SHLDQ - Sears Holdings Corp

[Mephistopheles]

Classic Jenga for sale on Amazon for $9.86. Free 2 day shipping with prime.

 

11.49 at Sears online. Or $15.49 earns 160 points for later purchases. 1000 points equals 1 dollar, so let's see, that's 16 cents? I guess you just have to think of them as points. And points are good!

 

I hate the whole member idea. Good game though, Jenga.

 

 

Got to love that he mentioned the game of Jenga.

 

I loved that reference... classic.

 

This doesn't really apply to Jenga, but some items are 'more likely to be returned' and therefore people would rather buy the item from the store (or an online retailer with brick & mortar locations) in case the items needs to be returned.  I've always hated mailing back items to Amazon.com or other online retailers .

 

Because of this I prefer to buy some things (even at a higher price) from online stores (target.com, sears.com, etc.) with a brick and mortar location.

 

True, but "more likely to be returned" doesn't help the retailer, just the customer. Using this same logic I can argue that Amazon has an advantage by NOT having brick and mortar stores, so that customers are less likely to return products. Perhaps that's why they are priced lower :P.

[ni-co]

The thing that makes SHLD such a tough investment is you have the opposite of what typically makes value investing work: time.  The more time that goes by, the worse the competitive position for SHLD.  This is not value investing.

 

I think this is the 64k question and part of the reason why this thread is hundreds of pages long. I agree that there are about half a dozen Buffett quotes out there to "prove" that SHLD is a bad investment – "time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre" comes to my mind. My opinion is that I don't know, yet.

[alertmeipp]

So why we still have physical bank branches.

 

Why The Bay is turning around and have u check Home depot.

 

Why Target spent billions trying to get to Canada.

 

There is no question that there is lots of value in all those locations. 

 

But is syw the right tool to unlock value?

 

I doubt it until i see the numbers.

 

Until then, this will pop 20 30 percent once in a while for no or good reason and i am betting we might get one soon

 

 

 

 

[alertmeipp]

Anyone out there that actually think SYW will ever produce good ROI?

 

They must put in hundreds of millions to build the system and billions to attract members?

[krazeenyc]

Anyone out there that actually think SYW will ever produce good ROI?

 

They must put in hundreds of millions to build the system and billions to attract members?

 

Barring something insane happening I don't expect Sears to grow gross retail sales from this point forward.  I think SYW is a defensive tactic meant to maintain a portion of their sales as they shrink their store network. They would like to preserve some of the economies of scale they have even as they shut down stores.

[BTShine]

Classic Jenga for sale on Amazon for $9.86. Free 2 day shipping with prime.

 

11.49 at Sears online. Or $15.49 earns 160 points for later purchases. 1000 points equals 1 dollar, so let's see, that's 16 cents? I guess you just have to think of them as points. And points are good!

 

I hate the whole member idea. Good game though, Jenga.

 

 

Got to love that he mentioned the game of Jenga.

 

I loved that reference... classic.

 

This doesn't really apply to Jenga, but some items are 'more likely to be returned' and therefore people would rather buy the item from the store (or an online retailer with brick & mortar locations) in case the items needs to be returned.  I've always hated mailing back items to Amazon.com or other online retailers .

 

Because of this I prefer to buy some things (even at a higher price) from online stores (target.com, sears.com, etc.) with a brick and mortar location.

 

True, but "more likely to be returned" doesn't help the retailer, just the customer. Using this same logic I can argue that Amazon has an advantage by NOT having brick and mortar stores, so that customers are less likely to return products. Perhaps that's why they are priced lower :P.

 

Absolutely true.  Fair point.  But Amazon is missing some sales because they aren't interested in forming brick and mortar locations for us to easily return items.

 

My point is that not all sales will go to Amazon unless they find a more convenient way to return items.

[ni-co]

Anyone out there that actually think SYW will ever produce good ROI?

