Picasso Posted February 7, 2016 Share Posted February 7, 2016 I'm sort of curious about the sell-side take on Constellation. There are no buys, eight holds and two sells. Looking back at the previous valuation history it definitely seems to be on the high side. I show a Bloomberg estimate of $20 CDN which seems high (seems like all these analysts report adjusted EPS estimates these days) but that would put this at 22x. Anyone long have a take on why the sell-side is wrong? There seems to be a new cult following of the stock given the low usage of debt/stock and Buffett similarities (along with new shareholders like Sequoia). I prefer stocks with sell-side hatred but I haven't seen anyone discuss why they're wrong, particularly as their estimates seem to line up with the threads thinking. Also what kind of long-term earnings growth are the bulls expecting here? Any other levers they can pull besides scaling into a new market (SaaS) which I'm assuming won't be as great as their previous strategy? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KCLarkin Posted February 7, 2016 Share Posted February 7, 2016 Anyone long have a take on why the sell-side is wrong? There seems to be a new cult following of the stock given the low usage of debt/stock and Buffett similarities (along with new shareholders like Sequoia). Analyst ratings don't reflect the 22% YTD drop. Here is what I have from Scotia: Target Price: $585 CAD (+26.8%) Sector Perform (Oct 29, 2015) 2015E Adj EPS: $16.80USD 2016E: 20.84USD 2017E: 25.75USD Current Price: $323.35USD P/E (2016 adj): 15.5 -- Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Picasso Posted February 7, 2016 Share Posted February 7, 2016 Sorry I was using USD by accident. I attached the average estimates in CAD. The sell-side, if you exclude a couple outliers, is saying the 52-week highs are fair value. You'd think they would be more in love when adjusted EPS goes from around a $1 to $28 in ten years. I'm just trying to get my arms around something that clearly compounds cash. The big things is the "adjusted" which is maybe no longer a good indicator of long-term earnings so we need to give it a lower multiple at this point. I understand the supposed moat but having a hard time verifying the long-term competitive advantage across so many different products other than a few anecdotal examples. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KJP Posted February 7, 2016 Share Posted February 7, 2016 Sorry I was using USD by accident. I attached the average estimates in CAD. The big things is the "adjusted" which is maybe no longer a good indicator of long-term earnings so we need to give it a lower multiple at this point. Why do you think eliminating the intangible amortization no longer reflects economic reality? Slowing (negative) organic growth? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Picasso Posted February 7, 2016 Share Posted February 7, 2016 Sorry I was using USD by accident. I attached the average estimates in CAD. The big things is the "adjusted" which is maybe no longer a good indicator of long-term earnings so we need to give it a lower multiple at this point. Why do you think eliminating the intangible amortization no longer reflects economic reality? Slowing (negative) organic growth? We're seeing slower organic growth but world economies have been weakening so I don't know how to interpret that. There's a big gap between trailing 12m net income and adjusted net income so just trying to get my arms around the right multiple for the adjusted net income. So far the adjusted net income has been a good indicator of cash generation but I'm wondering if anything has changed. Otherwise you can see on my estimates screen grab that it's trading low-mid teens adjusted multiples going out a couple years and obviously that would mean the stock is getting inexpensive here. It would be nice to understand the products beyond some anecdotal information. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Schwab711 Posted February 7, 2016 Share Posted February 7, 2016 I'm a big fan of Mark's writing and CSU seems like a shareholder-friendly company for both equity holders and acquired businesses [and I'm usually pretty careful about handing out that compliment]. Just started doing a deeper dive. I still think they are too expensive right now but I'd like to be comfortable with them in case they continue to decline. I haven't finished reading through the thread but a few initial questions: 1) What happened to operating margins in 2011 and beyond? Seems like they recovered some in the past 12-18 months but they nose-dived from 17%+ to 10%+. 2) Why is service revenue declining while license/maintenance rev is up >10%? Seems like these should grow relatively proportional to each other. Could it be a negative sign or just normal variance? 3) Why is the valuation so high for a collection of software businesses with little cross-sale opportunities? Is there an argument for any "platform value" here (for a lack of a better phrase)? I like their acquisition strategy but CSU sells for ~2x as much as what I think their individual companies would trade for. Their individual companies kind of remind me of FICO's software business, which has a dozen software titles that are #1 or #2 in their niche and earns similar margins (maybe a little higher). A collection like that is not unique and they don't garner much more than market multiples. 4) What is long-run organic growth? I think 0%-5% is a fair estimate (not overly conservative) and I'm not sure how many more acquisitions they can do that will move the needle while keeping the historic risk profile (they seem to prioritize stable businesses, which I like). 