AMBC - Ambac Assurance Corp

[BargainValueHunter]

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-24/wisconsin-appeals-court-upholds-ambac-account-rehab-plan-1-.html?cmpid=yhoo

 

Under the plan approved by Johnston after a five-day evidentiary hearing in November 2010 and upheld today, holders of claims associated with that account will be paid 25 percent of those claims in cash and the remainder in surplus notes that mature in 2020.

 

“Some time before the maturity date, the commissioner will assess the need to modify that date to allow for the continuation or reissuance of surplus notes after 2020,” according to the appellate ruling. “It is projected that the surplus notes may not be paid until 2050, if not later.”

[yitech]

Ambac: Where a Smaller Portfolio Means a Bigger Stock Price

 

http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424053111904009804579248341848300868.html

 

"What's intriguing about this little-followed stock is that improving markets and Ambac's own initiatives give it a good shot at paying the insurance claims against it with much less than the $6.6 billion that it's set aside for that purpose. BTIG analyst Mark Palmer estimates that Ambac can settle the claims for about $5 billion. The remaining $1.6 billion would be a lot of found money for a firm with a market valuation of just $1.1 billion. The shares traded last week at $21, and the handful of analysts who cover the company believe they could be worth about 50% more within a year and substantially more in two or three years."

 

"Although the insurer won't detail its activities (it declined to speak with Barron's), it's said to have been savvy about buying Ambac-insured bonds in the open market at deep discounts, thereby removing potential insurance payouts and acquiring an asset that could appreciate. Last quarter, for instance, it purchased $360 million of mainly student-loan-related credits for $65 million. Ambac's overall $189 billion portfolio has dropped 41% from $319 billion at year-end 2010. We estimate that it will be reducing its portfolio at an annual rate of $45.2 billion by year-end 2013."

 

"Ambac has two big suits: one against JPMorgan Chase (JPM) for $1.1 billion in claims and another against Bank of America (BAC) for $1.2 billion. A 70% recovery would mean $1.6 billion for Ambac."

 

"Be warned: Ambac is a speculative play that will require time to play out. Recently, it was disclosed that it guarantees $2.5 billion worth of debt issues from Puerto Rico, where many credits are shaky. The news pushed the shares, now around $21, down to $16, before they recovered. But 90% of Ambac's Puerto Rico obligations are considered less risky than other securities from that U.S. commonwealth because they're backed by specific revenues from tolls, sales taxes, and levies on gas, rum, and hotel occupancy."

[BargainValueHunter]

http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/03/02/bank-of-america-returns-to-a-familiar-battlefield.aspx

 

The bank's recent 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, however, shows that the legal fracas over toxic mortgages pumped out by Countrywide in years past hasn't died down just yet. Ambac Financial (Nasdaq: AMBC), recently emerged from bankruptcy, is looking for more than $2.5 billion from B of A for damages related to junk loans underlying disintegrating mortgage bonds.

 

Ambac, which insured these mortgages, has been paying out on these loans – and it wants its money back, not only for what it has already forked over, but also for "future claims it has paid or claims it will be obligated to pay under the policies, increasing over time as it pays claims under relevant policies, plus unspecified punitive damages."

 

Echoes of MBIA

This situation stirs up memories of the infamous Bank of America-MBIA (NYSE: MBI) fight, which dragged on for years with the two engaging in a series of skirmishes that bordered on the bizarre. Finally, B of A and the struggling monoline insurer settled last May, for $1.7 billion – a welcome and much-needed infusion of cash for MBIA, which was tottering on the brink of extinction.

 

 

[yitech]

A very well-written thesis from an author on VIC: https://www.dropbox.com/s/mho58qsecajjf9f/AMBC_Long_Pitch_VIC.pdf

 

SYCRF and AMBC are now two of my largest positions. Now that PR and Detroit are settling down, bond insurers no longer trade as derivatives on PR and Detroit news events. There is still a lot of upside from here.

[constructive]

A very well-written thesis from an author on VIC: https://www.dropbox.com/s/mho58qsecajjf9f/AMBC_Long_Pitch_VIC.pdf

 

SYCRF and AMBC are now two of my largest positions. Now that PR and Detroit are settling down, bond insurers no longer trade as derivatives on PR and Detroit news events. There is still a lot of upside from here.

 

PR and Detroit have quieted down but are unresolved issues and will return.

 

So Syncora's current book value is $1035 net assets - $61 liabilities - $200 preferred - $584 surplus notes = $190M? The latest news certainly seems promising.