 

They must put in hundreds of millions to build the system and billions to attract members?

 

Barring something insane happening I don't expect Sears to grow gross retail sales from this point forward.  I think SYW is a defensive tactic meant to maintain a portion of their sales as they shrink their store network. They would like to preserve some of the economies of scale they have even as they shut down stores.

 

I agree. That's a good way to look at it.

[Liberty]

My point is that not all sales will go to Amazon unless they find a more convenient way to return items.

 

Don't they have special amazon dropboxes/mailboxes in some locations? I can imagine those being used for returns.

 

ie.

 

You go to the site, say you want to return something. They give you a code and the address of a drop point. You go there, open locker B32 with the electronic keypad, put your item to return in and UPS comes pick it up later. Meanwhile, Amazon has already shipped you a replacement if you're a Prime member, and if not, you have to wait a few days for them to confirm that you did return the item.

[20ppy]

The thing that makes SHLD such a tough investment is you have the opposite of what typically makes value investing work: time.  The more time that goes by, the worse the competitive position for SHLD.  This is not value investing.

 

I think this is the 64k question and part of the reason why this thread is hundreds of pages long. I agree that there are about half a dozen Buffett quotes out there to "prove" that SHLD is a bad investment – "time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre" comes to my mind. My opinion is that I don't know, yet.

 

Is SHLD really losing money?

 

Assume the RE value is between $10billion and $50billion, reasonable? This has to be real.

And the cash burn is $1billion per year, there about,

And RE national average gains is 5%, we all know it has been greater than that

 

Here is the running balance:

 

Year                  RE % gains                    SHLD RE gains              cash loss

 

Year 2012          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2013          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2014          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2015          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2016

...

 

Is SHLD really losing money?

 

 

 

[Vish_ram]

The thing that makes SHLD such a tough investment is you have the opposite of what typically makes value investing work: time.  The more time that goes by, the worse the competitive position for SHLD.  This is not value investing.

 

I think this is the 64k question and part of the reason why this thread is hundreds of pages long. I agree that there are about half a dozen Buffett quotes out there to "prove" that SHLD is a bad investment – "time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre" comes to my mind. My opinion is that I don't know, yet.

 

Is SHLD really losing money?

 

Assume the RE value is between $10billion and $50billion, reasonable? This has to be real.

And the cash burn is $1billion per year, there about,

And RE national average gains is 5%, we all know it has been greater than that

 

Here is the running balance:

 

Year                  RE % gains                    SHLD RE gains              cash loss

 

Year 2012          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2013          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2014          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2015          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2016

...

 

Is SHLD really losing money?

 

 

Look at how small declines in revenues continually causes gross margin % & Op margin % to drop steadily. This in turn causes huge negative operating cash flow loss. This  op cash flow loss will accelerate as cost structure can't be aligned fast enough to compensate for revenue decline. A 28% decline in revenue was enough to send the Op cash flow from +1.5B to -1.1B.

 

Current scenario:

What can SHLD do?

http://online.wsj.com/articles/sears-holdings-posts-large-loss-1408617340?ru=yahoo?mod=yahoo_itp

 

They've to start borrowing against the RE. They've to start selling assets one by one. Closing stores causes more revenue decline and disastrous op cash flow scenarios. The real estate is not some big chunk of Gold in the vault that can be sold off at moments notice. The selling of chunks of real estate is a slow process. Yes they'll get good $ as they sell the chunks and these dollars will plug the hole created by ops. This is death by a thousand cuts.

 

There are only two ways shareholders would come out ahead

 

Scenario 1: SYW suddenly becomes profitable and revenue decline stops. 70% of sales is already due to SYW customers, and they still show huge losses. What would 100% of sales to SYW bring? probably more losses. There is just no indication of SYW being a profitable endeavor.

