BAC-WT - Bank of America Warrants

[Liberty]

If I heard it correctly , he mentioned that buyback will start in 2Q.

 

I can confirm that he did, I just watched that part.

[hyten1]

good to hear since bac hass been going down for the last 5 days, now bac will have a better entry point for purchases

[gokou3]

If I heard it correctly , he mentioned that buyback will start in 2Q.

 

I can confirm that he did, I just watched that part.

 

So that means... next Monday?  8)

[nkp007]

If I heard it correctly , he mentioned that buyback will start in 2Q.

 

I can confirm that he did, I just watched that part.

 

So that means... next Monday?  8)

 

Instead of "nibbling" at shares until the $5 billion allocation is done, I say they just put a tender offer out there at 10% over market and buy it all in a day.

[fareastwarriors]

BofA Pays Montag More Than Moynihan for Third Straight Year

 

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-28/bank-of-america-pays-montag-more-than-moynihan-for-third-year.html

 

 

Bank of America Corp. co-Chief Operating Officer Thomas K. Montag received a 21 percent raise to $14.5 million for 2012, topping his boss Brian T. Moynihan for the third straight year.

 

Montag, 56, got a $5.46 million cash bonus for 2012, $8.19 million in restricted stock units and an $850,000 base salary, the Charlotte, North Carolina-based lender said today in a regulatory filing. That compares with the $12 million awarded to Moynihan, 53, giving the chief executive officer a raise of more than 70 percent from 2011.

 

 

[rranjan]

Instead of "nibbling" at shares until the $5 billion allocation is done, I say they just put a tender offer out there at 10% over market and buy it all in a day.

 

They can buy 10% of total volume each day and be done within a month. It's not that much of problem to do 5B Buyback.

[Cardboard]

The guy has got tears in his eyes talking about how BAC is doing good in the community, helping people with their financial needs, reworking loans, etc. Then, he is supposed to be a tough BAC Phase 1 and 2 guy and sharpening the company through cost cutting??? Looks really odd to me.

 

The Buffett explanation is also really disappointing. If you are a true leader and say that you don't need capital, then you just don't bend on your knees in front of Buffett to prove to your people that: "We got a great franchise." The cost to apparently re-energize his people is horrendous here.

 

The first part of the interview is also quite telling when he says that CEO's told him to quickly put the past behind him and that he agrees. MBIA anyone?

 

I do like the guy, but he needs to get his act together real quick before the board replaces him. Asking for a dividend increase 2 years ago to regulators and being turned down, while this time around he could have but, did not even ask... Institutions are likely not very happy and the stock price is still abysmal. You guys have to remember that very few bought at $5 to $7 as we did. Stock doubling in 2012 as Charlie Rose said is a joke.

 

Cardboard

 

[Parsad]

thx for the link.  is it just me or does brian moynihan in this video look and talk like robin williams?

 

Do all people or Irish descent look the same to you?  ;)

 

LOL!  I thought he looked a little like Robin Williams as well.  Cheers!

[Parsad]

The guy has got tears in his eyes talking about how BAC is doing good in the community, helping people with their financial needs, reworking loans, etc. Then, he is supposed to be a tough BAC Phase 1 and 2 guy and sharpening the company through cost cutting??? Looks really odd to me.

 

See, I don't understand this and alot of the 99 percenters/unions talk about business in such terms as well.  Just because an executive has to make tough decisions to cut jobs, doesn't mean he cannot focus on taking care of his customer's needs and help them better their financial position.  The cost-cutting and lay-offs were necessary to save the remaining 175,000 employee jobs. 

 

I do like the guy, but he needs to get his act together real quick before the board replaces him. Asking for a dividend increase 2 years ago to regulators and being turned down, while this time around he could have but, did not even ask... Institutions are likely not very happy and the stock price is still abysmal. You guys have to remember that very few bought at $5 to $7 as we did. Stock doubling in 2012 as Charlie Rose said is a joke.

 

Alot of people bought Fairfax at $600 too, but I'm not sure their capital losses are Prem's fault.  I don't think those investors that bought Bank of America at $20+ dollars six years ago are also Moynihan's problem.  They should be asking Ken Lewis those questions.  Investors cannot invest in markets within a vacuum.  They not only have to have a working knowledge of investments, but the time and energy to do the research and buy on fundamentals.  Otherwise they should be outsourcing their capital to good managers or buying index funds.  By the way, I don't see $20 this year, but we will creep over $15!  ;D  Cheers!