[yitech]

PR's issue won't return for 2 more years after they issue the $3.5B debt to calm the Muni market.

 

AMBC's exposure to Detroit GO is only $170-$190M and the exposure to PR is mainly COFINA bonds with senior claims on hotel and water revenues.

 

Syncora's adjusted book value (if you believe this metric) is $14 per share. Surplus + unearned revenues + contingency reserves + NPV(future installments) - Preferred claims - Surplus notes ~ $825M.

 

Of course adjusted book value most likely overstates the actual insurance business in a run-off mode, but given the stock is currently $2 or 1/7 of ABV, I see some margin of safety here.

[muscleman]

A very well-written thesis from an author on VIC: https://www.dropbox.com/s/mho58qsecajjf9f/AMBC_Long_Pitch_VIC.pdf

 

SYCRF and AMBC are now two of my largest positions. Now that PR and Detroit are settling down, bond insurers no longer trade as derivatives on PR and Detroit news events. There is still a lot of upside from here.

 

Hi Yitech,

    I can't find any info about SYCRF. Could you please tell me where you got the adjusted book value of $14? I hope I could dig into it and see if I can adjust it and get a more conservative number. In addition, could you please tell me your thoughts about investing in SYCRF and AMBC instead of MBI and AGO?

 

 

 

Thanks!

 

[yitech]

For Syncora and AMBC, check out Mark Tapley's blog: http://tapleysbluedragon.blogspot.com/

 

For Syncora, you need to dig into statutory statements since they do not release quarterly GAAP financials.

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=198015&p=irol-reportsOther

 

It just received $400M or $7/share from JPM as-of last Thursday or so.

 

Tapley did some very great work on Syncora's ABV.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AlFMaAd3v9o0dHhxN1BqSHdUQWZmdm85WXJPcWlPYkE&usp=drive_web

 

I find them having more upside potential than MBI or AGO. I was in MBI as some other board members did before the BofA settlement and sold after it gradually drifted down. I guess new business would be the next catalyst for it to approach ABV.

 

I would recommend you go through the thesis on VIC for AMBC and Tapley's analysis on SYCRF.

 

One more thing, both companies took full valuation allowance against their DTAs, so there is further optionality from NOL credits once they restart their businesses.

[Clestor]

In regards to Syncora, I would appreciate it if someone could explain the following from the Feb 24 press release . . .

 

" . . . beginning from 2017, the Company continues to face a potential "liquidity mismatch" between expected claim payments in the earlier years, followed in later years by recoveries of these claims payments."

 

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=198015&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1902986&highlight=

 

It sounds as if Syncora will begin making payments in 2017 with recoveries of those payments in later years.  If so, what arrangement created this situation?

 

Thanks,

[constructive]

In regards to Syncora, I would appreciate it if someone could explain the following from the Feb 24 press release . . .

 

" . . . beginning from 2017, the Company continues to face a potential "liquidity mismatch" between expected claim payments in the earlier years, followed in later years by recoveries of these claims payments."

 

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=198015&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1902986&highlight=

 

It sounds as if Syncora will begin making payments in 2017 with recoveries of those payments in later years.  If so, what arrangement created this situation?

 

Thanks,

 

Good question.

 

All bond insurers have grappled with liquidity mismatch in the past few years (it has driven some into bankruptcy). So to a certain extent this statement could refer to a general risk in their business model.

 

But they specifically refer to 2017. Maybe the need for that disclosure is based on the dollar amount of below investment grade bonds maturing in 2017, for example Puerto Rico.

 

I see a substantial amount of upside, but I don't have a good grasp of the downside risk from "more problem credits relative to capital" resulting in Syncora having a "higher risk of being 0 than say Ambac's risk of being worth less than 16.67" according to Tapley. As rapidly as they have improved their balance sheet, maybe he has not adjusted his perspective fast enough to their new situation.

 

I wish Syncora broke out more of the problem credits, that would help clear up the downside risk.

[yitech]

I see a substantial amount of upside, but I don't have a good grasp of the downside risk from "more problem credits relative to capital" resulting in Syncora having a "higher risk of being 0 than say Ambac's risk of being worth less than 16.67" according to Tapley. As rapidly as they have improved their balance sheet, maybe he has not adjusted his perspective fast enough to their new situation.

 

Tapley's average cost was around 20-ish c/share, so it made sense to him to take some profits off the table for the 10-bagger. As well the lack of liquidity that exacerbates price movements is quite annoying. The lack of transparency combined with the above made him think the AMBC warrant is a safer bet.

