GLRE - Greenlight Capital Re

[KinAlberta]

Any thoughts on GLRE's performance should the overall market take a Hussman Dive - a long awaited but seemingly never materializing market correction  :-)

 

Since this market has some highly leveraged sectors (and the entire market could be somewhat excessively leveraged), I'm guessing it's shorts would give it a good near term gain in a general market pull back where those high-growth areas get a major wakeup call and stumble early in a down cycle.  From there on out though, I can't see GLRE's market pricing doing exceptionally well as a market correction occurs.

[Jurgis]

My feeling is that GLRE and TPRE are rather crappy (re)insurers. That plus 1.5 + 20% is rather significant tailwind against Einhorn's and Loeb's investment prowess. I start to doubt that GLRE and TPRE will outperform the market long term.

 

I don't like Mr. BigLarry very much, but I liked what he presumably said about the (re)insurance wannabes at 2015 Big meeting: "Everyone wants to run (re)insurance company and then... they hit the reality (and the regulators)".

 

I am starting to think that Ackman was right to IPO PSH as non-insurance company. At least he did not go into a business where he does not have an edge.

[KinAlberta]

Any thoughts on GLRE's performance should the overall market take a Hussman Dive - a long awaited but seemingly never materializing market correction  :-)

 

Since this market has some highly leveraged sectors (and the entire market could be somewhat excessively leveraged), I'm guessing it's shorts would give it a good near term gain in a general market pull back where those high-growth areas get a major wakeup call and stumble early in a down cycle.  From there on out though, I can't see GLRE's market pricing doing exceptionally well as a market correction occurs.

 

Well, as for a near term gain - I sure didn't guess right here.

[muscleman]

http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-einhorns-greenlight-takes-a-beating-in-august-1441063824

 

He isn't doing well when the market is going up, because he is taking precaution. Now the market is down and he is supposed to do better than average, but that didn't happen. He did worse.

I am glad that I only owned GLRE for a small period of time in 2013.  :)

 

[Guest Grey512]

I am not in the "David has lost his mojo" camp.

 

Even the best performers spend some time in the bottom quartiles. It would not surprise me if Greenlight continues to underperform in the next 2 years. Their process is more important to me than their short-term results.

 

Is there a good time to invest in Greenlight? Yes. I think that time is now.

[KinAlberta]

http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-einhorns-greenlight-takes-a-beating-in-august-1441063824

 

He isn't doing well when the market is going up, because he is taking precaution. Now the market is down and he is supposed to do better than average, but that didn't happen. He did worse.

I am glad that I only owned GLRE for a small period of time in 2013.  :)

 

With his open scepticism towards market values, I've been a bit surprised by this situation so I'm curious how things will transpire going forward.  Some earlier insider sales were a bit of an eye opener too.

[Guest Grey512]

Taking a look at the Greenlight portfolio (largest to smallest, on the long side; 13Fs do not disclose shorts). I'll just list the top 20.

 

1. Apple: good, will do well.

2. SunEdison: over-levered thing that makes money through financial engineering. Or maybe I'm just not smart enough to "get it".

3. Micron: meh... Commodity industry with a larger competitor who can afford to lose money longer than Micron, and deep cycles. Greenlight did not buy this cheap enough, IMO.

4. CONSOL Energy: no view.

5. GM: again, meh. Did not buy it cheap enough, IMO. Too high a valuation given the low quality of the overall industry.

6. Citizens: decent investment.

7. CBI: OK, but I like AECOM better.

8. TWX: decent value.

9. Voya: decent investment.

10. Green Brick: decent investment.

11. AerCap: good investment.

12. UIL: no view

13: AECOM: good. Trades at a low FCF yield.

14. ON Semiconductor: no view, though not a fan of semis.

15. BofNY: I don't see it. Crowded name.

16. LBTYK: Maybe I am too stupid to understand the Liberties, but I think there are cheaper telecom/media names out there.

17. AMAT: no view.

18. Michael Kors: great investment (at the current price).

18. Lam Research: no view.

19. IACI: too expensive.

20. Spirit AeroSystems: no view.

 

Verdict: Looks like an OK portfolio. MU should do well long-term, if Samsung does not drive it out of business until then. SUNE: I just don't get why people like it, but then again, I have not done too much work. If SUNE goes to zero, Greenlight would take another 9% hit on their PTF.