[xazp]

Apparently the fed official that said AIG had transferred its rights to sue to the Fed has recanted.  Huh.

 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323501004578390191013386534.html

[Cardboard]

"See, I don't understand this and alot of the 99 percenters/unions talk about business in such terms as well. "

 

My point was not about what he is doing not making sense, but that I have a hard time understanding how he can do it. He seems to express a lot of emotion talking about folks reworking their mortages, who are total strangers to him by the way, while he would be able to fire people he knows personally without any major remorse?

 

Regarding the share price performance, you only have to go back to 2011 to see it well above $10 and even touching $15 in early January. So it has gone nowhere under Moynihan's tenure for the vast majority of investors. And that is people who bought well below book value and slightly under TBV. Not at all momentum folks who bought Fairfax at $600! So when I hear things like the stock doubling in 2012 and being one of the best performer in the DJIA, it just makes me cringe. There is nothing to brag about here. I would not give someone a bonus for such performance.

 

Cardboard

[racemize]

Regarding the share price performance, you only have to go back to 2011 to see it well above $10 and even touching $15 in early January. So it has gone nowhere under Moynihan's tenure for the vast majority of investors. And that is people who bought well below book value and slightly under TBV. Not at all momentum folks who bought Fairfax at $600! So when I hear things like the stock doubling in 2012 and being one of the best performer in the DJIA, it just makes me cringe. There is nothing to brag about here. I would not give someone a bonus for such performance.

 

Cardboard

 

I will say that for myself (and probably many on this board), I only really paid attention and bought after it dropped well below $10, so I am a bit myopic on his tenure/my outlook (i.e., it seems to me he has done fairly well since I've been paying attention).

 

Overall though, I'm not sure how much I would have changed about what he did?  Probably not the Buffett deal, and asking for the dividend was too early, but what else should he have done differently?

[writser]

Cardboard: while I agree with you to some extent, why are you using the share price to prove your point? We should look at the fundamentals.

[xazp]

I'm with cardboard.  I feel like the board doesn't like to hear any criticisms of Moynihan or the company.  Moynihan started Jan 2010, and the stock is down ~20% while the S&P is up considerably.  Of course, Lewis bears most of the responsibility, most of the reason for BAC's problems stem from him. 

 

Overall though, I'm not sure how much I would have changed about what he did?  Probably not the Buffett deal, and asking for the dividend was too early, but what else should he have done differently?  >>

 

The Buffett deal is going to cost shareholders billions of dollars.  He also instituted a $5 surcharge on depositors, then backed down.  He lost mortgage share to other competitors which is what is driving WFC to record profits.  In comparison with C, which arguably started in about an equally bad position, C has much more consistent and higher profits.  He's shown basically no profits in the last few years. 

 

I don't think he's bad or good - just mediocre.  My thesis is just that a return to mediocrity is enough to get BAC a pretty good shareholder return though.

 

 

 

I will say that for myself (and probably many on this board), I only really paid attention and bought after it dropped well below $10, so I am a bit myopic on his tenure/my outlook (i.e., it seems to me he has done fairly well since I've been paying attention).

 

Overall though, I'm not sure how much I would have changed about what he did?  Probably not the Buffett deal, and asking for the dividend was too early, but what else should he have done differently?

[Shane]

He aligns himself with Buffett to add some credibility. I view this as a smart move.

 

What is BAC's key advantage?  Low cost deposits.  Trust is critical here.  In the long run he plans to build a strong balance sheet.  Until that is noticed by the masses he aligns the bank with WEB who brings instant credibility.  I know quite a few people who were on the verge of moving to WFC. The negative news flow scared them.  Turning the news flow positive probably helped keep quite a few customers.  Credibility is key for traditional banking IMO.

 

Is there error in this logic?

[LC]

Aside from the Buffett deal (which I think is only partially horrible for shareholders, not completely horrible), the only thing I would've done differently is settle with MBIA.

[jay21]

I also don't think people understand the severity of the operational challenges that BAC is facing.  A lot of people say ESL has a difficult job/plan on liquidating 100s of stores.  Well, consider the challenges of liquidating millions of mortgages.  You are foreclosing on people's houses and kicking them out.  Everyone knows about the huge legal battles. but there are thousands of people creating legal problems and trying not to get foreclosed on.  I believe that NY and NJ are particularly challenging where the liquidation timelines are averaging ~4-5 years.  We are only one half of the way back to a normal amount of delinquent loans and we probably won't be at a normal rate until ~2016 to 2017.    BAC has it the worst amongst all the big banks on this front.