 

Scenario 2: SHLD closes all stores; sells all their brands. Lays off all workers. Sells every bit of RE. In such a massive fire sale, they've to give huge discounts as existing companies can't absorb such huge supply. This discount could be as high as 30%. Add another 10% to costs of layoffs, restructuring expenses. You take Bakers mid point $13 and apply 40% discount , you get 7.8B. You get $73. If the discount higher, the upside drops. This is the scenario that Berkowitz, Chou are betting on as Plan B. The outcome is still hugely uncertain.

 

Most likely scenario:

Lampert will start selling assets, real estate slowly. He'll borrow against RE and load up debt. By end of this decade, debtors will take possession of the firm as cash burn would have amounted to several B dollars. The stockholders will be lucky to get the current price in post-bankruptcy.

 

The situation reminds a lot of Compton petroleum. They had $1B in assets (traded at 1/10 of assets), produced little op cash flow, burnt $ year in and out to develop the assets. They were selling some assets here and there. In the end, they ended up selling the whole co for ~10MM to MFC industrial.

[Luke 532]

Added a little SHLD common stock Friday and this morning.

[davidoosnk]

The thing that makes SHLD such a tough investment is you have the opposite of what typically makes value investing work: time.  The more time that goes by, the worse the competitive position for SHLD.  This is not value investing.

 

I think this is the 64k question and part of the reason why this thread is hundreds of pages long. I agree that there are about half a dozen Buffett quotes out there to "prove" that SHLD is a bad investment – "time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre" comes to my mind. My opinion is that I don't know, yet.

 

Is SHLD really losing money?

 

Assume the RE value is between $10billion and $50billion, reasonable? This has to be real.

And the cash burn is $1billion per year, there about,

And RE national average gains is 5%, we all know it has been greater than that

 

Here is the running balance:

 

Year                  RE % gains                    SHLD RE gains              cash loss

 

Year 2012          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2013          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2014          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2015          5%                                0.5 -  2.5                          1

Year 2016

...

 

Is SHLD really losing money?

 

 

Look at how small declines in revenues continually causes gross margin % & Op margin % to drop steadily. This in turn causes huge negative operating cash flow loss. This  op cash flow loss will accelerate as cost structure can't be aligned fast enough to compensate for revenue decline. A 28% decline in revenue was enough to send the Op cash flow from +1.5B to -1.1B.

 

Current scenario:

What can SHLD do?

http://online.wsj.com/articles/sears-holdings-posts-large-loss-1408617340?ru=yahoo?mod=yahoo_itp

 

They've to start borrowing against the RE. They've to start selling assets one by one. Closing stores causes more revenue decline and disastrous op cash flow scenarios. The real estate is not some big chunk of Gold in the vault that can be sold off at moments notice. The selling of chunks of real estate is a slow process. Yes they'll get good $ as they sell the chunks and these dollars will plug the hole created by ops. This is death by a thousand cuts.

 

There are only two ways shareholders would come out ahead

 

Scenario 1: SYW suddenly becomes profitable and revenue decline stops. 70% of sales is already due to SYW customers, and they still show huge losses. What would 100% of sales to SYW bring? probably more losses. There is just no indication of SYW being a profitable endeavor.

 

Scenario 2: SHLD closes all stores; sells all their brands. Lays off all workers. Sells every bit of RE. In such a massive fire sale, they've to give huge discounts as existing companies can't absorb such huge supply. This discount could be as high as 30%. Add another 10% to costs of layoffs, restructuring expenses. You take Bakers mid point $13 and apply 40% discount , you get 7.8B. You get $73. If the discount higher, the upside drops. This is the scenario that Berkowitz, Chou are betting on as Plan B. The outcome is still hugely uncertain.

 

Most likely scenario:

Lampert will start selling assets, real estate slowly. He'll borrow against RE and load up debt. By end of this decade, debtors will take possession of the firm as cash burn would have amounted to several B dollars. The stockholders will be lucky to get the current price in post-bankruptcy.