 

 

[constructive]

I see a substantial amount of upside, but I don't have a good grasp of the downside risk from "more problem credits relative to capital" resulting in Syncora having a "higher risk of being 0 than say Ambac's risk of being worth less than 16.67" according to Tapley. As rapidly as they have improved their balance sheet, maybe he has not adjusted his perspective fast enough to their new situation.

 

Tapley's average cost was around 20-ish c/share, so it made sense to him to take some profits off the table for the 10-bagger. As well the lack of liquidity that exacerbates price movements is quite annoying. The lack of transparency combined with the above made him think the AMBC warrant is a safer bet.

 

Sure, that makes sense.

 

But even assuming he is right that AMBC intrinsic value is much safer than SYCRF intrinsic value, I still think he is wrong that AMBCW price is safer than SYCRF price. SYCRF won't go to $0 unless it goes bankrupt, while AMBCW could go to $0, even if AMBC's intrinsic value is $30 or whatever. Bond insurance is risky enough without adding timing risk from warrants.

 

Personally I like Syncora since I believe they have less legal uncertainty than Ambac, now that JPM and Jefferson County are resolved. I have no edge in legal stuff.

 

What do you think about problem credits and potential claims in 2017 - 2019? Their disclosed credits just don't seem that bad. I could see taking say a $100M haircut in the next few years if their portfolio deteriorates, but don't see how equity could get wiped out.

[yitech]

But even assuming he is right that AMBC intrinsic value is much safer than SYCRF intrinsic value, I still think he is wrong that AMBCW price is safer than SYCRF price. SYCRF won't go to $0 unless it goes bankrupt, while AMBCW could go to $0, even if AMBC's intrinsic value is $30 or whatever. Bond insurance is risky enough without adding timing risk from warrants.

 

Personally I like Syncora since I believe they have less legal uncertainty than Ambac, now that JPM and Jefferson County are resolved. I have no edge in legal stuff.

 

What do you think about problem credits and potential claims in 2017 - 2019? Their disclosed credits just don't seem that bad. I could see taking say a $100M haircut in the next few years if their portfolio deteriorates, but don't see how equity could get wiped out.

 

I don't agree with him either and actually own more Syncora than Ambac after the recent run-up. Right now Syncora is pretty much being run by lawyers rather than the management. I also find it hard to see equity getting wiped out. A systematic risk that could happen is the potential bomb from PR, which is now being delayed by 2 more years when it showed the ability to tap the Muni market. Based on the numbers from the the supplementary statements, Syncora has been gradually commuting away exposures like other Muni insurers in the past few years.

 

There is a investor's hub forum for Syncora that goes all the way back to 2007 or 2008.

http://investorshub.advfn.com/Syncora-Holdings-Ltd-SYCRF-12091/

 

While pretty much none of the folks I know have 100% grasp on the credit side. There is more potential recovery (~$300M conservative estimate or $5/share) from the legal standpoint. I am pasting the analysis done by alzhus101 in the forum:

 

1. Greenpoint / Lehman lawsuit..

25% recovery on damages north of $527M or $125M-$250M estimate

 

2. Greenpoint/Capital One

$300M estimate.. 80% of that is $240M

 

Also there is the lawsuit for fraud against McQuire on Alinda's American Roads and some claim against BP for lack of toll bridge traffic around the Alabama area caused by oil spoil. The results from these two are more difficult to predict.

 

In addition, there is a potential optionality from the $3B NOL / release of the full VA against $1.2 B of DTA ($20/share) that may make it an attractive takeover candidate for firms like Assured Guaranty.

 

While I admit I could have missed some Black swan credit event in its portfolio and the global economy may take a turn for the worse taking every single credit down to the toilet in the next recession or so, I feel the current margin of safety including future claims and the attractive asymmetric risk-reward worth taking a decent position on it and am willing to wait for additional claims and hopefully eventual business writing.

[muscleman]

But even assuming he is right that AMBC intrinsic value is much safer than SYCRF intrinsic value, I still think he is wrong that AMBCW price is safer than SYCRF price. SYCRF won't go to $0 unless it goes bankrupt, while AMBCW could go to $0, even if AMBC's intrinsic value is $30 or whatever. Bond insurance is risky enough without adding timing risk from warrants.

 

Personally I like Syncora since I believe they have less legal uncertainty than Ambac, now that JPM and Jefferson County are resolved. I have no edge in legal stuff.