[Guest wellmont]

Instead of "nibbling" at shares until the $5 billion allocation is done, I say they just put a tender offer out there at 10% over market and buy it all in a day.

 

$5b is nibbling no matter how you do it. they don't need to tender for what amounts to way less than 4% of the fully diluted market cap. I think investors expected more frankly.

[xazp]

banks win big in libor suits. 

 

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Judge on Friday dismissed a "substantial portion" of claims facing a number of banks in a barrage of lawsuits accusing them of interest-rate rigging.

 

U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald in Manhattan ruled for the banks, which include Bank of America Corp (BAC.N), JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N) and others of allegedly manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate, commonly known as Libor.

 

The judge granted the banks' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims and partially dismissed their claims of commodities manipulation. She also dismissed racketeering and state-law claims.

[ERICOPOLY]

I also don't think people understand the severity of the operational challenges that BAC is facing.  A lot of people say ESL has a difficult job/plan on liquidating 100s of stores.  Well, consider the challenges of liquidating millions of mortgages.  You are foreclosing on people's houses and kicking them out.  Everyone knows about the huge legal battles. but there are thousands of people creating legal problems and trying not to get foreclosed on.  I believe that NY and NJ are particularly challenging where the liquidation timelines are averaging ~4-5 years.  We are only one half of the way back to a normal amount of delinquent loans and we probably won't be at a normal rate until ~2016 to 2017.    BAC has it the worst amongst all the big banks on this front.

 

 

I had to read your post several times, and I still can't figure out which way you intended it.

 

Either A or B was your intended message (or perhaps I'm missing "C").

 

A)  People don't understand how highly profitable BAC really is.  Just wait until they see the earnings power after these mortgages are run off!

B)  People should be more bearish -- it's going to take so long to run off these expenses that it's not really that cheap at all.

C)  ?

 

 

I'm figuring you probably meant "A", because:

1)  naturally, these ongoing expenses already exist in the current quarterly earnings. 

2)  We've only been talking about the runoff of NewBAC expenses and LAS costs. 

3)  Once these mortgages are also off the books and capital is redeployed in profitable loans, people will be positively surprised.

 

 

[jay21]

I also don't think people understand the severity of the operational challenges that BAC is facing.  A lot of people say ESL has a difficult job/plan on liquidating 100s of stores.  Well, consider the challenges of liquidating millions of mortgages.  You are foreclosing on people's houses and kicking them out.  Everyone knows about the huge legal battles. but there are thousands of people creating legal problems and trying not to get foreclosed on.  I believe that NY and NJ are particularly challenging where the liquidation timelines are averaging ~4-5 years.  We are only one half of the way back to a normal amount of delinquent loans and we probably won't be at a normal rate until ~2016 to 2017.    BAC has it the worst amongst all the big banks on this front.

 

 

I had to read your post several times, and I still can't figure out which way you intended it.

 

Either A or B was your intended message (or perhaps I'm missing "C").

 

A)  People don't understand how highly profitable BAC really is.  Just wait until they see the earnings power after these mortgages are run off!

B)  People should be more bearish -- it's going to take so long to run off these expenses that it's not really that cheap at all.

C)  ?

 

 

I'm figuring you probably meant "A", because:

1)  naturally, these ongoing expenses already exist in the current quarterly earnings. 

2)  We've only been talking about the runoff of NewBAC expenses and LAS costs. 

3)  Once these mortgages are also off the books and capital is redeployed in profitable loans, people will be positively surprised.

 

Sorry, for note being clear.  The option was actually C.  The posters above me were discussing Moniyhan's tenor at the company and said he did an average job.  I don't believe they know how challenging his job is operationally.

 

I think people miss what running off those mortgages actually mean.  It means foreclosing on families and repossessing their house.  It means thousands of small lawsuits from people that don't want to be kicked out their house (which also counters some of the critique on why they can't run these off faster.  It's hard to run something off when you have a 4 year court case).  At the same time, I think people grasp the operational difficulties of ESL's liquidation strategy with Sears. 

 

It wasn't a comment on the financial performance, but on the operational challenges.  Granted once these operational challenges are behind BAC, then I think Option A.

