GANS - Gainsco

[JanSvenda]

Hey there,

 

an idea from the forgotten OTC land!

• This non-standard auto insurer is trading at a slight premium to tangible book while it is able to earn half of that premium in one year. It also pays 9% dividend.
   
  
• Their business is strong and grew relatively steadily since 2005. They grew annual premiums written from $85 million to $238 million. The most recent results suggest continuation of this trend.
  
• While the cash flow can sometimes be volatile they have not generated a loss from cash from operations since 2007. Their loss ratio also seems to be stabilized.
  
• Their tangible book should be relatively liquid and due to significant cash position and low amount of debt should constitute margin of safety.
   
  
• The main downside risk is the possibility of a decrease in written premiums, however, I do not see a clear short-term trigger that would cause this.
  

Volume and liquidity are relatively okay and thus the position is okay even for larger portfolios.

 

You can read the rest of my report on SA - https://seekingalpha.com/article/4150662-gainsco-hidden-otc-gem-will-likely-continue-churn-cash

 

If you enjoy the write-up do not hesitate to check out my OTC Newsletter - https://jansvenda.com/otc/

 

I believe that GANS is an excellent example of why the database that I am working on should alleviate one of the main problems of the OTC space - idea generation.

 

 

[JanSvenda]

The company has filed the results of its insurance sub online - https://www.gainsco.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MGA-2017-Annual-Statement.pdf

 

They continued to grow premiums in Q4 and increased their operating margin to 8%. In total, they generated $40 million in cash from operations.

 

Overall the results are in line with my thesis. Let's see how the consolidated results look, but I am not expecting any negative surprises.

[Cigarbutt]

Hi Jan,

 

Disclosures:

 

-I had taken a serious look at Gainsco because of an interest in analyzing their 2005-6 recap plan which was well executed and maintained a large amount of NOLs which have been mostly used after.

-Followed until 2010 when it delisted.

-Did not invest in 2005-2010 because the thesis would have relied more on management than a well established operating history.

-Do not invest in OTC securities because of liquidity.

-Would consider an OTC investment if return opportunity sufficient to account for liquidity concern.

-I find your work is well done and I agree with most of it (FWIW) but will respectfully submit areas of concern.

 

1-underwriting risk

 

Since Gainsco has switched to focus on non-standard auto, it has done relatively well, likely producing better than average combined ratios in its niche. Historically, the field has been shared by 1-larger players who decide to have a hub focused on non-standard lines, 2-niche players like Gainsco and 3-regional mom and pop style boutiques. The market remains intensely competitive and a way to survive is to write more premiums and/or benefit from rising prices that occur when weaker competitors disappear and when larger players pull away. In the main, I think that Gainsco has well played this aspect but we have not truly seen a complete cycle in the life of Gainsco. The non-standard lines have many components with only pockets of potential lasting underwriting profitability. It looks like Gainsco has been able to apply a profitable strategy by using their market knowledge and by focusing on the right segments (cherry picking the best clients). For instance, I understand that they have segmented on clients who aim for minimal coverage and who otherwise have an adequate profile in terms of premium profitability. I understand that they have been able to serve well the Hispanic drivers who, it seems, were not well served by the market. This explains the geographic coverage where Gainsco is present. Recently, they have grown their NPW significantly (NPW 2013: 191,3 million to NPW: 287,2 million). So far, this has resulted in higher cash flows with (so far) no negative trends in loss ratios (like you describe). However, partly in relation to the dividends in 2016 and 2017, operating leverage has increased and NPW to surplus has grown from 1,86 in 2013 to 2,68 in 2017. Looking at the allocation to different states in their statutory filings, it seems that at least some growth is related to the application of the same underwriting standards to different geographic areas which is probably fine but some of the growth may be related to decreased underwriting discipline with new policies written to a less than reliable population (non-standard) in terms of risk and reward profile. In your analysis, you mention: “I would also mention that due to their combined ratio being below 100% GANS can ‘afford’ to change pricing so that the loss of customers is not as severe. In essence, the company can 'sacrifice' part of their profitability in order to retain market share.” I would submit that a significant growth in written premiums with this frame of mind associated with a large increase in operating leverage can be very painful and takes a while to show up in the numbers.

