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Is anyone worried about the on-going warrant buyback program vis a vis ultimately being able to realize full value for the warrants? Can the Company just squeeze out minority warrant holders without a premium? Or can you simply refrain from participating in any tender offer?

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The terms of the warrants are described here:

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1506307/000119312512255687/d355500d424b3.htm#toc355500_5

There is protection from the company issuing excessive dividends.

 

I don't understand what you're saying about a squeeze-out.  I don't see any provision where the company can squeeze out all of the warrant holders?

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Is anyone worried about the on-going warrant buyback program vis a vis ultimately being able to realize full value for the warrants? Can the Company just squeeze out minority warrant holders without a premium? Or can you simply refrain from participating in any tender offer?

 

I asked the same question a couple times regarding some of the bank warrants outstanding. Others here (far smarter than I) said no, it's not an issue.

 

What is an issue - if Mr. Kinder tries another MBO at a low enough price that would put the warrants in the red.

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Is anyone worried about the on-going warrant buyback program vis a vis ultimately being able to realize full value for the warrants? Can the Company just squeeze out minority warrant holders without a premium? Or can you simply refrain from participating in any tender offer?

 

I asked the same question a couple times regarding some of the bank warrants outstanding. Others here (far smarter than I) said no, it's not an issue.

 

What is an issue - if Mr. Kinder tries another MBO at a low enough price that would put the warrants in the red.

 

Good point. He's likely to NOT pay fair value in a buyout, and a 20% premium over $36 is only $43....seems risky.

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If that was his Machiavellian master plan all along, then why repurchase warrants in the first place?

 

Reading the tea leaves, I'm asking myself the same question over and over again. :)

 

Given the large number of warrants outstanding, it does give him an extra incentive to MBO at a "low" price, if he goes that route. I wonder if there's a way we could find out whether he personally owns any warrants or not? I'm guessing they would have showed up in his filings with the SEC, but I don't know for sure.

 

Besides an MBO, what are his options for moving the stock?

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It'd be kind of unfair if you take over El Paso, issue warrants in connection with the takeover, and then take KMI private.

 

But there's a protection against that.  The ex-El Paso shareholders can vote against the merger because they own lots of warrants.  Plus other KMI shareholders may vote against it.

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Kinder has spent at least $620 million repurchasing warrants in the open market since May 2012.  In the 4th quarter of 2013 he appeared to switch to repurchasing KMI common, spending $172 million repurchasing 5.2 million shares (avg. cost 33.08 (!!)).  Every time a warrant repurchase authorization was declared by the board it was quickly used up and replaced with another authorization.

 

Warrant count has gone from an initial 505 million to 348.44 million at the end of Q3.  We don't have the 10K yet, but it appears that he used almost all of his authorization in Q4 to repurchase shares at the low of the quarter.

 

I trust that his interests are aligned with shareholders.  I'm not worried about him trying another MBO at 43 or whatever - he's still working off the EP deal debt.  This thing will be public for a while.

 

edit:  just a note that there is an analyst presentation tomorrow:

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=93621&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1892415&highlight=

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I am reading this thread with great interest.  Looks like the company has a good jockey with a enviable record.  I am interested to know if someone has a valuation model for it, though.  I know that the company is yielding 4.6% and the dividend is growing in the double-digit percentage, which seems to say the current price is a good deal.

 

TIA.

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Hmm I'm trying to wrap my head around the accounting.  KMI is incentivized to inflate KMP's yield.  KMP is largely held by retail investors.  The retail investors will likely value KMP based on yield.  (Most institutional investors do it too.)

 

1- Others have accused KMP of inflating yield by under-maintaining their assets.  I think that this is a terrible argument.  Kinder Morgan has a reasonably good track record in safety as far as I can tell.

 

2- In some deals where KMP has acquired new assets, KMI has waived part of its incentive distribution fees in the short term.  In later years KMP will have to pay full fees.  This inflates yield in the short term at the expense of long-term yield.

 

3- If you look at the statement of cash flow, KMP regularly pays cash to KMI.  The 2010 cash distribution was lower than the 2009 cash distribution.

 

YE1996 - $0.268M

YE1997 - $2.280M  <-- Richard Kinder becomes the CEO in Feb. 1997

YE1998 - $27.450M

YE1999 - $52.674M

YE2000 - $91.366M

YE2001 - $181.198M

YE2002 - $253.344M

YE2003 - $314.244M

YE2004 - $376.005M

YE2005 - $460.869M

YE2006 - $523.198M

YE2007 - $567.7M

YE2008 - $764.7M

YE2009 - $918.4M

YE2010 - $861.7M

YE2011 - $1161M

YE2012 - $1340M

 

This happened because KMI waived feeds in 2010 relating to the Petrohawk/Kinderhawk acquisition.  I believe this allowed KMP to maintain the illusion of continually increasing dividends.