 

What do you think about problem credits and potential claims in 2017 - 2019? Their disclosed credits just don't seem that bad. I could see taking say a $100M haircut in the next few years if their portfolio deteriorates, but don't see how equity could get wiped out.

 

I don't agree with him either and actually own more Syncora than Ambac after the recent run-up. Right now Syncora is pretty much being run by lawyers rather than the management. I also find it hard to see equity getting wiped out. A systematic risk that could happen is the potential bomb from PR, which is now being delayed by 2 more years when it showed the ability to tap the Muni market. Based on the numbers from the the supplementary statements, Syncora has been gradually commuting away exposures like other Muni insurers in the past few years.

 

There is a investor's hub forum for Syncora that goes all the way back to 2007 or 2008.

http://investorshub.advfn.com/Syncora-Holdings-Ltd-SYCRF-12091/

 

While pretty much none of the folks I know have 100% grasp on the credit side. There is more potential recovery (~$300M conservative estimate or $5/share) from the legal standpoint. I am pasting the analysis done by alzhus101 in the forum:

 

1. Greenpoint / Lehman lawsuit..

25% recovery on damages north of $527M or $125M-$250M estimate

 

2. Greenpoint/Capital One

$300M estimate.. 80% of that is $240M

 

Also there is the lawsuit for fraud against McQuire on Alinda's American Roads and some claim against BP for lack of toll bridge traffic around the Alabama area caused by oil spoil. The results from these two are more difficult to predict.

 

In addition, there is a potential optionality from the $3B NOL / release of the full VA against $1.2 B of DTA ($20/share) that may make it an attractive takeover candidate for firms like Assured Guaranty.

 

While I admit I could have missed some Black swan credit event in its portfolio and the global economy may take a turn for the worse taking every single credit down to the toilet in the next recession or so, I feel the current margin of safety including future claims and the attractive asymmetric risk-reward worth taking a decent position on it and am willing to wait for additional claims and hopefully eventual business writing.

 

 

What is your entry point, mind disclosing?

 

I looked at their Q3 2013 supplements. Much lower leverage compared with AGO, but it also has a much higher BIG portfolio. Is there a way to find out if its loss reserve is sufficient?

[yitech]

What is your entry point, mind disclosing?

 

I looked at their Q3 2013 supplements. Much lower leverage compared with AGO, but it also has a much higher BIG portfolio. Is there a way to find out if its loss reserve is sufficient?

 

Slightly below $1.

 

That's the thing. Management is not exactly transparent.

[TheEnterprisingInvestor]

But even assuming he is right that AMBC intrinsic value is much safer than SYCRF intrinsic value, I still think he is wrong that AMBCW price is safer than SYCRF price. SYCRF won't go to $0 unless it goes bankrupt, while AMBCW could go to $0, even if AMBC's intrinsic value is $30 or whatever. Bond insurance is risky enough without adding timing risk from warrants.

 

Personally I like Syncora since I believe they have less legal uncertainty than Ambac, now that JPM and Jefferson County are resolved. I have no edge in legal stuff.

 

What do you think about problem credits and potential claims in 2017 - 2019? Their disclosed credits just don't seem that bad. I could see taking say a $100M haircut in the next few years if their portfolio deteriorates, but don't see how equity could get wiped out.

 

I don't agree with him either and actually own more Syncora than Ambac after the recent run-up. Right now Syncora is pretty much being run by lawyers rather than the management. I also find it hard to see equity getting wiped out. A systematic risk that could happen is the potential bomb from PR, which is now being delayed by 2 more years when it showed the ability to tap the Muni market. Based on the numbers from the the supplementary statements, Syncora has been gradually commuting away exposures like other Muni insurers in the past few years.

 

There is a investor's hub forum for Syncora that goes all the way back to 2007 or 2008.

http://investorshub.advfn.com/Syncora-Holdings-Ltd-SYCRF-12091/

 

While pretty much none of the folks I know have 100% grasp on the credit side. There is more potential recovery (~$300M conservative estimate or $5/share) from the legal standpoint. I am pasting the analysis done by alzhus101 in the forum:

 

1. Greenpoint / Lehman lawsuit..

25% recovery on damages north of $527M or $125M-$250M estimate

 

2. Greenpoint/Capital One

$300M estimate.. 80% of that is $240M

 

Also there is the lawsuit for fraud against McQuire on Alinda's American Roads and some claim against BP for lack of toll bridge traffic around the Alabama area caused by oil spoil. The results from these two are more difficult to predict.