 

2-Reserve risk

 

I submit that the reserve profile is not as comforting as you mention. You may want to look at the five-year historical data published annually in their statutory filings (line 75 and 77). Being involved in one segment, some volatility is expected but negative reserve development, especially if sustained, given the operating leverage, could really hurt results. If you analyze the long term profile of reserve development, you may want to remember that early on most redundancy was coming from the runoff commercial lines. Having said that, it appears that Gainsco has stronger reserves than related competitors. A relative negative for reserves is that Gainsco is concentrated in one segment and retains essentially all premiums written.

 

3-Investment risk

 

This may be a bias on my part (I find that reaching for yield has been rampant) but I submit that despite what looks on the surface as a relatively conservative portfolio, given investment results, the exposure to corporate bonds is very high and the last disclosure I checked (end 2016) showed that bonds with BBB+ and below made 65% of their bond portfolios. At the end of 2016, the bond market exposure to equity ratio was 1,44. I find also that the investment leverage is relatively low.

 

Conclusion

 

Given that the largest three shareholders together have about 73% of shares and given the above, I submit that a premium to book value is difficult to justify (IMO). Like you mention, they also a car dealership and sponsor race cars and I don’t know if that brings additional value for the minority shareholder.

Good luck.

 

[netnet]

Hi Jan,

 

Disclosures:

 

-I had taken a serious look at Gainsco because of an interest in analyzing their 2005-6 recap plan which was well executed and maintained a large amount of NOLs which have been mostly used after.

-Followed until 2010 when it delisted.

-Did not invest in 2005-2010 because the thesis would have relied more on management than a well established operating history.

-Do not invest in OTC securities because of liquidity.

-Would consider an OTC investment if return opportunity sufficient to account for liquidity concern.

-I find your work is well done and I agree with most of it (FWIW) but will respectfully submit areas of concern.

 

1-underwriting risk

 

Since Gainsco has switched to focus on non-standard auto, it has done relatively well, likely producing better than average combined ratios in its niche. Historically, the field has been shared by 1-larger players who decide to have a hub focused on non-standard lines, 2-niche players like Gainsco and 3-regional mom and pop style boutiques. The market remains intensely competitive and a way to survive is to write more premiums and/or benefit from rising prices that occur when weaker competitors disappear and when larger players pull away. In the main, I think that Gainsco has well played this aspect but we have not truly seen a complete cycle in the life of Gainsco. The non-standard lines have many components with only pockets of potential lasting underwriting profitability. It looks like Gainsco has been able to apply a profitable strategy by using their market knowledge and by focusing on the right segments (cherry picking the best clients). For instance, I understand that they have segmented on clients who aim for minimal coverage and who otherwise have an adequate profile in terms of premium profitability. I understand that they have been able to serve well the Hispanic drivers who, it seems, were not well served by the market. This explains the geographic coverage where Gainsco is present. Recently, they have grown their NPW significantly (NPW 2013: 191,3 million to NPW: 287,2 million). So far, this has resulted in higher cash flows with (so far) no negative trends in loss ratios (like you describe). However, partly in relation to the dividends in 2016 and 2017, operating leverage has increased and NPW to surplus has grown from 1,86 in 2013 to 2,68 in 2017. Looking at the allocation to different states in their statutory filings, it seems that at least some growth is related to the application of the same underwriting standards to different geographic areas which is probably fine but some of the growth may be related to decreased underwriting discipline with new policies written to a less than reliable population (non-standard) in terms of risk and reward profile. In your analysis, you mention: “I would also mention that due to their combined ratio being below 100% GANS can ‘afford’ to change pricing so that the loss of customers is not as severe. In essence, the company can 'sacrifice' part of their profitability in order to retain market share.” I would submit that a significant growth in written premiums with this frame of mind associated with a large increase in operating leverage can be very painful and takes a while to show up in the numbers.

 

2-Reserve risk

 

I submit that the reserve profile is not as comforting as you mention. You may want to look at the five-year historical data published annually in their statutory filings (line 75 and 77). Being involved in one segment, some volatility is expected but negative reserve development, especially if sustained, given the operating leverage, could really hurt results. If you analyze the long term profile of reserve development, you may want to remember that early on most redundancy was coming from the runoff commercial lines. Having said that, it appears that Gainsco has stronger reserves than related competitors. A relative negative for reserves is that Gainsco is concentrated in one segment and retains essentially all premiums written.