 

Or am I wrong here????

 

4- KMP wants investors to value the company based on distributable cash flow.  This is not a good metric when:

 

a- KMP is waiving fees in the short term at the expense of higher fees in the long run.

 

b- Some of KMP's assets have quickly depleting cash flows.  A pipeline can have a nice stream of cash flow for 60 years or more.

 

The E&P side of KMP will have cash flows that will decline in the near future (e.g. next several years). 

 

The gathering pipeline side will likely have cash flows that will decline in the near future.  The decline depends somewhat on how the contracts are structured.  Inherently, the shale gas wells themselves decline.  Once the well declines, there is no obvious alternative use for part or all of the gathering pipeline.

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Kevin Kaiser is the Hedgeye analyst.  I disagree with his thesis that KMP is underspending on maintenance capex.

 

But distributable cash flow is a misleading way to look at E&P assets.  Each individual well produces less and less each yeah after enhanced oil recovery begins.  The distributable cash flow of each well will fall dramatically each year.  The right way to value E&P assets is to look at their net present value.

A saner way of valuing the E&P assets would be to break them out and to provide reserve data and NPVs at different discount rates.  For example, Berkshire Hathaway is in a number of different industries.  Buffett helps investors by breaking out the insurance companies, since they should NOT be valued based on P/E or distributable cash flow or free cash flow.

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Trap,

 

Did you look at the Jeffries note? SEP spends ~$18k per mile on maintenance and EPB spends $3. Do you not agree with how Jeffries looks at it?

 

I agree distributable cash flow can be misleading. I like the "fully loaded" method Jeffries employs, which gives KMI credit for ebitda based on its percentage ownership of the distributable cash flow, which takes into account the GP split.

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Here's the analyst day link with presentations.  I listened to some of it and read through the main presentation.  There is some discussion of the warrants versus stock repurchases near the end.  Also a nice chart setting forth their historic an projected costs of capital ROICs and ROE.

 

http://www.kindermorgan.com/investor/presentations/presentations.cfm

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Trap,

 

Did you look at the Jeffries note? SEP spends ~$18k per mile on maintenance and EPB spends $3. Do you not agree with how Jeffries looks at it?

 

I agree distributable cash flow can be misleading. I like the "fully loaded" method Jeffries employs, which gives KMI credit for ebitda based on its percentage ownership of the distributable cash flow, which takes into account the GP split.

 

They held a conference call addressing that.

http://seekingalpha.com/article/1704582-kinder-morgan-energy-partners-investors-webcast-transcript

 

Their track record in pipeline safety seems to be fine, though I could have done more work crunching PHMSA data.

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The 2010 10-K describes how KMP was able to increase its dividend and why the distributions of cash to KMI fell:

 

On May 28, 2010, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, referred to in this report as the FERC, approved a settlement agreement that our subsidiary SFPP, L.P. reached with 11 of 12 shippers regarding various rate challenges.  We refer to this settlement agreement as the Historical Cases Settlement, and it resolved a wide range of rate challenges dating back as early as 1992.  The Historical Cases Settlement resolved all but two of the cases outstanding between SFPP and the eleven shippers, and we do not expect any material adverse impacts on our business from the remaining two unsettled cases.  The twelfth shipper entered into a separate settlement agreement with SFPP, L.P. in February 2011.  The FERC has not yet acted on the second settlement.  In 2010, we recognized a $172.0 million expense due to adjustments of our liabilities related to both the Historical Cases Settlement and other matters related to SFPP and other rate litigation, and in June 2010, we made settlement payments to various shippers totaling $206.3 million.  Our cash distributions of $4.40 per unit to our limited partners for 2010 were not impacted by these rate case litigation settlement payments because, from a cash perspective, a portion of our partnership distributions for the second quarter of 2010 was a distribution of cash from interim capital transactions, rather than a distribution of cash from operations;

 

I made a mistake earlier.

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One of the slides in the analysts conference goes over growth targets.

http://www.kindermorgan.com/investor/presentations/2014_Analysts_Conf_01_Overview.pdf

 

Long-term Growth Targets

 

KMI – 3-year targeted dividend/share CAGR of about 8% (2013-2016)

 

KMP / KMR – 3-year targeted LP distribution/unit CAGR of about 5% (2013-2016)

 

EPB – LP distribution/unit growth expected to resume in 2017 with growth projects coming online beginning in 2016

 

Key Assumptions

 

2013 actual results as base year

 

Growth varies by year

 

No major acquisitions assumed

 

----

I'm guessing that management will overdeliver like it has in the past.  Any accretive acquisitions by KMP or EPB will grow KMI's fees from its IDRs.

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