 

The situation reminds a lot of Compton petroleum. They had $1B in assets (traded at 1/10 of assets), produced little op cash flow, burnt $ year in and out to develop the assets. They were selling some assets here and there. In the end, they ended up selling the whole co for ~10MM to MFC industrial.

 

How about this for scenario #3

 

Online and best real estate are spun off separately to existing shareholders within the next two years and do well, providing market beating returns for those who had the tenacity to hold on. Online maybe eventually sold to Amazon or Overstock or?

 

Store closures accelerate. Holding company dies a slow death but ultimately becomes a 10 billion a year revenue co. with positive cash-flow and manageable debt  and a stock price close to current market cap. Maybe eventually gets sold to Amazon or Walmart. Negative cash-flow is offset on balance sheet by continuing asset sales.

 

I think the wild cards right now are Sears Canada and the Auto Stores. If Lampert is successful generating cash from them by unloading them he will maybe have enough $$ to plug the holes from the cash burn for the next year or two and continue a slow orderly wind down.

 

 

 

 

 

[BTShine]

Lampert and Schriesheim say that they believe they have ample assets and funding to finance this transformation.  I don't see reason to believe they are telling a lie. 

[zarley]

Lampert and Schriesheim say that they believe they have ample assets and funding to finance this transformation.  I don't see reason to believe they are telling a lie.

 

Well, they could just be wrong, not lying.  Plus, they may have ample assets to pull off the transformation, but that doesn't mean the end result can/will compete and win against Amazon, Ebay, and WalMart.

[BTShine]

Lampert and Schriesheim say that they believe they have ample assets and funding to finance this transformation.  I don't see reason to believe they are telling a lie.

 

Well, they could just be wrong, not lying.  Plus, they may have ample assets to pull off the transformation, but that doesn't mean the end result can/will compete and win against Amazon, Ebay, and WalMart.

 

Agreed.

[ni-co]

There are only two ways shareholders would come out ahead

 

Scenario 1: SYW suddenly becomes profitable and revenue decline stops. 70% of sales is already due to SYW customers, and they still show huge losses. What would 100% of sales to SYW bring? probably more losses. There is just no indication of SYW being a profitable endeavor.

 

Scenario 2: SHLD closes all stores; sells all their brands. Lays off all workers. Sells every bit of RE. In such a massive fire sale, they've to give huge discounts as existing companies can't absorb such huge supply. This discount could be as high as 30%. Add another 10% to costs of layoffs, restructuring expenses. You take Bakers mid point $13 and apply 40% discount , you get 7.8B. You get $73. If the discount higher, the upside drops. This is the scenario that Berkowitz, Chou are betting on as Plan B. The outcome is still hugely uncertain.

 

Most likely scenario:

Lampert will start selling assets, real estate slowly. He'll borrow against RE and load up debt. By end of this decade, debtors will take possession of the firm as cash burn would have amounted to several B dollars. The stockholders will be lucky to get the current price in post-bankruptcy.

 

The situation reminds a lot of Compton petroleum. They had $1B in assets (traded at 1/10 of assets), produced little op cash flow, burnt $ year in and out to develop the assets. They were selling some assets here and there. In the end, they ended up selling the whole co for ~10MM to MFC industrial.

 

How about this for scenario #3

 

Online and best real estate are spun off separately to existing shareholders within the next two years and do well, providing market beating returns for those who had the tenacity to hold on. Online maybe eventually sold to Amazon or Overstock or?

 

Store closures accelerate. Holding company dies a slow death but ultimately becomes a 10 billion a year revenue co. with positive cash-flow and manageable debt  and a stock price close to current market cap. Maybe eventually gets sold to Amazon or Walmart. Negative cash-flow is offset on balance sheet by continuing asset sales.

 

I think the wild cards right now are Sears Canada and the Auto Stores. If Lampert is successful generating cash from them by unloading them he will maybe have enough $$ to plug the holes from the cash burn for the next year or two and continue a slow orderly wind down.