 

3-Investment risk

 

This may be a bias on my part (I find that reaching for yield has been rampant) but I submit that despite what looks on the surface as a relatively conservative portfolio, given investment results, the exposure to corporate bonds is very high and the last disclosure I checked (end 2016) showed that bonds with BBB+ and below made 65% of their bond portfolios. At the end of 2016, the bond market exposure to equity ratio was 1,44. I find also that the investment leverage is relatively low.

 

Conclusion

 

Given that the largest three shareholders together have about 73% of shares and given the above, I submit that a premium to book value is difficult to justify (IMO). Like you mention, they also a car dealership and sponsor race cars and I don’t know if that brings additional value for the minority shareholder.

Good luck.

Nice critique, you saved me a boatload of work on this name.

[JanSvenda]

Hi,

 

Sorry for the late response. I did not notice the post until now.

 

First of all, thanks for the insight I appreciate it.

 

1) I believe that the key point you raise is the following;

 

‘Looking at the allocation to different states in their statutory filings, it seems that at least some growth is related to the application of the same underwriting standards to different geographic areas which is probably fine but some of the growth may be related to decreased underwriting discipline with new policies written to a less than reliable population (non-standard) in terms of risk and reward profile.’

 

Please present quantifiable evidence of your statement that ‘some of the growth may be related to decreased underwriting discipline’ because otherwise this is just a pure speculation. Sure, you can call it conservative speculation, but I believe that GANS is not reliant much on growth due to their valuation.

 

If you source the growth period data (from 2014 to 2017) you can see that the biggest growth is coming from Georgia ($24 million in premiums) and South Carolina ($41 million in premiums). One could also include Arizona with an increase of $7 million in premiums.

 

Georgia has the following direct loss ratio (2017 to 2014); 52.59%, 54.18%, 64.41%, 55.99%.

South Carolina has the following direct loss ratio (2017 to 2014); 48.21%, 65.90%, 59.27%, 51.35%

Arizona has the following direct loss ratio (2017 to 2014); 49.45%, 59.31%, 53.0%, 51.5%

 

You can compare this with the average direct loss ratio for the whole company (2017 to 2014); 49.7%, 58.3%, 55.2%, 53.1%

 

If you average those numbers, Arizona is positively deviated by 0.74%. South Carolina is negatively deviated by 2.12% and Georgia is negatively deviated by 2.736%. I do not believe that these deviations are material.

 

I also wanted to point out this;

 

‘I would submit that a significant growth in written premiums with this frame of mind associated with a large increase in operating leverage can be very painful and takes a while to show up in the numbers.'

 

I am not sure what you mean by this comment. In essence, my comment says that they might not be subject to steep premium drops due to their current profitability which theoretically allows them to retain their market share. I do not care much if they can grow as even the 2015 or 2016 profitability is enough for them to generate a material amount of cash. I care if there is a risk of them losing a lot of business fast.

 

The rest of your comments is either focused on the past or on raising general points.

 

For example; ‘The non-standard lines have many components with only pockets of potential lasting underwriting profitability’

 

This is certainly material, but I would love to know why specifically GANS should be impacted. You mention that they have been able to carve out a niche (minimum lia) and thus the sustainability might be enough for me to see a material ROI. It only takes me two years to get my money back in terms of cash flow barring large operational changes. How likely is it that this risk will occur in this period when there is no hint of this as of now?

 

Sure, it could be a long-term risk, but by the same measure you can say that autonomous cars are going to wipe out GANS.

 

2) I believe that the key point you raise is the following;

 

‘Being involved in one segment, some volatility is expected but negative reserve development, especially if sustained, given the operating leverage, could really hurt results.’

 

I agree. However, GANS has not shown sustained negative reserve development in the past three years and the only time they had ‘issues’ was around 2012 (the negative development lasted until 2014) which is likely connected to the issues in Florida. Thus, you would have to create an argument as to why this should happen again.

 

Maybe you could say that given the underwriting risk this could start to occur. However, I would first need to see quantifiable evidence that there is an increase in underwriting risk.

 

Other than that, please specify what do you think could trigger this.

 

3) I believe that the key point you raise is the following;

 

‘This may be a bias on my part (I find that reaching for yield has been rampant) but I submit that despite what looks on the surface as a relatively conservative portfolio, given investment results, the exposure to corporate bonds is very high and the last disclosure I checked (end 2016) showed that bonds with BBB+ and below made 65% of their bond portfolios.’