[rb]

Taking a look at the Greenlight portfolio (largest to smallest, on the long side; 13Fs do not disclose shorts). I'll just list the top 20.

 

1. Apple: good, will do well.

2. SunEdison: over-levered thing that makes money through financial engineering. Or maybe I'm just not smart enough to "get it".

3. Micron: meh... Commodity industry with a larger competitor who can afford to lose money longer than Micron, and deep cycles. Greenlight did not buy this cheap enough, IMO.

4. CONSOL Energy: no view.

5. GM: again, meh. Did not buy it cheap enough, IMO. Too high a valuation given the low quality of the overall industry.

6. Citizens: decent investment.

7. CBI: OK, but I like AECOM better.

8. TWX: decent value.

9. Voya: decent investment.

10. Green Brick: decent investment.

11. AerCap: good investment.

12. UIL: no view

13: AECOM: good. Trades at a low FCF yield.

14. ON Semiconductor: no view, though not a fan of semis.

15. BofNY: I don't see it. Crowded name.

16. LBTYK: Maybe I am too stupid to understand the Liberties, but I think there are cheaper telecom/media names out there.

17. AMAT: no view.

18. Michael Kors: great investment (at the current price).

18. Lam Research: no view.

19. IACI: too expensive.

20. Spirit AeroSystems: no view.

 

Verdict: Looks like an OK portfolio. MU should do well long-term, if Samsung does not drive it out of business until then. SUNE: I just don't get why people like it, but then again, I have not done too much work. If SUNE goes to zero, Greenlight would take another 9% hit on their PTF.

You forgot he has a large position in gold and is short French bonds. Both went bad for Greenlight.

 

Now you can clone the portfolio from the 13Fs. So why own GLRE? With GLRE you get a not very good reinsurer and pay Einhorn's hedge fund fees. Doesn't sound like a very attractive proposition. Especially when you consider that there's the mother of all agency problems involved.

[TwoCitiesCapital]

Taking a look at the Greenlight portfolio (largest to smallest, on the long side; 13Fs do not disclose shorts). I'll just list the top 20.

 

1. Apple: good, will do well.

2. SunEdison: over-levered thing that makes money through financial engineering. Or maybe I'm just not smart enough to "get it".

3. Micron: meh... Commodity industry with a larger competitor who can afford to lose money longer than Micron, and deep cycles. Greenlight did not buy this cheap enough, IMO.

4. CONSOL Energy: no view.

5. GM: again, meh. Did not buy it cheap enough, IMO. Too high a valuation given the low quality of the overall industry.

6. Citizens: decent investment.

7. CBI: OK, but I like AECOM better.

8. TWX: decent value.

9. Voya: decent investment.

10. Green Brick: decent investment.

11. AerCap: good investment.

12. UIL: no view

13: AECOM: good. Trades at a low FCF yield.

14. ON Semiconductor: no view, though not a fan of semis.

15. BofNY: I don't see it. Crowded name.

16. LBTYK: Maybe I am too stupid to understand the Liberties, but I think there are cheaper telecom/media names out there.

17. AMAT: no view.

18. Michael Kors: great investment (at the current price).

18. Lam Research: no view.

19. IACI: too expensive.

20. Spirit AeroSystems: no view.

 

Verdict: Looks like an OK portfolio. MU should do well long-term, if Samsung does not drive it out of business until then. SUNE: I just don't get why people like it, but then again, I have not done too much work. If SUNE goes to zero, Greenlight would take another 9% hit on their PTF.

You forgot he has a large position in gold and is short French bonds. Both went bad for Greenlight.

 

Now you can clone the portfolio from the 13Fs. So why own GLRE? With GLRE you get a not very good reinsurer and pay Einhorn's hedge fund fees. Doesn't sound like a very attractive proposition. Especially when you consider that there's the mother of all agency problems involved.

 

13F-s wouldn't contain short exposure or foreign positions - both of which have the ability to add large amounts of return over time. I'm certainly not standing up to justify the 1.5% + 20% fee, but you can't simply parrot his investments using a 13F because you'd be missing this large portion of the portfolio.

[rb]

You forgot he has a large position in gold and is short French bonds. Both went bad for Greenlight.

