my opinion. Our different viewpoints is what makes a market...

 

As far as sticky institutional money, I think it's fair to say they do:

 

AUM by client type %

Corporations 4 %

Governments 39 %

Endowments 2 %

Private pension funds 18 %

Public pension funds 14 %

Fund of funds 1 %

Banks 4 %

Insurance 4 %

Sub-advisors 5 %

Permanent Capital Vehicles 1 %

High Net Worth investors 8 %

Sum 100 %

 

 

As far as recent outflows go, they're not that dramatic:

 

AUM (USD Bn) Q3 2013 Q4 2013 Change Q-O-Q

 

External debt 13.8 13.4 -0.4

Local currency 17.2 16.9 -0.3

Corporate debt 6.4 7 0.6

Blended debt 19.7 19.1 -0.6

Equities 5.7 5.3 -0.4

Alternatives 2.9 2.5 -0.4

Multi-strategy 3.3 2.8 -0.5

Overlay/Liquidity 9.5 8.3 -1.2

Total 78.5 75.3 -3.2

in GBP 47.9 45.9 -2.0

 

 

I am, as I wrote, way BELOW consensus for 2014 and 2015. I also think the stock is worth 5.2 GBP, not 392 GBP. My view is then obviously not identical to the consensus view (even if I say buy rather than hold or sell also). I disagree with the consensus estimates both on a 12m basis and in terms of ASHMs long term value.

 

How long an EM crisis lasts is unknown to us both. I don't think a rule of three years is especially reliable (the data set is too small to give any reliable indication and each crisis is unique) That said, you may be right and things could get much worse.

 

Finally, I very much hope the price falls below 325 or even 3 GBP (or even 2.50 for that matter). I don't give a flying diddly squat about volatility and would be very happy is this were the case  :D

 

Thanks again for your input, much appreciated.

[cr6196]

"I am also not convinced by any argument on what investors should do and then taking a market share based on that (I would also be very cautious about projecting anything forward in USD terms). Just in terms of logic, it makes no sense. It is possible that they have sticky institutional money (I don't think they do, esp. after the last AUM report) but even then that is just an argument for why they won't lose money, not how they are going to grow. Basically, I don't see any argument which really says...here is why AUM is going to grow, here is why profit is going to grow. I would also add, EM crises take many years to get to crisis point, usually about three. We may have already started that process but that is just going to weigh on them in my view."

 

While I respect your opinion, I still disagree.

 

I am not basing my projections on market share or the numbers I showed. If I was unclear on that, my apologies. I wrote that I am optimistic because I perceive that growth is likely. Those numbers were an illustration of the potential, but is not the actual basis for my projections. You think it's unlikely. Fair enough. But I don't think your argument makes more logical sense than mine.

I think AUM and earnings will grow because of increased distribution efforts, good relationships with key capital allocators built over time and INCREASED flows to EM, for the structural reasons cited. MAybe not i the short term (1-2 yrs), but in the long term it is likely - in my opinion. Our different viewpoints is what makes a market...

 

As far as sticky institutional money, I think it's fair to say they do:

 

AUM by client type %

Corporations 4 %

Governments 39 %

Endowments 2 %

Private pension funds 18 %

Public pension funds 14 %

Fund of funds 1 %

Banks 4 %

Insurance 4 %

Sub-advisors 5 %

Permanent Capital Vehicles 1 %

High Net Worth investors 8 %

Sum 100 %

 

 

As far as recent outflows go, they're not that dramatic:

 

AUM (USD Bn) Q3 2013 Q4 2013 Change Q-O-Q

 

External debt 13.8 13.4 -0.4

Local currency 17.2 16.9 -0.3

Corporate debt 6.4 7 0.6

Blended debt 19.7 19.1 -0.6

Equities 5.7 5.3 -0.4

Alternatives 2.9 2.5 -0.4

Multi-strategy 3.3 2.8 -0.5

Overlay/Liquidity 9.5 8.3 -1.2

Total 78.5 75.3 -3.2

in GBP 47.9 45.9 -2.0

 

 

I am, as I wrote, way BELOW consensus for 2014 and 2015. I also think the stock is worth 5.2 GBP, not 392 GBP. My view is then obviously not identical to the consensus view (even if I say buy rather than hold or sell also). I disagree with the consensus estimates both on a 12m basis and in terms of ASHMs long term value.

 

How long an EM crisis lasts is unknown to us both. I don't think a rule of three years is especially reliable (the data set is too small to give any reliable indication and each crisis is unique) That said, you may be right and things could get much worse.

 

Finally, I very much hope the price falls below 325 or even 3 GBP (or even 2.50 for that matter). I don't give a flying diddly squat about volatility and would be very happy is this were the case  :D

 

Thanks again for your input, much appreciated.