 

I write about this in the article. I checked their bond portfolio and I do not see it as risk barring an all-out financial crisis. They never have more than $1 million in a single issue and they rarely hold more than two issues of single entity. Their sector exposure seems neutral. They have bonds ranging from Wells Fargo, AT&T to Autodesk.

 

Sure, raising interest rates could pressure some of the underlying entities but given their diversification I do not see this as a problem. They could even move towards A ratings if interest rates are going to increase as yield hunting might not be as necessary.

 

The maturity of the investments is also obviously rather short.

 

To conclude, the investment income is low, and their strategy might be rather dull, but at least it is not going to be overly volatile and thus I do not see this as a drag on the investment thesis.

 

Conclusion

 

‘Given that the largest three shareholders together have about 73% of shares and given the above, I submit that a premium to book value is difficult to justify (IMO).’

 

Please specify why the ownership should be a problem. At face value, it does not mean much. The management has been ‘shareholder’ friendly given dividends and I have not seen any red flags. Sure, they could decide to low-ball it or extract cash through salaries, but as of now, this is not happening. This would again be conservative speculation.

 

By saying that premium to tangible book (which is even overly conservative because it is likely going to increase given the MGA results - remember that MGA surplus is now $100 million, slightly above market cap) is not justifiable you are saying that the company will be unable to create any free cash flow in the future.

 

This means that you think the operations are going to suddenly turn negative and the management is going to have a hard time doing anything about it. Given their recent results and my research I have not found any clear and short-term trigger that should cause this.

 

You also do not seem to have a precise catalyst in mind which would make this risk factor stand out, or at least it is not clear from what you have written.

 

Btw, they actually stopped the car racing team and are going to ‘only’ sponsor one - http://www.racer.com/pwc/item/145739-gainsco-bob-stallings-racing-closes-doors. I am sure that this is not material to the thesis.

 

In any way to distil my thesis into two sentences. Given their valuation and relatively liquid tangible book GANS can even start losing business or profitability and I should not be overly exposed to downside risk. Sure, perception drives the ‘market’, but unless they start to actively destroy the value an adverse share price action might be unlikely to occur.

 

Perhaps I could be setting myself up to become a victim of ‘mean reversion’, but until I will see a clear catalyst I do not think this is a valid argument as I am in no way reliant on them continuing the growth. They just need to maintain at least the 2015 profitability, worst-case scenario they can just break even.

 

Best,

 

Jan

 

[Cigarbutt]

The idea behind these exchanges is to trigger a reassessment of assumptions.

Impressed by your response.

Your posts show that you a have done a more detailed and granular analysis for many aspects.

I'm kind of busy today but will get back to you with a short answer.

I have studied a lot of insurance firms that have failed and maybe have developed an inversion bias. :)

 

 

 

 

 

[writser]

Looks somewhat interesting. I assume the NOL's are held at the holding level? As they are almost used up I guess future income will be taxed at 20%?

[Cigarbutt]

This follow-up is meant to be constructive. Your assessment may be right.

 

I looked at Gainsco really hard around 2005 and then followed 1+ only to look again to some extent after your initial post on this Board. Reviewed some more for this specific post.

 

Just for context (to help you value my post), I have used a limited concentrated punchcard approach and I’ve reached milestones about halfway through and (while trying to adapt) will tend to wait for even fatter pitches going forward.  And I haven’t found any significant or meaningful positions for at least three years. So my selection criteria and focus on margin of safety might be too restrictive. You may want to work with writser who signalled somewhat of an interest as he is likely a much better investor than I am, especially for this kind of opportunity.

 

About this investment, I agree with you on 90 to 95% of the facts and will discuss topics at the margin. The top management have been there for a while and have been able to successfully go through a difficult re-positioning (leaving commercial lines and expanding from a relatively small operation based in Florida) and to profitably grow the non-standard lines after. Before reaching a conclusion and investing in Gainsco now, I would have spent much more time on the present underwriting environment where policies are written and much more time on the investment portfolio that they have presently. You have done more work than me in these areas. So, take my comments with a grain of salt.