 

Now you can clone the portfolio from the 13Fs. So why own GLRE? With GLRE you get a not very good reinsurer and pay Einhorn's hedge fund fees. Doesn't sound like a very attractive proposition. Especially when you consider that there's the mother of all agency problems involved.

 

13F-s wouldn't contain short exposure or foreign positions - both of which have the ability to add large amounts of return over time. I'm certainly not standing up to justify the 1.5% + 20% fee, but you can't simply parrot his investments using a 13F because you'd be missing this large portion of the portfolio.

I didn't want to go into the short story to keep the post well short. But now since you brought it up, he talks about a lot of the shorts in the quarterly letters which are readily available on the internet. He also talks about foreign positions in the letters. You can also get info on the foreign positions from the foreign regulators. I'm not saying that you can emulate the portfolio 100% but you can get pretty close if you put in a bit of work. If you pay me 1/4 of Einhorn's fee I'll do it for you.

 

So given what I've said here and above I get back to my initial premise. Why own GLRE?

[StevieV]

"Why own GLRE?"

 

Not saying you should, but here is why one might:

 

(1)  The work involved in recreating the portfolio.

(2)  The fees and taxes involved in recreating the portfolio.

(3)  Given delayed reporting, you would have different a different cost basis in the stocks GLRE buys.

(4)  Mental - Many investors would have a hard time blindly following.  There is a strong tendency to pick and choose particular securities.  I believe this would afflict many investors and there would be no true emulation of the portfolio.

(5)  The investment leverage provided by the insurance.  You are giving the insurance company a negative value.  If it provides investment leverage (and Mr. Einhorn's investments begin to pay off), that will provide value to the upside.  There is also the possibility of some insurance earnings, though one probably shouldn't expect that to be the case.

 

In the end, I doubt many people (if any) would successfully create a copy of the GLRE portfolio that is very close on performance.  If anything, I think an investor would be better off considering piggybacking off of ideas of some of the best investors, which I think is relatively common.

[james22]

After the close Friday, Greenlight Re (GLRE -8.2%) reported a Q3 loss of $219.7M or $5.98 per share vs. a loss of $51.8M and $1.40 one year earlier.

 

Book value per share fell 20% to $23.29 from $29.16 90 days earlier.

 

At issue was a net investment loss of 14.2% on the company's investment portfolio as David Einhorn's Greenlight Capital suffered a rough quarter.

 

Making matters worse, A.M. Best cuts its outlook on GLRE's credit rating to negative from stable, a move which could make it harder to win new reinsurance business.

 

http://seekingalpha.com/news/2856296-rough-session-for-greenlight-re-after-big-loss

 

Ouch.

 

[doughishere]

Is it me or are a lot of these guys getting hit with bad times right now.

 

It's kind of weird but I've started to think that one of Buffets greatest moves has been to go into actual business. Sure he does some hedge fund moves...sure he owns stocks bought at a margin of safety but in reality I feel like he's just a better business managers. Don't worry I'll flip to the "he's a better hedge fund" but at some point I gatta think that the pure play "hedge fund" model might be prone to one off events that kill results.

 

And in no way am I ripping on some of the hedge fund guys but a 20% loss for one year is killer for long term results. I marveled at a table I saw about Buffett to a member awhile ago about how much per year % Buffett has actually lost. His reply....that's why there's only one warren.

[muscleman]

Is it me or are a lot of these guys getting hit with bad times right now.

 

It's kind of weird but I've started to think that one of Buffets greatest moves has been to go into actual business. Sure he does some hedge fund moves...sure he owns stocks bought at a margin of safety but in reality I feel like he's just a better business managers. Don't worry I'll flip to the "he's a better hedge fund" but at some point I gatta think that the pure play "hedge fund" model might be prone to one off events that kill results.

 

And in no way am I ripping on some of the hedge fund guys but a 20% loss for one year is killer for long term results. I marveled at a table I saw about Buffett to a member awhile ago about how much per year % Buffett has actually lost. His reply....that's why there's only one warren.

 

Well........ Don't forget that Charlie Munger lost 30% per year back to back in the 70's. He still turned out to be a great investor.  :)

[Jurgis]

Is it me or are a lot of these guys getting hit with bad times right now.