 

Another possible scenario: declining revenue and turning back to profitability by closing non-performing stores and scaling back traditional promotional programs. I'm curious why both of you didn't include this one, because it's most certainly the one scenario of which ESL thinks that it's going to play out. At least that's what he's telling investors who want to listen over and over again.

 

I'm pretty sure that ESL's plan is actually what he tells people it is. Unfortunately, I have not idea whether this will work out. Yet, I think you're going to waste your time waiting for any kind of financial engineering that would destroy his core retail strategy (though it goes without saying that he has one or several backup plans).

 

Just as an aside: It always amazes me that people point to declining revenues in absolute numbers. It surely makes for a nice headline to point to 30 quarters of declining sales. You can't conclude anything from that, though, when the stated strategy is closing down non-performing stores and spinning-off other more or less productive and revenue generating assets (like LE for example). Of course revenues will decline! SSS and online sales, if any, are the sales metrics to watch and follow.

[Vish_ram]

Regarding #3: this is similar to the financial firms reengineering where they created good co and bad co. They put all bad assets into bad co and have it in run off. The good co thrives.

 

Why didn't circuit city and numerous other retailers close down badly performing stores and keep profitable ones? I suspect if SHLD has few dozen stores that are responsible for all the losses, they would have done it already. The losses should have been pervasive. This is not the case where appliance unit is a loss leader and others are hugely profitable. SHLD can't say, I'm doing to shut down GA distribution center because of revenue decline. The decline is spread across the country. There are so much built-in costs that cannot be reduced lock step with decline in revenue. This is reflected in precipitous decline in Op margin.

 

Given hypothetical current state, you've say 100 loss making stores & 150 profitable ones, upon closing 100 loss making stores, you'll end up with 50 loss making and 100 profitable ones. The issue here is diseconomies of scale. When you face a death spiral, any shutdown of loss making units pushes the firm to further losses. The overheads continue to eat into capital.

 

Let's invert. what was the effect of all store closings in last few years? why haven't they improved margins? Either they didn't close enough stores or you are seeing death spiral hard at work.

 

Look at pg 12 of http://searsholdings.com/invest/docs/Q2_2014_EarningsDeck.pdf.

 

This is the kind of statements that Buffett frowned upon when his lieutenants sugar coated their companies performance. Lampert is doing the same (like except for this, we are profitable....). Now next Q, he'll say "except for Mattresses we were profitable..". where does it end?

 

Yes, Lampert can succeed. You cannot deny the odds of SHLD turning around. it is good for employees and shareholders. But never underestimate the incompetency of Lampert the retailer-in-chief. Lampert the passive retailer (AZO) and capital allocator may be a brilliant guy though.

 

[ni-co]

Regarding #3: this is similar to the financial firms reengineering where they created good co and bad co. They put all bad assets into bad co and have it in run off. The good co thrives.

 

Why didn't circuit city and numerous other retailers close down badly performing stores and keep profitable ones? I suspect if SHLD has few dozen stores that are responsible for all the losses, they would have done it already. The losses should have been pervasive. This is not the case where appliance unit is a loss leader and others are hugely profitable. SHLD can't say, I'm doing to shut down GA distribution center because of revenue decline. The decline is spread across the country. There are so much built-in costs that cannot be reduced lock step with decline in revenue. This is reflected in precipitous decline in Op margin.

 

Oh, there can be lots of reasons. I think management is essential. You really need a) a good capital allocator that b) doesn't get fired when he tries to shrink the company. I don't think those two conditions are often met simultaneously. Re. money-losing stores: ESL said that he waited too long to sell them after the financial crisis. I think we are observing closing stores down at this very moment. The key is that you don't need all those stores, but you may need half of it in the 21st century. So you might as well keep the better-performing ones. This is not about loss-leaders but about optimizing your footprint. As I said, I have no idea if it will work, but that's ESL's strategy. He's not stupid.