 

In addition, there is a potential optionality from the $3B NOL / release of the full VA against $1.2 B of DTA ($20/share) that may make it an attractive takeover candidate for firms like Assured Guaranty.

 

While I admit I could have missed some Black swan credit event in its portfolio and the global economy may take a turn for the worse taking every single credit down to the toilet in the next recession or so, I feel the current margin of safety including future claims and the attractive asymmetric risk-reward worth taking a decent position on it and am willing to wait for additional claims and hopefully eventual business writing.

 

I don't think the NOL makes it a takeover candidate, a change in control usually wipes out NOLs.  It may be a takeout candidate for other reasons, the NOL probably isn't one.

[yitech]

I don't think the NOL makes it a takeover candidate, a change in control usually wipes out NOLs.  It may be a takeout candidate for other reasons, the NOL probably isn't one.

 

There are ways to get around loss of NOLs. I am sure Google used quite a bit of Motorola NOLs. (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/31/us-motorolamobility-google-tax-idUSTRE77U1QX20110831) Of course not all of them will be used, but the potential value is there to be unlocked. Takeover is just speculation. That's why I specifically said "optionality."

 

NOL is subject to section 382 limitations.

http://www.valuationresearch.com/knowledge-base/tax-insight/valuation-considerations-relating-section-382-limitations

 

SECTION 382 LIMITATION

After an ownership change, the new loss corporation may only deduct its pre-change losses against taxable income in an amount equal to the Sec. 382 limitation amount. There are two components to the Sec. 382 limitation: 1) base limitation, which is driven by the value of the stock, and 2) built-in gain/loss, which is driven by the value of the assets.

 

The Sec. 382 base limitation amount is approximated using the following equation:

 

  Fair Market Value of Old Loss Corporation Stock

x Federal Long-term Tax Exempt Rate

  Section 382 Base Limitation

 

The fair market value is subject to potential adjustments described in the regulations, and the federal long-term tax exempt rate is published monthly in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.

 

In order to utilize its NOLs, a company will strive to calculate the largest Sec. 382 limitation amount possible. As mentioned previously, the base limitation amount is driven by the value of the stock. Determining the value of the stock involves a consideration of the following:

 

• All classes of loss company stock, including the pure preferred stock immediately prior to the change. Preferred stock

  with similar terms, rights and preferences should be valued equally.

 

• For publicly traded companies the IRS has acknowledged that the stock value does not necessarily equal the trading

  value on an exchange, i.e. certain blocks of stock may have higher value due to control rights.

 

• For privately held companies, different classes of stock may have different rights and vary in value.

 

A full discussion of recognized and net unrealized built-in gains and losses is beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to note that if you have a built-in loss it is best to hold onto it for at least the five year recognition period. Otherwise, you will be increasing the NOLs subject to Sec. 382.

 

[BargainValueHunter]

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ambac-announces-proposed-amendments-to-the-plan-of-rehabilitation-of-the-segregated-account-2014-04-21

 

There would also be a proportionate redemption of surplus notes, excluding junior surplus notes. Using unpaid policy claim balances as of December 31, 2013, total catch-up payments of Deferred Amounts, together with accrued interest thereon, would be approximately $1.1 billion. Using balances as of December 31, 2013, total proportionate payments on the Surplus Notes (excluding Junior Surplus Notes) would be approximately $415 million.

[yitech]

From Q1, 2014 of the Arbitrage Credit Opportunities Fund on Ambac and Syncora's surplus notes

https://www.arbitragefunds.com/restricted/get/259/ACOF_2014_Q1_Commentary.pdf

 

During the first quarter a number of our refinancing and merger-related positions were tendered or redeemed. These include Accellent 8.375% and 10.0% Notes which were refinanced in conjunction with the company’s acquisition of Lake Region Medical, and Oneok 5.2% notes which were redeemed as part of the company’s plan to separate its natural gas distribution business from its natural gas gathering and processing business.

 

The largest performance drivers for the quarter were Syncora Surplus Notes and Ambac Surplus Notes which make up our “Mortgage Put-Back Litigation” bucket. GSAT 8% Convertible Notes were another top performer as the equity and convertibles continued to rise on building confidence of FCC approval to convert the company’s mobile satellite spectrum to terrestrial use.