5) What is the argument for adding back amortized acquisition costs? This gets into the VRX debate, but I just don't think it's conservative accounting so I'm interested to hear why others do it. If the businesses really do remain relevant beyond the amortization period then profits will increase at that time. In my opinion, adding back these costs distorts the discounting that should be done, which inflates value. I'd obviously rather buy the stock on a fair multiple of net income and sell it when net income begins to approach adj EBITDA (many years from now). 6) Does anyone have projections for how much of the amortized charges will convert to permanent software maintenance expenses after the amortization period? Is 25% reasonable or should I model for closer to 75%-100%? My thinking is that as the software ages they will have to pay to "modernize" it, which is an expense (possibly capitalized as well) that is above and beyond current "normal" maintenance 7) What are the debentures trading at? Above or below par? 8) How much is a reasonable amount to model for annual acquisitions? I want to have a secondary model that adds back amortization (basically, their adj EBITDA) but also includes annual acquisitions. Do others believe they will need to spend > 50% of OCF on acquisitions going forward? Anyone worried about costs of modernization on top of this in a few years? This probably ties-in with #4 but is there any chance LT growth (ex-acq) is negative in a few years? This is why I want to know more about their individual software units? 9) Does anyone have any research on their individual software units they'd be willing to share? A breakdown of proj market share or market size, what regions they predominately operate in, segment growth, competitors, ect? I know they don't report a lot of this info but I was hoping someone had started to research this on their own. If you want to pm me instead, that works too. I'd be really grateful for whatever you can provide and I'll definitely send whatever I find in return. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KJP Posted February 7, 2016 Share Posted February 7, 2016 5) What is the argument for adding back amortized acquisition costs? This gets into the VRX debate, but I just don't think it's conservative accounting so I'm interested to hear why others do it. If the businesses really do remain relevant beyond the amortization period then profits will increase at that time. In my opinion, adding back these costs distorts the discounting that should be done, which inflates value. I'd obviously rather buy the stock on a fair multiple of net income and sell it when net income begins to approach adj EBITDA (many years from now). The intangibles being amortized are software and customer relationships. Constellation expenses (rather than capitalizes) its internal R&D, which amounted to $250 million in 2014. (See page 6 here: http://www.csisoftware.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/SR_Q4_2014.pdf). And it expenses, rather than capitalizes, its sales and marketing costs, which are intended to replace churned off customer relationships. To date, reported organic growth has been positive. In light of those accounting policies, why isn't it double counting to also subtract the intangible amortization expense to get a net income figure? Put another way, what real world expense not already captured by other expenses does the intangible amortization expense capture? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Schwab711 Posted February 7, 2016 Share Posted February 7, 2016 Thanks for pointing me to the capitalized vs expensed costs. Very much appreciated. 5) What is the argument for adding back amortized acquisition costs? This gets into the VRX debate, but I just don't think it's conservative accounting so I'm interested to hear why others do it. If the businesses really do remain relevant beyond the amortization period then profits will increase at that time. In my opinion, adding back these costs distorts the discounting that should be done, which inflates value. I'd obviously rather buy the stock on a fair multiple of net income and sell it when net income begins to approach adj EBITDA (many years from now). The intangibles being amortized are software and customer relationships. Constellation expenses (rather than capitalizes) its internal R&D, which amounted to $250 million in 2014. (See page 6 here: http://www.csisoftware.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/SR_Q4_2014.pdf). And it expenses, rather than capitalizes, its sales and marketing costs, which are intended to replace churned off customer relationships. To date, reported organic growth has been positive. In light of those accounting policies, why isn't it double counting to also subtract the intangible amortization expense to get a net income figure? Put another way, what real world expense not already captured by other expenses does the intangible amortization expense capture? Acquisition of the code, employees, customers, contracts, ect were real expenses. How else did they come to own these operating businesses? If the business is as wonderful as they should be (based on acq criteria) then we will see earnings increase after these expenses are fully amortized. It's unreasonable to pay for those undiscounted higher earnings when I will surely need to repay the associated debt. Subtracting them out now acts as if they acquired these businesses/growth with indefinite bonds (which is not the case). I'm ok with subtracting out these costs to see what NI *might* look like after fully amortized, but only as a curiosity; the expense is included in GAAP accounting for a reason. There are shades of VRX in this