 

Given hypothetical current state, you've say 100 loss making stores & 150 profitable ones, upon closing 100 loss making stores, you'll end up with 50 loss making and 100 profitable ones. The issue here is diseconomies of scale. When you face a death spiral, any shutdown of loss making units pushes the firm to further losses. The overheads continue to eat into capital.

 

…unless SYW works out the way it's supposed to.

 

Let's invert. what was the effect of all store closings in last few years? why haven't they improved margins? Either they didn't close enough stores or you are seeing death spiral hard at work.

 

Look at pg 12 of http://searsholdings.com/invest/docs/Q2_2014_EarningsDeck.pdf.

 

Yes, either or. ESL for sure says that he didn't close stores fast enough.

 

This is the kind of statements that Buffett frowned upon when his lieutenants sugar coated their companies performance. Lampert is doing the same (like except for this, we are profitable....). Now next Q, he'll say "except for Mattresses we were profitable..". where does it end?

 

Agreed. This is bad communication. I hate that.

 

Yes, Lampert can succeed. You cannot deny the odds of SHLD turning around. it is good for employees and shareholders. But never underestimate the incompetency of Lampert the retailer-in-chief. Lampert the passive retailer (AZO) and capital allocator may be a brilliant guy though.

 

It's funny. I'd say the exact opposite: Don't underestimate a brilliant guy.

[Picasso]

 

It's funny. I'd say the exact opposite: Don't underestimate a brilliant guy.

 

I think he means don't overestimate someone who has no experience actually running a retail operation.  No doubt he has been brilliant in other aspects of his career.

[davidoosnk]

Regarding #3: this is similar to the financial firms reengineering where they created good co and bad co. They put all bad assets into bad co and have it in run off. The good co thrives.

 

Why didn't circuit city and numerous other retailers close down badly performing stores and keep profitable ones? I suspect if SHLD has few dozen stores that are responsible for all the losses, they would have done it already. The losses should have been pervasive. This is not the case where appliance unit is a loss leader and others are hugely profitable. SHLD can't say, I'm doing to shut down GA distribution center because of revenue decline. The decline is spread across the country. There are so much built-in costs that cannot be reduced lock step with decline in revenue. This is reflected in precipitous decline in Op margin.

 

Given hypothetical current state, you've say 100 loss making stores & 150 profitable ones, upon closing 100 loss making stores, you'll end up with 50 loss making and 100 profitable ones. The issue here is diseconomies of scale. When you face a death spiral, any shutdown of loss making units pushes the firm to further losses. The overheads continue to eat into capital.

 

Let's invert. what was the effect of all store closings in last few years? why haven't they improved margins? Either they didn't close enough stores or you are seeing death spiral hard at work.

 

Look at pg 12 of http://searsholdings.com/invest/docs/Q2_2014_EarningsDeck.pdf.

 

This is the kind of statements that Buffett frowned upon when his lieutenants sugar coated their companies performance. Lampert is doing the same (like except for this, we are profitable....). Now next Q, he'll say "except for Mattresses we were profitable..". where does it end?

 

Yes, Lampert can succeed. You cannot deny the odds of SHLD turning around. it is good for employees and shareholders. But never underestimate the incompetency of Lampert the retailer-in-chief. Lampert the passive retailer (AZO) and capital allocator may be a brilliant guy though.

 

Vishram, yes exactly re #3. Doesn't this somewhat mitigate the death spiral hypothesis? Especially given prior spinoffs like Land's End and Lampert's financial background? In the end shareholders get stock in better cos.

 

I suppose the key is in Lampert deciding to do this instead of burning assets to keep the whole beast of a holding co. afloat. My only difficulty with this spec investment is that people often don't behave rationally. Everything else seems to be mitigated by the R.E. assets and spinoff potential.