 

[goldfinger]

I also don't think people understand the severity of the operational challenges that BAC is facing.  A lot of people say ESL has a difficult job/plan on liquidating 100s of stores.  Well, consider the challenges of liquidating millions of mortgages.  You are foreclosing on people's houses and kicking them out.  Everyone knows about the huge legal battles. but there are thousands of people creating legal problems and trying not to get foreclosed on.  I believe that NY and NJ are particularly challenging where the liquidation timelines are averaging ~4-5 years.  We are only one half of the way back to a normal amount of delinquent loans and we probably won't be at a normal rate until ~2016 to 2017.    BAC has it the worst amongst all the big banks on this front.

 

 

I had to read your post several times, and I still can't figure out which way you intended it.

 

Either A or B was your intended message (or perhaps I'm missing "C").

 

A)  People don't understand how highly profitable BAC really is.  Just wait until they see the earnings power after these mortgages are run off!

B)  People should be more bearish -- it's going to take so long to run off these expenses that it's not really that cheap at all.

C)  ?

 

 

I'm figuring you probably meant "A", because:

1)  naturally, these ongoing expenses already exist in the current quarterly earnings. 

2)  We've only been talking about the runoff of NewBAC expenses and LAS costs. 

3)  Once these mortgages are also off the books and capital is redeployed in profitable loans, people will be positively surprised.

 

Sorry, for note being clear.  The option was actually C.  The posters above me were discussing Moniyhan's tenor at the company and said he did an average job.  I don't believe they know how challenging his job is operationally.

 

I think people miss what running off those mortgages actually mean.  It means foreclosing on families and repossessing their house.  It means thousands of small lawsuits from people that don't want to be kicked out their house (which also counters some of the critique on why they can't run these off faster.  It's hard to run something off when you have a 4 year court case).  At the same time, I think people grasp the operational difficulties of ESL's liquidation strategy with Sears. 

 

It wasn't a comment on the financial performance, but on the operational challenges.  Granted once these operational challenges are behind BAC, then I think Option A.

 

By the way, during the interview with Charlie Rose Brian Moynihan indicated that they were 60% to 70% through those mortgage issues not 50%.  Don't ask me exactly where but I remember that clearly.

[xazp]

Possibly only interesting to me:  the LIBOR ruling  http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/uploadedFiles/Reuters_Content/2013/03_-_March/liborMTDopinion.pdf

[kevin4u2]

I also don't think people understand the severity of the operational challenges that BAC is facing.  A lot of people say ESL has a difficult job/plan on liquidating 100s of stores.  Well, consider the challenges of liquidating millions of mortgages.  You are foreclosing on people's houses and kicking them out.  Everyone knows about the huge legal battles. but there are thousands of people creating legal problems and trying not to get foreclosed on.  I believe that NY and NJ are particularly challenging where the liquidation timelines are averaging ~4-5 years.  We are only one half of the way back to a normal amount of delinquent loans and we probably won't be at a normal rate until ~2016 to 2017.    BAC has it the worst amongst all the big banks on this front.

 

 

I had to read your post several times, and I still can't figure out which way you intended it.

 

Either A or B was your intended message (or perhaps I'm missing "C").

 

A)  People don't understand how highly profitable BAC really is.  Just wait until they see the earnings power after these mortgages are run off!

B)  People should be more bearish -- it's going to take so long to run off these expenses that it's not really that cheap at all.

C)  ?

 

 

I'm figuring you probably meant "A", because:

1)  naturally, these ongoing expenses already exist in the current quarterly earnings. 

2)  We've only been talking about the runoff of NewBAC expenses and LAS costs. 

3)  Once these mortgages are also off the books and capital is redeployed in profitable loans, people will be positively surprised.

 

Sorry, for note being clear.  The option was actually C.  The posters above me were discussing Moniyhan's tenor at the company and said he did an average job.  I don't believe they know how challenging his job is operationally.

 

I think people miss what running off those mortgages actually mean.  It means foreclosing on families and repossessing their house.  It means thousands of small lawsuits from people that don't want to be kicked out their house (which also counters some of the critique on why they can't run these off faster.  It's hard to run something off when you have a 4 year court case).  At the same time, I think people grasp the operational difficulties of ESL's liquidation strategy with Sears. 

 

It wasn't a comment on the financial performance, but on the operational challenges.  Granted once these operational challenges are behind BAC, then I think Option A.