investment but I like Mark Leonard A LOT more than I ever liked Pearson. The similarities could be the quality of the individual software segments not being as great as implied (means acquisitions might need to continue to maintain growth) and the market valuing the company on a non-GAAP metric that I don't think is representative of what a new investor could pull out of the company (as mentioned, I believe at lease some portion of those amortization costs will eventually be converted to higher operating costs for software modernization - pretty common in the industry from what I understand). I'm a huge fan of FICO, which is also valued on a non-GAAP metric. I am not adverse to such metrics, but I want to limit their use to situations where I think they represent what a new investor buying 100% of the company would be able recoup or pull out of the business. In this case, at the moment, I think they could only recoup part of the amortization (see #6). Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Picasso Posted February 8, 2016 Share Posted February 8, 2016 Constellation reports under IFRS not GAAP. I'm more curious if there's a difference of adjusted versus economic going forward as SaaS becomes a larger mix. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KJP Posted February 8, 2016 Share Posted February 8, 2016 Acquisition of the code, employees, customers, contracts, ect were real expenses. How else did they come to own these operating businesses? If the business is as wonderful as they should be (based on acq criteria) then we will see earnings increase after these expenses are fully amortized. It's unreasonable to pay for those undiscounted higher earnings when I will surely need to repay the associated debt. Subtracting them out now acts as if they acquired these businesses/growth with indefinite bonds (which is not the case). I'm ok with subtracting out these costs to see what NI *might* look like after fully amortized, but only as a curiosity; the expense is included in GAAP accounting for a reason. This debate has been had many times, so there's no sense rehashing it all here. I referred to the numbers suggesting that Constellation is already expensing, through R&D and sales and marketing, the amounts necessary to replace the acquired "customer relationship" and "software" assets as they wear out. That's why it appears to me that, with respect to Constellation specifically, adjusted net income is an appropriate metric. But I could be wrong. I would be very interested in data suggesting that the amounts the company is already expensing are inadequate to maintain current operations. The money spent to acquire businesses is, of course, a real expense like any other growth capex. I evaluate the success or failure of the acquisition strategy of a serial acquirer by looking at RONIC. On that metric, Constellation's acquisitions have been great. They'll need to continue that success for an investment at today's prices to be a home run. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KCLarkin Posted February 12, 2016 Share Posted February 12, 2016 I'm sort of curious about the sell-side take on Constellation. The attached article gives a good overview of analyst opinion. One_of_the_very_best_TSX-listed_stocks_has_zero_buy_ratings_-_The_Globe_and_Mail.pdf Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Picasso Posted February 12, 2016 Share Posted February 12, 2016 Thanks KC. I think the lack of sell-side love is a positive if they're wrong because you have new marginal buyers of CSU in the future and less is priced in. I'm more curious about what the sell-side is missing because if you can figure that out and it's not priced into the shares then its probably going to do well in the future. It seems to be a mix of issues and disbelief over the future growth looking anything like the past. But I think it's super (maybe even super duper) important to kill the bear thesis because this stock checks off a lot of boxes on a short sellers list. Just to name a few: 1) EPS of $7 in 2015 but $20 adjusted EPS in 2016. 2) It's a rollup 3) It's in Canada 4) Donville Kent likes it 5) Software accounting treatment gets the attention short sellers 6) Bulls probably can't name the top ten CSU products making them susceptible to a bear raid (potentially weak hands) There's a pretty simple playbook with the short sellers and this ticks off a lot of boxes. Whether they get enough juice to launch an attack (they're already doing this with a decent quality rollup Ametek) is another story but I think you have to know this business inside out. I personally think its legit but it wouldn't surprise me to see this become a battleground. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
physcdisp Posted February 12, 2016 Share Posted February 12, 2016 I believe the company is legit, but then the business plan loses its relevance as it grows larger. It worked wonderfully when small. Leonard is a great capital allocator, and that is probably why the company did this long. Most acquisition are small and the decisions are done at business unit level. I doubt whether new crop of folks are as incentivized as a founder did and therefore motivations are different. Also, based of memory, there is negative organic growth (partly due to strengthening of dollar), and the company operates in more than dozen verticals. I think the conglomerates have had good run, historically have performed poorly in bear markets. FWIW Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KCLarkin Posted February 12, 2016 Share Posted February 12, 2016 I don't think sell-side is a good representation of the short thesis. Here is a good summary of the short thesis: http://www.valuewalk.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Conglomerate-Boom-2.0-JHL-Capital-Group-10-20-15.pdf Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Liberty Posted February 18, 2016 Author Share Posted February 18, 2016 Q4 http://www.csisoftware.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PR_Q4_2015.pdf http://www.csisoftware.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SR_Q4_2015.pdf Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