 

Our weakest performers were each related to idiosyncratic events that impacted individual companies. These included Endeavour International 1st and 2nd Lien Bonds (a stuck valve in one of the company’s key North Sea production sites impacted results and liquidity); and Midwest Vanadium which experienced a fire at its Australian vanadium mine just as production was ramping. We have since exited the Midwest Vanadium position due to the increased length of recovery for the assets and significant doubts about the company’s prospects.

 

The Mortgage Put-Back Litigation mentioned above relates to our investment in the surplus notes of bond insurance companies Ambac Financial Group and Syncora Holdings. Prior to the financial crisis, bond insurance companies insured or “wrapped” pools of mortgages against the risk of default. As part of this securitization process, the mortgage originators provide guarantees, known as representations and warranties, that these mortgages meet an agreedupon level of underwriting due diligence and credit worthiness. As the financial crisis ensued and mortgage defaults skyrocketed, bond insurers came under serious financial stress; they were responsible for paying out claims to banks and investors for defaulted securities. However, the bond insurers claimed the originators failed to meet their representation and warranty obligations, and, as a result, the bond insurers had the right to “put back” impaired loans to the underwriting banks and mortgage originators.

 

We have closely followed monoline insurance company litigation against mortgage underwriters, and we believe precedent court rulings and legal settlements support the respective cases of Ambac and Syncora to receive close to 100% of damage claims against the banks in outstanding court cases.

 

Ambac currently has pending litigation against several parties, including Bank of America and JPMorgan, with damage claims that we estimate total $4.75 billion. Syncora recently entered into a settlement with JPMorgan whereby JPMorgan agreed to pay $400 million in return for a release of all claims; this settlement implied a recovery of close to 100% of estimated damage claims. We estimate Syncora also stands to recover damages close to $300 million as an indirect beneficiary of litigation against Greenpoint Mortgage Funding. A number of announcements led to the notes’ positive contribution to portfolio returns in Q1. These include the settlement between Syncora and JPMorgan, Bank of America’s disclosure in its 10-K filing of an additional $500 million of claims by Ambac, and Puerto Rico’s access to the bond market and the reduction of its overall default risk. These factors have increased our confidence in the ultimate recovery on the surplus notes. We estimate that, with proceeds from expected settlements with counterparties in the next two years, asset values at Ambac and Syncora cover the surplus notes by 3.9x and 1.5x, respectively. Purchasing these surplus notes at significant discounts to their accreted value could provide significant returns. As always, we have balanced this return opportunity with the potential downside risk, and sized our positions accordingly.

[BargainValueHunter]

http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/09/deal-in-detroit-bankruptcy-case/

 

Syncora to recover 26% in Detroit bankruptcy

 

According to Syncora spokesman Steven Schlein, the firm would recover around 26% of its claim with the negotiated settlement.

 

Details of the deal include Syncora Holdings Ltd. (OTCMKTS:SYCRF) receiving $23.5 million in cash for a $120 million bond.

 

The firm also receives a long-term lease to manage the parking structure under Grand Circus Park. Syncora is required to make $13 million in improvements to the facility, but is guaranteed $21.6 million in revenue from the parking garage. The city receives 25% of the revenue during the term of the lease.

 

Syncora also receives an extended lease from 2020 to 2040 as well as net revenue from the Detroit side of the Windsor (Ontario) tunnel. Analysts say this comes to around $4 to $5 million a year.

[muscleman]

Does anyone still own AMBC or Syncora?

It has been a difficult year for AMBC, Syncora and MBIA. AGO seems to have done ok.

http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/syncora-holdings-ltd-successfully-completes-mta-amendments-and-executes-intercompany-capital-support-agreement-300132257.html

 

The liquidity seems to have improved. I am still not sure if they are able to figure out the liquidity mismatch problem after 2017. Thoughts?

 

http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/syncora-holdings-ltd-announces-2014-gaap-financial-results-300074664.html

The GAAP result shows Adjusted book is $2 per share. Not that great. If no business is written then the $2 will be received after 20-30 years. Deducting management expenses during these years, I think there will be no money left for shareholders.

 

Can anyone please help me understand the bull thesis?

 

 

[yitech]

Syncora book value went up 6-fold YoY (from $1.02 to $5.96) with 56.3M shares outstanding.

 

[BargainValueHunter]

Syncora book value went up 6-fold YoY (from $1.02 to $5.96) with 56.3M shares outstanding.

 

 

Wow. Thanks for the head's up...will take a closer look at this one.

[misterkrusty]

Trial date set for February 22, 2021.  Anyone else getting excited?