 

By the way, during the interview with Charlie Rose Brian Moynihan indicated that they were 60% to 70% through those mortgage issues not 50%.  Don't ask me exactly where but I remember that clearly.

 

I believe he said they started with 6 million delinquent mortgages in LAS and entered 2013 with 2.5 million left.  By the end of 2013 he said they expect to have 750k left.  So they are 60% through and will be 88% through the problem loans by the end of this year.  Costs will come down dramatically. 

[xazp]

Here's the conclusion of the judge in LIBOR:

 

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions to

dismiss are granted in part and denied in part. First,

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ federal antitrust

claim is granted. Regardless of whether defendants’ conduct

constituted a violation of the antitrust laws, plaintiffs may

not bring suit unless they have suffered an “antitrust injury.”

An antitrust injury is an injury that results from an

anticompetitive aspect of defendants’ conduct. Here, although

plaintiffs have alleged that defendants conspired to suppress

LIBOR over a nearly three-year-long period and that they were

injured as a result, they have not alleged that their injury

resulted from any harm to competition. The process by which

banks submit LIBOR quotes to the BBA is not itself competitive,

and plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants’ conduct had an

anticompetitive effect in any market in which defendants

compete. Because plaintiffs have not alleged an antitrust

injury, their federal antitrust claim is dismissed.

Second, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

commodities manipulation claims is granted in part and denied in

part. Contrary to defendants’ arguments, plaintiffs’ claims do

not involve an impermissible extraterritorial application of the

CEA, and plaintiffs have adequately pleaded their claims.

However, certain of plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred because

numerous articles published in April and May 2008 in prominent

national publications placed plaintiffs on notice of their

injury. Therefore, plaintiffs’ commodities manipulation claims

based on contracts entered into between August 2007 and May 29,

2008, are time-barred. However, plaintiffs’ claims based on

contracts entered into between April 15, 2009, and May 2010 are

not time-barred, and plaintiffs’ claims based on contracts

entered into between May 30, 2008, and April 14, 2009, may or

may not be barred, though we will not dismiss them at this

stage. Additionally, because the Barclays settlements brought

to light information that plaintiffs might not previously have

been able to learn, we grant plaintiffs leave to move to amend

their complaint to include allegations based on such

information, provided that any such motion addresses the

concerns raised herein and is accompanied by a proposed second

amended complaint.

 

Third, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ RICO claim

is granted. For one, the PSLRA bars plaintiffs from bringing a

RICO claim based on predicate acts that could have been the

subject of a securities fraud action. Here, the predicate acts

of mail and wire fraud underlying plaintiffs’ RICO claim could

have been the subject of a claim for securities fraud.

Additionally, RICO applies only domestically, meaning that the

alleged “enterprise” must be a domestic enterprise. However,

the enterprise alleged by plaintiffs is based in England. For

these reasons, plaintiffs’ RICO claim is dismissed.

Finally, plaintiffs’ state-law claims are all dismissed,

some with prejudice and some without. Plaintiffs’ Cartwright

Act claim is dismissed with prejudice for lack of antitrust

injury. The exchange-based plaintiffs’ New York common law

unjust enrichment claim is also dismissed with prejudice, as

plaintiffs have not alleged any relationship between them and

defendants. With regard to the remaining state-law claims, we

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and therefore

dismiss the claims without prejudice.

We recognize that it might be unexpected that we are

dismissing a substantial portion of plaintiffs’ claims, given

that several of the defendants here have already paid penalties

to government regulatory agencies reaching into the billions of

dollars. However, these results are not as incongruous as they

Case 1:11-md-02262-NRB Document 286 Filed 03/29/13 Page 159 of 161

160

might seem. Under the statutes invoked here, there are many

requirements that private plaintiffs must satisfy, but which

government agencies need not. The reason for these differing

requirements is that the focuses of public enforcement and

private enforcement, even of the same statutes, are not

identical. The broad public interests behind the statutes

invoked here, such as integrity of the markets and competition,

are being addressed by ongoing governmental enforcement. While

public enforcement is often supplemented by suits brought by

private parties acting as “private attorneys general,” those

private actions which seek damages and attorney’s fees must be

examined closely to ensure that the plaintiffs who are suing are

the ones properly entitled to recover and that the suit is, in

fact, serving the public purposes of the laws being invoked.

Therefore, although we are fully cognizant of the settlements

that several of the defendants here have entered into with

government regulators, we find that only some of the claims that

plaintiffs have asserted may properly proceed.