gary17 Posted April 11, 2016 Share Posted April 11, 2016 Hi there can someone please help me with a concept - Mark said ROIC + organic growth is a good proxy for increase in shareholder value... So if ROIC + organic growth is around 30 ~ 40%; is he implying that the intrinsic value has increased by 30 ~ 40%? I also don't quite understand the term "average invested capital" - he defined it as the capital investors initially invested in CSU- i guess from the IPO; and adjusted for adjusted net incomes and dividends paid... essentially it's a way of keeping track of the 'cash' in the business - Why is this number not the same as the "book value" ? ### I guess I found my own answer - average invested capital is based on adjusted earnings which includes amortization & depreciation ... whereas book value would not have included that. Thanks Gary Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Patmo Posted April 11, 2016 Share Posted April 11, 2016 Book value includes depreciation & amortization... Capital assets are shown net of those... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KCLarkin Posted April 11, 2016 Share Posted April 11, 2016 Gary, this was discussed here: http://www.cornerofberkshireandfairfax.ca/forum/general-discussion/roic-organic-new-revenue-growth/ Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
gary17 Posted April 21, 2016 Share Posted April 21, 2016 What are people's thoughts on the DE Commons ? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KCLarkin Posted April 21, 2016 Share Posted April 21, 2016 What are people's thoughts on the DE Commons ? I like the idea. But I'm not sure it is worthwhile for most shareholders since you trade tax efficiency for liquidity. The dividend yield is only 1%. The added complexity is a drawback. Wish they would just scrap the dividend. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Liberty Posted April 27, 2016 Author Share Posted April 27, 2016 Another masterclass: http://www.csisoftware.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PL_2015.pdf Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
KCLarkin Posted April 27, 2016 Share Posted April 27, 2016 Anyone else coming to the AGM? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
snowball82 Posted April 27, 2016 Share Posted April 27, 2016 Yes KC, I will be there. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
netnet Posted April 27, 2016 Share Posted April 27, 2016 Another masterclass: http://www.csisoftware.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PL_2015.pdf Truly a master class. This guy is awesome, I just wish the stock were cheaper. He speaks directly to the problem, referencing another software company he admires that is also acquisitive and well run: Great Companies Are Not Always Great Stocks There ’s one last lesson from JKHY that I’d like to share. It relates to you as shareholders. There was a ten year period during which JKHY’s shares both underperformed the S&P 500 (2000 until 2010) and didn’t make any money for shareholders. The underperformance vs the S&P 500 was minor ... approximately 1%. JKHY’s revenues per share and ANI [net income] per share had compound average annual growth rates of 14% and 21%, respectively during that decade. Why did stock results and operating results diverge so widely for such a long period? It had to do with shareholder expectations and market exuberance. The general mania which gripped the market in 2000, and the more specific enthusiasm for JKHY ’s stock which then traded at well over 60 times ANI, left shareholders incredibly vulnerable. When the market “corrected” the JKHY stock had no margin of safety. When really good companies start trading at 5 and 6 times revenues, it’s time to start worrying. I hope our shareholders are never in that position. The last statement is, well, ironic and CEO's are not supposed do irony. CSU shareholders are precisely in this position at a 60 P/E and 6X revenues. Basically he is saying, well guys I'm growing the company but you have no margin of safety. Plus I'm not working as hard as I used to, so.... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Liberty Posted April 27, 2016 Author Share Posted April 27, 2016 The last statement is, well, ironic and CEO's are not supposed do irony. CSU shareholders are precisely in this position at a 60 P/E and 6X revenues. Basically he is saying, well guys I'm growing the company but you have no margin of safety. Plus I'm not working as hard as I used to, so.... P/E ratio is only 60x if you don't take into account that the stock is trading in CAD and the earnings are in USD, and that they are depressed by a lot of non-cash amortization (after all it's a very acquisitive company) that might not have an actual economic impact (your call to decide if that's the case, but organic growth has been positive over the long-term (including this year, ex-FX)). FCF multiple has been closer to 20-25x lately. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Recommended Posts
Create an account or sign in to comment
You need to be a member in order to leave a comment
Create an account
Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!
Register a new accountSign in
Already have an account? Sign in here.
Sign In Now