 

It's kind of weird but I've started to think that one of Buffets greatest moves has been to go into actual business. Sure he does some hedge fund moves...sure he owns stocks bought at a margin of safety but in reality I feel like he's just a better business managers. Don't worry I'll flip to the "he's a better hedge fund" but at some point I gatta think that the pure play "hedge fund" model might be prone to one off events that kill results.

 

And in no way am I ripping on some of the hedge fund guys but a 20% loss for one year is killer for long term results. I marveled at a table I saw about Buffett to a member awhile ago about how much per year % Buffett has actually lost. His reply....that's why there's only one warren.

 

Well........ Don't forget that Charlie Munger lost 30% per year back to back in the 70's. He still turned out to be a great investor.  :)

 

OT: so how do you decide if the Mr. Hedge Fund Manager is going to be next Munger or next Failure?

 

Of course, everyone underperforming compares themselves to Munger and Buffett (see Mr. Big's letter to the clients). But how do you decide whether to believe them?

 

Also see the Third Avenue/Marty Whitman bashing thread in General. It seems all rather emotional and like/dislike based. "Einhorn is cool dude, so he's gonna be next Munger even if he's underperforming, but Whitman is a has been who has no clue" (actually Whitman is has-been since he mostly retired from his funds and so the blame for underperformance goes to his crappy successors, but ...).

 

This year will be tough again to Einhorn, Loeb (I think), Ackman, Stahl/Bregman, possibly Sequoia (if VRX does not recover), etc. Might be tough to BRK, FFH too. So these questions are quite pertinent.

[scorpioncapital]

In the case of GLRE, I can see the problem very easily, which is why I would never invest in it.

 

You have a mismatch of asset types for the structure and financing used. You have an insurance company that gives you leverage at low cost and is offshore for virtually no tax. You already have a key advantage. To use this financing vehicle to buy speculative investments that are highly indebted (e.g. SUNE) or go short is the height of lunacy. What you do if you want to be Buffett is you buy solid, highly rated large companies that may return 7 to 10 per year, slow and steady wins the race types and with your leverage advantage you earn 15 or 16% after-tax.

 

I sometimes wonder with great curiosity how these hedge fund stars and managers at public companies are able to sell investors to give them their money when it doesn't seem any better than a coin flip.

 

[rb]

In the case of GLRE, I can see the problem very easily, which is why I would never invest in it.

 

You have a mismatch of asset types for the structure and financing used. You have an insurance company that gives you leverage at low cost and is offshore for virtually no tax. You already have a key advantage. To use this financing vehicle to buy speculative investments that are highly indebted (e.g. SUNE) or go short is the height of lunacy. What you do if you want to be Buffett is you buy solid, highly rated large companies that may return 7 to 10 per year, slow and steady wins the race types and with your leverage advantage you earn 15 or 16% after-tax.

 

I sometimes wonder with great curiosity how these hedge fund stars and managers at public companies are able to sell investors to give them their money when it doesn't seem any better than a coin flip.

I would say you're pretty spot on with your comments. I would add that there's also a question of the quality of underwriting at GLRE. Then there's the hedge fund fees. It's not at all clear if this company is looking out for shareholders. To me it looks like a vehicle to drive AUM into Greenlight Capital. There are serious conflicts of interest with GLRE. But it seems like a lot of people really like David Einhorn and they're ok with that.

[muscleman]

In the case of GLRE, I can see the problem very easily, which is why I would never invest in it.

 

You have a mismatch of asset types for the structure and financing used. You have an insurance company that gives you leverage at low cost and is offshore for virtually no tax. You already have a key advantage. To use this financing vehicle to buy speculative investments that are highly indebted (e.g. SUNE) or go short is the height of lunacy. What you do if you want to be Buffett is you buy solid, highly rated large companies that may return 7 to 10 per year, slow and steady wins the race types and with your leverage advantage you earn 15 or 16% after-tax.

 

I sometimes wonder with great curiosity how these hedge fund stars and managers at public companies are able to sell investors to give them their money when it doesn't seem any better than a coin flip.

I would say you're pretty spot on with your comments. I would add that there's also a question of the quality of underwriting at GLRE. Then there's the hedge fund fees. It's not at all clear if this company is looking out for shareholders. To me it looks like a vehicle to drive AUM into Greenlight Capital. There are serious conflicts of interest with GLRE. But it seems like a lot of people really like David Einhorn and they're ok with that.

 

 

Totally agree.