 

On the underwriting and reserve profile, I do not “see” a specific catalyst and you are right in saying that “predicting” a change in trends here can be qualified as speculation. In fact, for Gainsco, if the future is like the past, especially the recent past and you expect more of the same, your investment is likely to turn a nice profit.

 

Specifically, if you look at the numbers, the loss ratio in 2017 is lower but that seems to be a relative outlier comparing to long term trends. In non-standard lines, loss liabilities are quite short-tailed and changes in patterns tend to show up quite rapidly and I agree with you that this hasn’t been the case but the turnover of drivers in VERY high and the underwriting profile can change very rapidly. My concern is more conceptual in nature and is based on the higher operating leverage. You put emphasis on short term cashflows whereas, for insurance companies, I tend to put more emphasis on profitability across the longer term underwriting cycle. I value capacity to grow in a hard market as much as I value decreasing premiums in a soft market. Even if management is very qualified, all competitors mention that they only want to write the profitable policies and leave the rest to others. In the absence of a rationale (one has to rely on management in this case, which may be OK), to grow significantly in a soft market (even if most of it seems to be geographic extension) constitutes a relative red flag. I don’t think that Gainsco will fail spectacularly, I just think that the profitability is likely to go down to historical levels and the higher operating leverage may proportionately hurt more the bottom line and this context may limit flexibility to grow when a true hard market develops.

 

For their investment portfolio, like said before, I haven’t dissected down to specific holdings. These days, I find that a lot of corporate bonds are mispriced (priced too high) and offer the opinion that it may not be the best time to focus on corporate bonds in absolute terms. If you think in relative terms, many insurance companies that I follow (large and small) have similar bond exposure (% bonds/total investments) but the exposure to lower graded bonds is quite unusual (relatively speaking).  So your comfort level with this has to be integrated into your analysis.

 

I will put this investment off my radar and please provide updates to show how wrong I was.

 

Good luck.

 

 

[JanSvenda]

Writser - Yeah the income will be taxed at the full percentage in 2019. I do not believe this should lessen the upside if the management is able to continue to earn similar cash flow (and I do not see a reason to believe it won't).

 

Cigarbutt - Thanks for the follow-up.

 

I acknowledge the possibility of mean reversion and will make sure to track the most important factors that could point to this trend. As I mentioned in the thesis, even if the company stops growing and will retain only small profitability the downside should be minimal due to the current valuation.

[writser]

I only spent like an hour or so on this company so take this post with a grain of salt. I think your research is extensive but the conclusion is very brief, basically: "It's cheap because it trades at 1.3x tangible book". But is that actually cheap? By that metric it's 100% more expensive than KCLI and 50% more expensive than AIG or Prudential. At what multiples do you think a (decently-run minority stake in an illiquid OTC microcap car) insurer should trade? What's your estimate of fair value and what returns do you expect going forward if they continue growing revenue ~4% p.a. like they did the past decade?

[JanSvenda]

I believe that relative valuation is not really an efficient way to look at things. Btw KCLI has $277 million of deferred acquisition costs, which I would not call tangible assets. So it actually trades at an only slight discount to tangible book. By that measure, GANS would be trading only at around 1.15x tangible book of its 2016 balance sheet (mind you that barring any expansion in car biz, their tangible book is going to increase). Regarding AIG or Prudential, you can't really compare these with GANS as their combined ratios vary a lot and generally run over 100%. Also look at ICPP, another non-standard car insurer (slightly more expanded offering than GANS, but they do serve similar market and have similar combined ratios). They were recently purchased for 2.5x their tangible book.

 

Let me expand the conclusion. It is cheap because it can earn 33% of the tangible book premium just in one year. 33% represents the lower dividend from 2017. If you take the 2016 dividend this would expand to 50%. This is not even the FCF, it is just the dividend. The policy is not set in stone and thus it might not continue, but I am just showcasing the undervaluation here. Do not forget to couple that with the fact that I have not found a clear trigger (apart from mean reversion) that would cause the operations to falter immediately. This conclusion takes their tangible book at face value which I believe is reasonable given their reserve developments and possibly accurate PP&E item. They can also pay down most of its debt now as they have roughly $40 million in cash-like assets and $53 million in debt. Their policies are also short-term in duration. Thus run-off should not be an issue and at the current valuation should not present shareholders with downside risk.