 

I didn't say it was a rule about EM crises, my point was that EM investor behaviour is unique. There is little retail money generally so herding tends to be particularly extreme. I.e. drips turn into floods overnight. There isn't a small data set, EM crises have been happening for 200 years. The difference is that EM flows today are basically all institutional which makes for severe herding. This is also why I think the money isn't sticky (also if currencies do depreciate, governments need to get $ from somewhere, the Ashmore argument is that these FX reserves will last forever...history suggests they won't).

 

The relevance about 320p is that, if you look at volume, it seems that most people who own this stock own it above 320p (the free float has traded multiple times over above 320p). What tends to happen in these cases is that as soon as it drops below 320p volume will drop off and it becomes extremely hard to make money because people sell every rally.

[klarmanite]

I don't think the causes of an EM crisis 50, 100 or 200 years ago is particularly relevant today. But that's my opinion and I respect the fact that people have other views.

 

As for the technical analysis argument, that is usually not part of my investment process and certainly not in this case.

 

 

[steph]

They have an amazing track record in attracting AUM. If they continue like this, the stock is clearly very cheap.

But without the growth it is not. Paying 4 to 5% of AUM for what is essentially a fixed income manager is expensive.

I must admit that their cost/income ratio is top of the class.

 

What scares me a little bit is that all those AUM are quite new...are they sticky? These are not long term client relationships.

[klarmanite]

Agreed. With no growth in AUM, the stock is fairly valued. It all boils down to whether you believe they can grow further. Thanks for a good discussion. It will be interesting to see what the results look like next week.

[klarmanite]

My numbers vs BB consensus numbers (see attachment).

[skanjete]

Ashmore disappointed the market somewhat with it's results.

But I suppose it's within the range of the estimation from Klarmanite.

 

There was a considerable currency effect which I prefer to consider separately.

 

One critical thought though : Ashmore has been good at attracting FUM over the last decade. But the competition did so to, and even more aggressively. The consequence is that the revenue they can generate from the FUM has been steadily declining, from about  1,25%/FUM (even somewhat higher), to about 0,67% right now. The revenue per dollar of FUM has halved in other words.

 

Because of their superior revenue/dollar FUM Ashmore historically deserved a premium in comparison with it's competitors.

For example : in 2006 Ashmore was valued at about 11% of FUM (which were growing strongly and very profitably) while Aberdeen Asset management (which had some troubles of it's own) was valued in that same year at about 1,55% of FUM.

 

Over the last few years, the difference in revenue generated from FUM has narrowed so that Ashmore generates 0,67% revenue/FUM while Aberdeen generates 0,58%.  The consequence of course was that the valuation difference is narrowing as well : Ashmore is currently valued at about 4% of FUM and Aberdeen at 2,25% of FUM.

 

I still consider Ashmore to be of higher quality than Aberdeen, but it is difficult to quantify this. Their valuation suggests  their FUM to be worth almost double the FUM of Aberdeen.

[skanjete]

Another thought, but not directly related to Ashmore :

did one ever read a report from a fund management company where it isn't stated that they did considerably better than their "respective benchmarks"?

 

Maybe these statements say more about the benchmarks and the people that invented them, than about the investment capabilities of the managers...

[klarmanite]

I think this was a non-event personally and doubled my position today. The price did not get quite as low as I had hoped, but I let greed get the better of me and bought today.

 

Short interest is quite high considering the low liquidity. About 30 days' volume well over 10% of the free float(insider holdings comprise over 50% of shares) according to the numbers I've looked at. That's interesting and a positive in my opinion.

 

On the negative side I also noticed that long time shareholder Lone Pine's stake is now below 3%.

 

/K

 

[klarmanite]

Article in the FT

 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13f8feaa-9dfe-11e3-95fe-00144feab7de.html#axzz2vgNwlztD

 

[klarmanite]

Interesting paper by the IIF

 

 

http://www.iif.com/emr/resources+3219.php

 

[klarmanite]

 

Read this, then consider pricing Ashmore for no growth is appropriate :)

 

Caged Tiger: The Transformation of the Asian Financial System

 

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MjI1OTI1fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1

 

[Guest ajc]

 

Read this, then consider pricing Ashmore for no growth is appropriate :)

 

Caged Tiger: The Transformation of the Asian Financial System

 

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MjI1OTI1fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1

 

Great read. Thanks for posting.

 

 

[klarmanite]

http://www.4-traders.com/ABERDEEN-ASSET-MANAGEMENT-9583548/news/Aberdeen-Asset-Management--Trading-update-18187692/

 

"Encouraging inflows to emerging market debt, high yield bonds and property have partly offset net outflows from our Asian and emerging market equity products, and we have seen further growth in the pipeline of new business awarded but not funded at the end of February."

 

ADN up 7% today.

[klarmanite]

EM flows improving in recent weeks

 

http://advisorperspectives.com/dshort/guest/Chris-Puplava-140405-Market-Update.php

 

Chart: Chris Puplava, Bloomberg