This type of corp structure is great for either high frequency trading firms or long term asset holders.

[Haasje]

If you have a 20% net long portfolio is that really that risky? (I think it is a little more now) I guess it is risky but a 100% bond portfolio has its own type of risk. It just does not show up as often. Also this is 1 of only 2 down years in Einhorn's track record. 2 down years... If he ends this one down that is, which is extremely likely. I believed in the underwriting team sucks story for a while but I examined these guys track records for myself and it not as bad at all as their history at GLRE. I contributed an article to SA, I think it just went behind paywall but in case some of you have access:

 

http://seekingalpha.com/research/11236431-bram-de-haas/4349586-greenlight-re-double-digit-returns-over-the-next-five-years-seem-likely

 

Most probably have not so I've included the table with the underwriting guys track records as an attachment.

 

 

 

 

 

[rb]

The track record in this instance may not be relevant. You may have good underwriters, and when they work for a company that values that they'll write good business. But Greenlight Capital makes a lot of money off fees in the hedge funds. In order to drive AUM you need float so you need to write business. So the underwriters may say this is not a good deal and the bosses say write it anyway, that's not the fault of the underwriters.

 

Basically in the format of GLRE the incentives are so skewed that it's very difficult to trust the underwriting and when a reinsurance company writes bad business your returns are gonna suck no matter how good the investing. And once you pay 2 and 20 on the investing, the investing results won't be that terrific either.

 

You should also note that GLRE wrote a lot of reinsurance when Berkshire basically stopped writing reinsurance. 1: that can't be good. 2: I think it reinforces the point's I've made above regarding screwing shareholders to drive up AUM at the hedge fund. Other people may disagree.

[doughishere]

Is it me or are a lot of these guys getting hit with bad times right now.

 

It's kind of weird but I've started to think that one of Buffets greatest moves has been to go into actual business. Sure he does some hedge fund moves...sure he owns stocks bought at a margin of safety but in reality I feel like he's just a better business managers. Don't worry I'll flip to the "he's a better hedge fund" but at some point I gatta think that the pure play "hedge fund" model might be prone to one off events that kill results.

 

And in no way am I ripping on some of the hedge fund guys but a 20% loss for one year is killer for long term results. I marveled at a table I saw about Buffett to a member awhile ago about how much per year % Buffett has actually lost. His reply....that's why there's only one warren.

 

Well........ Don't forget that Charlie Munger lost 30% per year back to back in the 70's. He still turned out to be a great investor.  :)

 

If youre lucky(or smart) you learn.

[Haasje]

The track record in this instance may not be relevant. You may have good underwriters, and when they work for a company that values that they'll write good business. But Greenlight Capital makes a lot of money off fees in the hedge funds. In order to drive AUM you need float so you need to write business. So the underwriters may say this is not a good deal and the bosses say write it anyway, that's not the fault of the underwriters.

 

Basically in the format of GLRE the incentives are so skewed that it's very difficult to trust the underwriting and when a reinsurance company writes bad business your returns are gonna suck no matter how good the investing. And once you pay 2 and 20 on the investing, the investing results won't be that terrific either.

 

You should also note that GLRE wrote a lot of reinsurance when Berkshire basically stopped writing reinsurance. 1: that can't be good. 2: I think it reinforces the point's I've made above regarding screwing shareholders to drive up AUM at the hedge fund. Other people may disagree.

 

This is a much better way to think about the underwriters results. The underwriting results have not been good. All too often I see people immediately conclude they suck at their job but 1) it is quite a small sample size to review, given how lumpy these results can be and 2) they may operate under different constraints as compared to other underwriters.

 

In the end the results suck but 2) is much more easily fixed as compared to "they suck" and 1) is a legitimate concern when you try to predict the future underwriting results based off recent history.