 

Another item to look at in the context of financial engineering is the small float. Makes it easier IMO, esp. if Berkowitz et al get a slice of the new unencumbered entities. If Lampert plays ball...

[Luke 532]

This is the kind of statements that Buffett frowned upon when his lieutenants sugar coated their companies performance. Lampert is doing the same (like except for this, we are profitable....). Now next Q, he'll say "except for Mattresses we were profitable..". where does it end?

Agreed. This is bad communication. I hate that.

 

The following might explain why Lampert keeps saying "excluding electronics..."

 

August 2013:

http://www.nugget.ca/2013/08/09/sears-unveils-fresh-look

"Gone from the department store are electronics and window coverings – which are still available in its catalogue and online – in favour of an expanded selection of other products including appliances and mattresses."

 

August 2013:

http://www.postcrescent.com/article/20130820/APC0301/308200292/The-Buzz-Sears-Outlet-open-shortly?nclick_check=1

"The store’s stock will change weekly, but focuses mostly on home appliances and apparel. It doesn’t have TVs or computers."

 

From SHOS report...

"The comparable store sales increase of 1.4% was comprised of a 0.4% decrease in Hometown and a 8.2% increase in Outlet. The 1.4% increase was primarily driven by increased sales in lawn and garden and home appliances partially offset by consumer-electronics comparable sales that were down over 50% (following a planned exit of the business in the majority of Hometown stores), and lower apparel sales in Outlet."

 

Lampert is probably looking to discontinue many electronics from SHLD and SHOS, which would validate his footnotes on the latest presentations about excluding electronics.  So it's not as if he is just randomly picking the worst thing and excluding it, it looks like he's actively moving away from those products and wants to give investors a glimpse of what comps would have looked like without those line of products.

[prevalou]

 

It's funny. I'd say the exact opposite: Don't underestimate a brilliant guy.

 

I think he means don't overestimate someone who has no experience actually running a retail operation.  No doubt he has been brilliant in other aspects of his career.

 

Bezos had no experience of retail before starting AMAZON

[Picasso]

 

It's funny. I'd say the exact opposite: Don't underestimate a brilliant guy.

 

I think he means don't overestimate someone who has no experience actually running a retail operation.  No doubt he has been brilliant in other aspects of his career.

 

Bezos had no experience of retail before starting AMAZON

 

Come on, we're not really going to compare Bezos to Lampert in terms of retail acumen? 

 

The more I see the way people tilt anything positive in SHLD, the more I want to short this sucker.  The high short interest seems to have it right this time. 

[adesigar]

 

It's funny. I'd say the exact opposite: Don't underestimate a brilliant guy.

 

I think he means don't overestimate someone who has no experience actually running a retail operation.  No doubt he has been brilliant in other aspects of his career.

 

Bezos had no experience of retail before starting AMAZON

 

Come on, we're not really going to compare Bezos to Lampert in terms of retail acumen? 

 

The more I see the way people tilt anything positive in SHLD, the more I want to short this sucker.  The high short interest seems to have it right this time.

 

Please do short it I want to buy at lower prices.

[Picasso]

 

It's funny. I'd say the exact opposite: Don't underestimate a brilliant guy.

 

I think he means don't overestimate someone who has no experience actually running a retail operation.  No doubt he has been brilliant in other aspects of his career.

 

Bezos had no experience of retail before starting AMAZON

 

Come on, we're not really going to compare Bezos to Lampert in terms of retail acumen? 

 

The more I see the way people tilt anything positive in SHLD, the more I want to short this sucker.  The high short interest seems to have it right this time.

 

Please do short it I want to buy at lower prices.

 

Upside on a SHLD short does not really interest me.  There are 625 pages of forum discussion on this stock and clearly the market price over that time frame is reflecting a continued weakness in the underlying business.  This falls into the "way too hard" bucket.  I just wish some longs would stop making this stock out to be some no brainer 10 bagger.