 

What would be an appropriate multiple? I do not know, but I do not think it is the current valuation which in my mind matters the most (a sale of the company would be a welcomed final catalyst), the same goes for fair value. If they continue to grow like they have done in past then I do not need to worry about appropriate multiple at all. What I need to worry about is the downside risk if the operations do start to be pressured (i.e. they start losing business and enter a loss) and I believe that as of now this risk is acceptable given the current valuation and the state of the business. 

 

[Cigarbutt]

Painful post-mortem (i was wrong)

Jan Svenda had suggested that the stock was cheap, expecting more of the same was reasonable and that the company could be eventually acquired.

i focused on the downside and the downside did not materialize. Two-level mistake: 1) initially and 2) then while following and partially getting convinced of the story and failing to buy when it got close enough to a more optimistic (adjusted) appraisal (especially in early 2019 and 2020). In short, at the initiation of this thread in early 2018, the stock was trading at 20-21, a dividend was paid: 2 in 2018 (+ there was significant buyback activity after, especially in 2019) and State Farm just announced the acquisition (100% stock acquisition and debt assumed) at about 107.38. For the arbitragers, the stock is trading at 102 now. There seems to be little in the way of this acquisition but they are paying 3.6xBV and PE 17 (normalized PE more like 20-25) which includes "synergies" that simply don't exist with Gainsco as a stand-alone business.

 

Attenuating factors vs the process and outcome

The company continued to be exposed on the investment side with a large exposure to corporate bonds in the lower investment-grade category (although short duration) and that hasn't been a problem lately in this low interest rate environment. The company has used significant operational leverage (see below) and has also used significant financial leverage (note payable and debenture) but leverage potentiates good results and i failed to appreciate the talent of the management to maintain and even expand (organic and geographic) their main business with moat in their niche (non-standard personal auto with minimum limits). Also, the acquisition (first acquisition by State Farm in its 98-yr history) and the 'premium' paid was hard to discount, even if possible.

 

Even if a missed opportunity, this was an interesting case to follow. Thanks to Jan Svenda. Last i heard, he was trying to get some investment venture going about OTC stocks and maybe he's retired in his wholly-owned timberlands in Eastern Europe.

 

The numbers (note: the company also owns one franchised auto dealership but it's small relative to the rest of the numbers); all numbers unaudited

 

                                                  2016        2017        2018        2019        up to Q2 2020

Total investments                        220.4      259.5      276.5      298.4

Estimated reserves                      148.0      172.1      199.6      204.0 

SE                                              97.1        107.4      102.7      112.4

NI                                              12.0          11.7        20.2        29.7

EPS                                            2.45          2.34        4.05        6.33

end-of-period SO                          4.90          5.08        4.79        3.72

BVPS                                          19.82        21.14        21.44      30.22     

net favorable dvpt                          8.4          (1.1)        2.5          6.5

net premiums earned                  237.6        274.5      326.0      343.0        168.6x2 

surplus                                      103.3        107.3      109.2      125.0        123.1

NPE/S                                          2.3          2.6          3.0          2.7            2.7

CR (%)                                        96.9        94.0          93.3        94.5          87.8

[writser]

Yes, kudos to Jan.

[bizaro86]

Jan took his writing private - he writes "Svenda's Manual" now: https://svendamanual.com/

 

Basically its like a 21st century Walkers Manual, with a database showing a bunch of OTC stocks as well as writeups. I think its worth the money (its $199) just from a time saving/idea sourcing point of view. Obviously I doubt every idea will turn out like this one, I'm using it more like a coarse filter to weed out the garbage in otc land.

[Foreign Tuffett]

Good call by Jan on this.

 

Trading has been all over the place today, as low as $100 and as high as $107. Might be worth a look as a merger arb play given:

 

(a) $400 million transaction is a rounding error for State Farm, which is very large

 

https://static1.st8fm.com/en_US/downloads/2019-annual-report.pdf

 

(b) quick, "early 2021" expected close

 

© "The transaction is the first acquisition of an insurance company by State Farm in its 98-year history." Given this, State Farm leadership will look like idiots if the deal blows up ("They waited 98 years to do a deal, and THIS is the best they can do!?"). I think they have probably crossed all their "T-s" and dotted all this "I-s" here.

 

 

https://newsroom.statefarm.com/state-farm-to-acquire-gainsco/