[Scunny Bunny]

GLRE trades at $18.40 for a market cap of $681m and a 9/30/15 NTA of $23.40/share - a 21% discount. NTA at 12/31/2015 should be around $1.10 lower based on -4% investment return in Q4, so at $22.30 estimated NTA the discount is about 17.5%. I've always figured the very best time to buy insurers - subject to them having some kind of underwriting skill - is when the THREE key drivers of investment return - (1) underwriting profitability (2) investment returns (3) price/NTA for the company - are way low.  GLRE sure fits all three at present in spades. (1) I run rolling twelve months results on the company and it lost around $60m from UW in the year to 9/30/15.  Of that, about $37m was from a liability program in run off. Historically the UW hasn't been great with adverse loss experiences in 4 of last five years; however, they've generally been smallish and the company writes very little earned premium ($360m annually) versus equity of about $867m. So its not leveraged too badly to current day underwriting.  Nor is it leveraged to adverse reserving since reserves net of reinsurance (yep aware of that risk) are only $164m or $4.42 a share. Reserves are paid off relatively quickly.  (2) investment returns have been killed by David Einhorn's implosion in Q3 when investment return was (14.2%) in the quarter.  Things hadn't improved by 11/30/15 when the return had "grown" to (20.2%) for the 11 months and based on knowledge of the major holdings - AER, APPL, CNX, GM and gold - it probably hasn't done much in December either.  Einhorn has been a class long term investor and its obviously a matter of judgement as to whether he can get it back together again.  If you believe he can, then there's about $8/share of investments (ex-cash) netting short against long ($51.40/share if you gross the exposures).  because of the nature of the investing, there is a net $23.72/share in CASH. (Hold that thought). A reasonable criticism of GLRE is the Einhorn take of "1.5% + 20%". Totally fair but he is miles underwater on the HWM and needs to recoup $150m plus ($200m + probably) to get back there.  So there's a free kick for a while. (3) the discount is obvious and the company has been buying back stock.  GLRE represents c.10% of Greenlight assets managed so its relevant and Einhorn wouldn't want to liquidate that easily.  But if the discount grows, it would become an option. Given the apparent lack of leverage to underwriting, there may be some chance of "embarrassment" pressure - remember the company is incorporated in Grand Cayman so certain rules don't apply. I do own the stock having acquired recently.

[muscleman]

Please do a search before you open a new thread. There is already a GLRE thread. Please delete this one and discuss there.

 

Your calculation is based on 9/30/2015's book value, which is not up to date.

 

[Scunny Bunny]

GLRE trades at $18.40 for a market cap of $681m and a 9/30/15 NTA of $23.40/share - a 21% discount. NTA at 12/31/2015 should be around $1.10 lower based on -4% investment return in Q4, so at $22.30 estimated NTA the discount is about 17.5%. I've always figured the very best time to buy insurers - subject to them having some kind of underwriting skill - is when the THREE key drivers of investment return - (1) underwriting profitability (2) investment returns (3) price/NTA for the company - are way low.  GLRE sure fits all three at present in spades. (1) I run rolling twelve months results on the company and it lost around $60m from UW in the year to 9/30/15.  Of that, about $37m was from a liability program in run off. Historically the UW hasn't been great with adverse loss experiences in 4 of last five years; however, they've generally been smallish and the company writes very little earned premium ($360m annually) versus equity of about $867m. So its not leveraged too badly to current day underwriting.  Nor is it leveraged to adverse reserving since reserves net of reinsurance (yep aware of that risk) are only $164m or $4.42 a share. Reserves are paid off relatively quickly.  (2) investment returns have been killed by David Einhorn's implosion in Q3 when investment return was (14.2%) in the quarter.  Things hadn't improved by 11/30/15 when the return had "grown" to (20.2%) for the 11 months and based on knowledge of the major holdings - AER, APPL, CNX, GM and gold - it probably hasn't done much in December either.  Einhorn has been a class long term investor and its obviously a matter of judgement as to whether he can get it back together again.  If you believe he can, then there's about $8/share of investments (ex-cash) netting short against long ($51.40/share if you gross the exposures).  because of the nature of the investing, there is a net $23.72/share in CASH. (Hold that thought). A reasonable criticism of GLRE is the Einhorn take of "1.5% + 20%". Totally fair but he is miles underwater on the HWM and needs to recoup $150m plus ($200m + probably) to get back there.  So there's a free kick for a while. (3) the discount is obvious and the company has been buying back stock.  GLRE represents c.10% of Greenlight assets managed so its relevant and Einhorn wouldn't want to liquidate that easily.  But if the discount grows, it would become an option. Given the apparent lack of leverage to underwriting, there may be some chance of "embarrassment" pressure - remember the company is incorporated in Grand Cayman so certain rules don't apply. I do own the stock having acquired recently.